fix(auth): app passwords now sign in SMTP, IMAP and POP3

The webmail creates app passwords (shown once, stored hashed, with scopes) but
the protocol servers only compared a login against mailboxes.password_hash, so
an app password was always refused with 535 / authentication failed. They exist
because mail clients cannot do a second factor.

- port.MailboxAuth carries the mailbox's app passwords (newest 20) with their
  scopes; the Postgres repository loads them and stamps last_used_at on use
- verifyCredential accepts the mailbox password or an app password that holds
  the scope of the protocol; SMTP, IMAP and POP3 use it. ManageSieve keeps the
  mailbox password only, as no default scope covers it
- a malformed app password hash is skipped instead of failing the login; a
  malformed mailbox hash still surfaces as the server-side error it was

Tests: unit cases for scopes and malformed hashes, the three entry points,
repository tests against Postgres, and an end-to-end test on the real
submission server that fails with 535 without the fix and passes with it.
Full `go test ./...` with TEST_DATABASE_URL, go vet and lang-lint are clean.
This commit is contained in:
Lucas Rayan committed 2026-10-16 09:21:08 -03:00
1 parent 8e7c0abd0a
commit 110a240cd9
10 files changed
+599 -5

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@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
package usecase
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"github.com/alexedwards/argon2id"
"lambdamail/protocols/internal/application/port"
)
// Scopes an app password can be limited to. They match the values of
// app_passwords.scopes, whose default is {imap,pop3,smtp}.
const (
ScopeSMTP = "smtp"
ScopeIMAP = "imap"
ScopePOP3 = "pop3"
)
// verifyCredential reports whether password unlocks the mailbox for a client
// of the given protocol: either the mailbox's own password, or one of its app
// passwords that holds the scope.
//
// Before this, every protocol compared only against the mailbox password, so
// an app password - created in the webmail precisely because a mail client
// cannot answer a second factor - never worked anywhere.
//
// An error is returned only when the mailbox's own stored hash is unreadable
// (a server-side fault, reported as before) and no app password matched. A
// broken app password hash is skipped: it must not take the good ones, or a
// plain wrong-password answer, down with it.
func verifyCredential(ctx context.Context, repo port.AuthRepository, rec *port.MailboxAuth, password, scope string) (bool, error) {
match, mainErr := argon2id.ComparePasswordAndHash(password, rec.PasswordHash)
if mainErr == nil && match {
return true, nil
}
for _, app := range rec.AppPasswords {
if !hasScope(app.Scopes, scope) {
continue
}
ok, err := argon2id.ComparePasswordAndHash(password, app.Hash)
if err != nil || !ok {
continue
}
if recorder, can := repo.(port.AppPasswordUseRecorder); can {
// Best effort: a failed timestamp must not fail a login that succeeded
if err := recorder.RecordAppPasswordUse(ctx, app.ID); err != nil {
slog.Warn("record app password use", "error", err)
}
}
return true, nil
}
if mainErr != nil {
return false, mainErr
}
return false, nil
}
func hasScope(scopes []string, scope string) bool {
for _, s := range scopes {
if s == scope {
return true
}
}
return false
}
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
package usecase
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/alexedwards/argon2id"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"lambdamail/protocols/internal/application/port"
)
// Light parameters: the tests check logic, not the cost of a real hash.
var testArgon = &argon2id.Params{Memory: 8 * 1024, Iterations: 1, Parallelism: 1, SaltLength: 16, KeyLength: 32}
func mustHash(t *testing.T, password string) string {
t.Helper()
hash, err := argon2id.CreateHash(password, testArgon)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create hash: %v", err)
}
return hash
}
// recordingAuthRepo is an AuthRepository that also records which app password
// was used, like the Postgres one does.
