chore(i18n): finish translating code comments and scripts to English

Completes the English-only standardization for code, comments, scripts
and CI templates (UI/CLI-facing strings stay bilingual pt-BR/en,
untouched). Covers the remaining crates/, apps/gui/ui/ and
apps/gui/src-tauri/ comments, .gitea/ workflow and template comments,
.githooks/ hooks, and the scripts/ source comments for the files
already renamed in a prior commit (check.sh, generate-logo.py,
install-hooks.sh).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VAyr8d7HuAdUGB6aA5xmDD

crates/sabia-core/tests/scan_e2e.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-//! Integração: beacon + probe + handshake completo passando pelo caminho
-//! público de agregação (`ScanTable`), verificando que AP, cliente e
-//! handshake são detectados de ponta a ponta.
+//! End-to-end integration test: ingests beacon, probe, and 4-way handshake
+//! frames into `ScanTable` and verifies AP, client, handshake, and live CCMP
+//! data frame decryption.
 
 mod common;
 
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use sabia_core::scan::ScanTable;
 fn detects_ap_client_and_handshake_end_to_end() {
     let mut table = ScanTable::new();
 
-    // RSN com AKM PSK (2) para que a rede apareça como WPA2-PSK.
+    // Include an RSN IE with PSK AKM (2) so the AP is classified as WPA2-PSK.
     let beacon = common::beacon_frame(common::ap(), "RedeTeste", 6, &[2]);
     table.ingest(&common::radiotap_wrap(&beacon, 2437, -35));
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ fn detects_ap_client_and_handshake_end_to_end() {
 fn hidden_ssid_beacon_is_marked_hidden() {
     let mut table = ScanTable::new();
 
-    // SSID vazio = rede oculta.
+    // Empty 0-length SSID IE = hidden network.
     let beacon = common::beacon_frame(common::ap(), "", 11, &[2]);
     table.ingest(&common::radiotap_wrap(&beacon, 2462, -60));
 
@@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ fn hidden_ssid_beacon_is_marked_hidden() {
     assert!(aps[0].hidden);
 }
 
-/// Depois que a senha de uma rede WPA2/CCMP é conhecida (quebrada), o
-/// tráfego de dados do cliente cujo handshake foi capturado passa a ser
-/// decifrado em tempo real pelo pipeline de ingestão — e a identidade
-/// (aqui, o IP de origem, que exercita o parser de IPv4 por trás do LLC)
-/// aparece mesmo com o bit "Protected" ligado.
+/// Once a WPA2/CCMP handshake has been cracked, subsequent protected QoS Data
+/// frames from that station are decrypted on the fly using its derived TK to
+/// populate client identity fields (such as its IPv4 address).
+///
+///
 #[test]
 fn decrypts_ccmp_traffic_once_password_is_known_and_fills_client_identity() {
     use sabia_core::crack::{compute_ptk, derive_pmk};
@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ fn decrypts_ccmp_traffic_once_password_is_known_and_fills_client_identity() {
     let station_str = sabia_core::dot11::mac_to_string(&common::sta());
     table.set_password(&bssid_str, &station_str, password);
 
-    // A TK derivada pelo pipeline tem que bater com a calculada à parte, com
-    // os mesmos nonces fixos (0xaa/0xbb) que handshake_radiotap_frames usa.
+    // The pipeline-derived TK must match the TK computed directly from the same nonces.
+    //
     let anonce = [0xaa; 32];
     let snonce = [0xbb; 32];
     let pmk = derive_pmk(password, ssid);
@@ -107,16 +107,16 @@ fn decrypts_ccmp_traffic_once_password_is_known_and_fills_client_identity() {
         "TK deveria ser derivada ao quebrar a senha"
     );
 
-    // Monta um quadro QoS Data, STA->AP, protegido, com CCMP header (PN=1,
-    // ExtIV ligado) e cifra um payload LLC/SNAP+IPv4 "na mão" — o CTR do
-    // CCMP é simétrico, então usar decrypt_data pra cifrar é válido aqui.
+    // Build a protected STA->AP QoS Data frame (CCMP PN=1, ExtIV=1) carrying an
+    // encrypted LLC/SNAP + IPv4 packet.
+    //
     let llc_ipv4 = {
         let mut v = vec![0xAA, 0xAA, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00];
         let mut ip = vec![
             0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 64, 17, 0x00, 0x00,
         ];
-        ip.extend_from_slice(&[192, 168, 1, 50]); // origem privada
-        ip.extend_from_slice(&[192, 168, 1, 1]); // destino
+        ip.extend_from_slice(&[192, 168, 1, 50]); // private source IPv4
+        ip.extend_from_slice(&[192, 168, 1, 1]); // destination IPv4
         v.extend_from_slice(&ip);
         v
     };
@@ -124,22 +124,22 @@ fn decrypts_ccmp_traffic_once_password_is_known_and_fills_client_identity() {
     let mut to_cipher = Vec::new();
     to_cipher.extend_from_slice(&ccmp_header);
     to_cipher.extend_from_slice(&llc_ipv4);
-    to_cipher.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]); // placeholder pro MIC, ignorado
+    to_cipher.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]); // 8-byte MIC placeholder
     let ciphertext = sabia_core::ccmp::decrypt_data(&expected_tk, &common::sta(), 0, &to_cipher)
         .expect("cifra via CTR simétrico");
 
     let mut body = Vec::new();
     body.extend_from_slice(&ccmp_header);
     body.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
-    body.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]); // MIC cifrado — não conferido na decriptação
+    body.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]); // trailing 8-byte MIC
 
     let mut frame = Vec::new();
     let fc: u16 = 0x0088 | 0x0100 | 0x4000; // QoS Data, to_ds, protected
     frame.extend_from_slice(&fc.to_le_bytes());
     frame.extend_from_slice(&0u16.to_le_bytes()); // duration
     frame.extend_from_slice(&common::ap()); // addr1 = BSSID
-    frame.extend_from_slice(&common::sta()); // addr2 = transmissor (estação)
-    frame.extend_from_slice(&common::ap()); // addr3 = destino (irrelevante aqui)
+    frame.extend_from_slice(&common::sta()); // addr2 = transmitter (station)
+    frame.extend_from_slice(&common::ap()); // addr3 = destination
     frame.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 2]); // sequence control
     frame.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 2]); // QoS control, TID 0
     frame.extend_from_slice(&body);
@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ fn decrypts_ccmp_traffic_once_password_is_known_and_fills_client_identity() {
 fn pmkid_only_handshake_is_detected_and_crackable() {
     let mut table = ScanTable::new();
 
-    // Beacon com SSID visível, para que o handshake herde o SSID via hint.
+    // Beacon with visible SSID so the PMKID handshake inherits the SSID hint.
     let beacon = common::beacon_frame(common::ap(), "RedePmkid", 11, &[2]);
     table.ingest_at(&common::radiotap_wrap(&beacon, 2462, -60), 1);
 
-    // Handshake via PMKID (só msg1, sem msg2/snonce).
+    // PMKID-only handshake (message 1 with PMKID KDE, no message 2).
     let (m1, _m2) = common::handshake_frames("RedePmkid", "outra-senha", 2, true);
     let f1 = common::frame_with_eapol(true, common::ap(), common::sta(), common::sta(), &m1);
     let ev = table.ingest_at(&common::radiotap_wrap(&f1, 2462, -55), 20);