sabia/crates/sabia-core/tests/crack_roundtrip.rs

//! Integration test: synthetic handshake -> `CrackTarget` -> `verify()` and
//! dictionary cracking across both EAPOL 4-way and PMKID modes.
//!

mod common;

use sabia_core::crack::{compute_mic, compute_pmkid, compute_ptk, derive_pmk, CrackTarget};

const BSSID: &str = "00:11:22:33:44:55";
const STATION: &str = "66:77:88:99:aa:bb";

#[test]
fn eapol_4way_roundtrip_verifies_password() {
    let (m1, m2) = common::handshake_frames("MinhaRede", "senha-correta", 2, false);
    let hs = common::synthetic_handshake("MinhaRede", BSSID, STATION, &m1, &m2);

    let target = CrackTarget::from_handshake(&hs).expect("alvo EAPOL válido");
    assert_eq!(target.method(), "EAPOL/CCMP");
    assert!(target.verify("senha-correta"));
    assert!(!target.verify("senha-errada"));
}

#[test]
fn pmkid_roundtrip_verifies_password() {
    let (m1, _m2) = common::handshake_frames("MinhaRede", "senha-correta", 2, true);
    let hs = common::synthetic_handshake("MinhaRede", BSSID, STATION, &m1, &[]);

    let target = CrackTarget::from_handshake(&hs).expect("alvo PMKID válido");
    assert_eq!(target.method(), "PMKID");
    assert!(target.verify("senha-correta"));
    assert!(!target.verify("senha-errada"));
}

#[test]
fn tkip_keyversion_roundtrip_verifies_password() {
    let (m1, m2) = common::handshake_frames("RedeAntiga", "outra-senha", 1, false);
    let hs = common::synthetic_handshake("RedeAntiga", BSSID, STATION, &m1, &m2);

    let target = CrackTarget::from_handshake(&hs).expect("alvo EAPOL/TKIP válido");
    assert_eq!(target.method(), "EAPOL/TKIP");
    assert!(target.verify("outra-senha"));
    assert!(!target.verify("senha-errada"));
}

#[test]
fn incomplete_handshake_without_pmkid_or_msg2_has_no_target() {
    let (m1, _m2) = common::handshake_frames("MinhaRede", "senha-correta", 2, false);
    // Without message 2 or a PMKID, the handshake is not yet crackable.
    let hs = common::synthetic_handshake("MinhaRede", BSSID, STATION, &m1, &[]);
    assert!(CrackTarget::from_handshake(&hs).is_none());
}

#[test]
fn derive_pmk_compute_ptk_and_mic_are_consistent() {
    let ssid = "VetorDireto";
    let password = "senha-direta";
    let anonce = [0xaa; 32];
    let snonce = [0xbb; 32];

    let pmk = derive_pmk(password, ssid);
    let ptk = compute_ptk(&pmk, &common::ap(), &common::sta(), &anonce, &snonce);

    // Compute the MIC over a message 2 frame with its MIC field zeroed.
    let mut m2 = common::key_frame(2, 2, snonce, &[]);
    let mic = compute_mic(2, &ptk[..16], &m2, sabia_core::eapol::MIC_OFFSET).expect("mic");
    m2[sabia_core::eapol::MIC_OFFSET..sabia_core::eapol::MIC_OFFSET + 16].copy_from_slice(&mic);

    // Recomputing the MIC over the already-signed frame must yield the same digest
    // (`compute_mic` zeroes the MIC slice before hashing).
    let mic_again = compute_mic(2, &ptk[..16], &m2, sabia_core::eapol::MIC_OFFSET).expect("mic");
    assert_eq!(mic, mic_again);

    // Direct PMKID computation is deterministic and verifies via `CrackTarget::Pmkid`.
    let pmkid = compute_pmkid(&pmk, &common::ap(), &common::sta());
    assert_eq!(
        pmkid,
        compute_pmkid(&pmk, &common::ap(), &common::sta()),
        "PMKID deve ser determinístico"
    );
}