Esqueleto inicial: sabia-core + sabia-cli + UI local, OpenWolf

- sabia-core: descoberta de interfaces, controle de modo monitor/canal
  via iw (ponte até ter nl80211 nativo), captura crua 802.11 via
  AF_PACKET (sem libpcap), parsing de radiotap e quadros de
  gerenciamento (beacon/probe/EAPOL), agregação em tabela de APs/
  clientes, escrita de .pcap, trilha de auditoria encadeada por hash,
  auto-atualização via GitHub releases (curl, sem dependências de
  rede extras)
- sabia-cli: `sabia iface`, `sabia scan`, `sabia update`,
  `sabia audit-verify`, `sabia ui` (servidor local + navegador,
  protegido por token, mesma filosofia do Guará)
- OpenWolf inicializado para memória de projeto entre agentes

.claude/commands/security-audit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+description: Layered security audit of the current project (dependencies → secrets → injection → authz → report)
+argument-hint: [path or scope, e.g. src/api — omit for whole project]
+---
+
+Perform a layered security audit of: $ARGUMENTS (if empty: the whole project).
+
+Use `.wolf/anatomy.md` to target files instead of scanning blindly, and check
+`.wolf/buglog.json` for previously found security issues before re-reporting them.
+
+Work through the layers in order. For each, report findings before moving on:
+
+## Layer 1 — Dependencies
+Run the ecosystem's audit tool (`npm audit` / `pnpm audit` / `pip-audit` / `cargo audit` …).
+Flag known-vulnerable versions and unmaintained packages that handle untrusted input.
+
+## Layer 2 — Secrets
+Search for hardcoded credentials: API keys, tokens, passwords, connection strings,
+private keys. Check committed env files, config files, and test fixtures. Verify
+`.gitignore` covers secret-bearing files (.env*, *.pem, *.key, credentials*).
+
+## Layer 3 — Injection surfaces
+Find every place external input reaches an interpreter: shell commands built by string
+interpolation (exec/execSync with template strings), SQL string concatenation, HTML
+injection/XSS sinks, path traversal (user input joined into fs paths), deserialization
+of untrusted data, SSRF (user-controlled URLs fetched server-side).
+
+## Layer 4 — AuthN / AuthZ
+Map endpoints and privileged operations. Check: missing auth middleware, IDOR (object
+IDs without ownership checks), privilege escalation paths, session handling, CORS and
+CSRF posture, servers bound to 0.0.0.0 without auth.
+
+## Layer 5 — Report
+Produce a severity-ranked table (Critical/High/Medium/Low): finding, file:line, attack
+scenario, concrete fix. Log confirmed vulnerabilities to `.wolf/buglog.json` with tag
+"security". Offer to fix Critical and High items immediately.
+
+Rules: verify each finding against the actual code before reporting (no
+pattern-match-only findings); prefer minimal, targeted fixes; never weaken existing
+security to silence a warning.