type recordingAuthRepo struct {
used []uuid.UUID
}
func (r *recordingAuthRepo) FindByAddress(context.Context, string) (*port.MailboxAuth, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (r *recordingAuthRepo) RecordAppPasswordUse(_ context.Context, id uuid.UUID) error {
r.used = append(r.used, id)
return nil
}
func TestVerifyCredential(t *testing.T) {
appID := uuid.New()
rec := &port.MailboxAuth{
ID: uuid.New(),
PasswordHash: mustHash(t, "main-password-123"),
AppPasswords: []port.AppPasswordAuth{
{ID: appID, Hash: mustHash(t, "app-password-abc"), Scopes: []string{ScopeSMTP, ScopeIMAP}},
{ID: uuid.New(), Hash: mustHash(t, "imap-only-xyz"), Scopes: []string{ScopeIMAP}},
},
}
repo := &recordingAuthRepo{}
cases := []struct {
name string
password string
scope string
want bool
}{
{"main password works for smtp", "main-password-123", ScopeSMTP, true},
{"main password works for imap", "main-password-123", ScopeIMAP, true},
{"app password works in a scope it holds", "app-password-abc", ScopeSMTP, true},
{"app password works for imap too", "app-password-abc", ScopeIMAP, true},
{"app password is refused outside its scopes", "app-password-abc", ScopePOP3, false},
{"an imap-only app password cannot send", "imap-only-xyz", ScopeSMTP, false},
{"an imap-only app password can read", "imap-only-xyz", ScopeIMAP, true},
{"wrong password fails", "nope", ScopeSMTP, false},
{"empty password fails", "", ScopeSMTP, false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := verifyCredential(context.Background(), repo, rec, tc.password, tc.scope)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("verifyCredential = %v, want %v", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
// Only the successful app password logins were recorded, and only that one
for _, id := range repo.used {
if id == rec.ID {
t.Fatalf("recorded the mailbox id as an app password use")
}
}
if len(repo.used) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected app password use to be recorded")
}
}
func TestVerifyCredentialMainPasswordDoesNotRecordAppUse(t *testing.T) {
rec := &port.MailboxAuth{
ID: uuid.New(),
PasswordHash: mustHash(t, "main-password-123"),
AppPasswords: []port.AppPasswordAuth{{ID: uuid.New(), Hash: mustHash(t, "app-password-abc"), Scopes: []string{ScopeSMTP}}},
}
repo := &recordingAuthRepo{}
ok, err := verifyCredential(context.Background(), repo, rec, "main-password-123", ScopeSMTP)
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("main password: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
if len(repo.used) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a main password login must not touch app passwords, recorded %v", repo.used)
}
}
func TestVerifyCredentialMalformedAppHashIsSkipped(t *testing.T) {
rec := &port.MailboxAuth{
ID: uuid.New(),
PasswordHash: mustHash(t, "main-password-123"),
AppPasswords: []port.AppPasswordAuth{
{ID: uuid.New(), Hash: "not-a-phc-string", Scopes: []string{ScopeSMTP}},
{ID: uuid.New(), Hash: mustHash(t, "app-password-abc"), Scopes: []string{ScopeSMTP}},
},
}
ok, err := verifyCredential(context.Background(), &recordingAuthRepo{}, rec, "app-password-abc", ScopeSMTP)
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("a good app password must still work next to a broken one: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
ok, err = verifyCredential(context.Background(), &recordingAuthRepo{}, rec, "wrong", ScopeSMTP)
if err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a broken app hash must not turn a wrong password into an error: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
}
func TestVerifyCredentialMalformedMainHashKeepsReportingTheError(t *testing.T) {
rec := &port.MailboxAuth{ID: uuid.New(), PasswordHash: "garbage"}
ok, err := verifyCredential(context.Background(), &recordingAuthRepo{}, rec, "anything", ScopeSMTP)
if ok {
t.Fatalf("must not authenticate against a malformed hash")
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("a malformed main hash is a server-side fault and must surface as an error, as before")
}
}
func TestVerifyCredentialMalformedMainHashStillAllowsAnAppPassword(t *testing.T) {
rec := &port.MailboxAuth{
ID: uuid.New(),
PasswordHash: "garbage",
AppPasswords: []port.AppPasswordAuth{{ID: uuid.New(), Hash: mustHash(t, "app-password-abc"), Scopes: []string{ScopeSMTP}}},
}
ok, err := verifyCredential(context.Background(), &recordingAuthRepo{}, rec, "app-password-abc", ScopeSMTP)
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
}
// The three protocol entry points, wired the way the servers wire them: an app
// password signs in where its scopes allow, and only there.
func appPasswordMailbox(t *testing.T, scopes ...string) (port.MailboxAuth, string) {
t.Helper()
const secret = "app-password-from-the-webmail"
return port.MailboxAuth{
ID: uuid.New(),
PasswordHash: mustHash(t, "the-real-mailbox-password"),
AppPasswords: []port.AppPasswordAuth{{ID: uuid.New(), Hash: mustHash(t, secret), Scopes: scopes}},
}, secret
}
func TestSubmissionAuthenticate_AcceptsAnAppPasswordWithTheSmtpScope(t *testing.T) {
rec, secret := appPasswordMailbox(t, ScopeSMTP)
uc := NewProcessOutboundEmailUseCase(&fakeAuthRepo{record: &rec}, nil, nil, nil)
got, err := uc.Authenticate(context.Background(), "user@example.test", secret)
if err != nil || got == nil || got.ID != rec.ID {
t.Fatalf("Authenticate = %+v, %v; want the mailbox", got, err)
}
}
func TestSubmissionAuthenticate_RefusesAnAppPasswordWithoutTheSmtpScope(t *testing.T) {
rec, secret := appPasswordMailbox(t, ScopeIMAP)
uc := NewProcessOutboundEmailUseCase(&fakeAuthRepo{record: &rec}, nil, nil, nil)
if _, err := uc.Authenticate(context.Background(), "user@example.test", secret); !errors.Is(err, ErrSubmissionAuthFailed) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want ErrSubmissionAuthFailed", err)
}
}
func TestImapLogin_AcceptsAnAppPasswordWithTheImapScope(t *testing.T) {
rec, secret := appPasswordMailbox(t, ScopeIMAP)
auth := &fakeAuthRepository{byAddress: map[string]port.MailboxAuth{"user@example.test": rec}}
uc := NewImapSessionUseCase(auth, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil)
id, err := uc.Login(context.Background(), "user@example.test", secret)
if err != nil || id != rec.ID.String() {
t.Fatalf("Login = %q, %v; want %q", id, err, rec.ID)
}
}
func TestImapLogin_RefusesAnAppPasswordWithoutTheImapScope(t *testing.T) {
rec, secret := appPasswordMailbox(t, ScopeSMTP)
auth := &fakeAuthRepository{byAddress: map[string]port.MailboxAuth{"user@example.test": rec}}
uc := NewImapSessionUseCase(auth, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil)
if _, err := uc.Login(context.Background(), "user@example.test", secret); !errors.Is(err, ErrAuthFailed) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want ErrAuthFailed", err)
}
}
func TestPop3Login_AcceptsAnAppPasswordWithThePop3Scope(t *testing.T) {
rec, secret := appPasswordMailbox(t, ScopePOP3)
auth := &fakeAuthRepository{byAddress: map[string]port.MailboxAuth{"user@example.test": rec}}
uc := NewPop3SessionUseCase(auth, nil, nil, nil, nil)
id, err := uc.Login(context.Background(), "user@example.test", secret)
if err != nil || id != rec.ID.String() {
t.Fatalf("Login = %q, %v; want %q", id, err, rec.ID)
}
}
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"github.com/alexedwards/argon2id"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"lambdamail/protocols/internal/application/port"
@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ func (uc *ImapSessionUseCase) Login(ctx context.Context, address, password strin
if rec == nil {
return "", ErrAuthFailed
}
match, err := argon2id.ComparePasswordAndHash(password, rec.PasswordHash)
match, err := verifyCredential(ctx, uc.auth, rec, password, ScopeIMAP)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/alexedwards/argon2id"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"lambdamail/protocols/internal/application/port"
@@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ func (uc *Pop3SessionUseCase) Login(ctx context.Context, username, password stri
if rec == nil {
return "", ErrAuthFailed
}
match, err := argon2id.ComparePasswordAndHash(password, rec.PasswordHash)
match, err := verifyCredential(ctx, uc.authRepo, rec, password, ScopePOP3)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("verify password hash: %w", err)
}
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func (uc *ProcessOutboundEmailUseCase) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, address
return nil, ErrSubmissionAuthFailed
}
match, err := argon2id.ComparePasswordAndHash(password, rec.PasswordHash)
match, err := verifyCredential(ctx, uc.auth, rec, password, ScopeSMTP)
if err != nil || !match {
return nil, ErrSubmissionAuthFailed
}