fix(tls): sem watcher nao ha veredito, e o README passa a explicar os modos

Com TLS_MODE=acme o certificado e emitido por este servico, nao vigiado em
disco, portanto nao ha watcher para estar saudavel. O painel reportava false e
mostrava "indisponivel" em permanencia, ao lado de um certificado perfeitamente
valido. Passa a ser null, e a pagina nao mostra veredito nenhum.

O README ganha uma seccao sobre os dois modos de certificado. O modo traefik
falha de duas maneiras silenciosas -- sem router para o PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST o
nome nunca chega ao acme.json, e o acme.json fica em 600 do root, ilegivel para
o utilizador nao-root do contentor. Nos dois casos o HTTPS continua a funcionar
porque quem o serve e o proxy, enquanto as portas de correio caem no
autoassinado e sao recusadas por qualquer cliente que verifique. Foi
exactamente o que aconteceu nesta instalacao.

Actualizado tambem o que ja nao esta por acabar: a resposta de ausencia, a
assinatura e as regras Sieve sao consumidas, e a reconciliacao de DNS conduz o
estado em vez de o relatar.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -9,9 +9,8 @@ paid tiers and no artificial limits on domains or mailboxes.
 
 > **Status: pre-release.** The mail path, the security posture and the web
 > interfaces work end to end, and there is an automated test suite behind them.
-> Several console panels are still read-only, and some features are recorded but
+> See [What is not finished](#what-is-not-finished) before putting real mail
-> not yet acted on — see [What is not finished](#what-is-not-finished) before
+> through it.
-> putting real mail through it.
 
 ---
 
@@ -23,8 +22,10 @@ paid tiers and no artificial limits on domains or mailboxes.
 | **Authentication** | SPF, DKIM (Ed25519 + RSA dual signature), DMARC, ARC sealing, DANE/TLSA and MTA-STS on delivery, TLS-RPT ingestion |
 | **Filtering** | Rspamd scoring with greylisting, RBLs and rate limiting; ClamAV; Sieve |
 | **Delivery** | Durable outbound queue in Postgres with the retry ladder and RFC 3464 bounces; smarthost fallback for hosts with port 25 blocked |
-| **DNS** | Cloudflare reconciliation of the 13 records, idempotent, with drift detection |
+| **DNS** | Cloudflare reconciliation of the expected records for every active domain, idempotent, with per-record verification against public resolvers |
+| **Filing** | Sieve rules built in the UI, custom folders, and an RFC 5230 vacation responder that replies in thread and once per sender per week |
 | **Web** | Webmail at `/user/*` and an admin console at `/admin/*`, isolated by session audience, with TOTP two-factor, recovery codes, app passwords, and English, Portuguese and Spanish |
+| **Console** | Server-side paging and filtering, user editing (role, quota, language, password, second factor), per-user aliases, and a diagnostics page at `/admin/tests` |
 
 ## Architecture
 
@@ -109,13 +110,8 @@ more thing to keep patched.
 - **Ports below 1024** are bound by Docker's proxy on the host, so the daemon
   needs the privilege — the default on a normal install. The containers
   themselves run unprivileged.
-- **The proxy's certificate directory** must be readable by the `protocols`
+- **The proxy's certificate directory**, under `TLS_MODE=traefik` only — see
-  container. Under `TLS_MODE=traefik` it reads the certificate the proxy
+  [Certificates](#certificates) below, and prefer `TLS_MODE=acme` if you can.
-  obtained, from the directory given by `COOLIFY_PROXY_DIR`, mounted read-only.
-  The images run as a non-root user, so an `acme.json` left at mode `600` and
-  owned by root cannot be read, and the mail listeners fall back to a
-  self-signed certificate while HTTPS keeps working — a confusing failure that
-  looks like a certificate problem and is a permissions problem.
 - **Disk** for the mail spool (`protocols_spool`) and Postgres. Mail is stored
   once and reference-counted, but plan for growth.
 - **A firewall that does not rate-limit port 25 into uselessness.** Some
@@ -159,6 +155,34 @@ default:
 | `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `REDIS_PASSWORD` | No defaults; compose fails without them. |
 | `MAIL_DOMAIN`, `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST`, `PUBLIC_IPV4` | Identity. `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST` must match the PTR of `PUBLIC_IPV4`. |
 
+### Certificates
+
+Two modes, and the choice matters more than it looks.
+
+**`TLS_MODE=acme` (recommended).** LambdaMail obtains its own certificate for
+`PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST`, `mta-sts.<domain>` and `autoconfig.<domain>` over DNS-01,
+using the Cloudflare token already configured for DNS. It needs
+`LAMBDAMAIL_MASTER_KEY` to seal the account and certificate keys, and
+`ACME_EMAIL`. It is the only mode DANE can run in, because it is the only one
+where the key for the next certificate exists before that certificate does.
+
+**`TLS_MODE=traefik`.** The mail listeners read the certificate the reverse
+proxy already obtained, from `COOLIFY_PROXY_DIR`, mounted read-only. Two things
+have to be true, and neither is obvious when they are not:
+
+- the proxy must have a router for `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST`, or that name never
+  appears in `acme.json` and no certificate exists to read;
+- `acme.json` must be readable by the container's non-root user. Left at mode
+  `600` owned by root — which is how the proxy writes it — it cannot be.
+
+Either failure is silent in the same way: HTTPS keeps working, because the
+proxy is serving it, while the mail listeners fall back to a **self-signed
+certificate** and every client that verifies refuses SMTP, IMAP and POP3. It
+reads as a certificate problem and is usually a permissions problem.
+
+`/admin/security` names the issuer and says outright when the certificate is
+self-signed, which is the fastest way to tell the two apart.
+
 ## Operating
 
 | | |
@@ -176,12 +200,8 @@ what the alerts mean and how to read a delivery failure.
 
 Stated plainly, because a mail server that half works loses mail:
 
-- **Recorded but not acted on.** Vacation responder, signature and the Sieve
+- **Read-only console panels.** The guided domain onboarding checklist reports
-  rules built in the UI are stored, but nothing consumes them yet — enabling a
+  on state rather than driving it.
-  vacation reply does not send one.
-- **Read-only console panels.** The guided domain onboarding checklist, the DNS
-  desired-vs-actual diff and the CSV import report on state rather than driving
-  it.
 - **Not implemented.** JMAP, BIMI, CalDAV/CardDAV, multi-node. Backups are
   documented but not automated.
 - **DANE** is off unless `TLS_MODE=acme`, and deliberately so: under a

services/protocols/internal/presentation/http/admin_tls_api.go

@@ -43,13 +43,16 @@ func (a *adminTlsAPI) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	status := map[string]any{
-		"tls_mode":            a.tlsMode,
+		"tls_mode":          a.tlsMode,
-		"mail_host":           a.mailHost,
+		"mail_host":         a.mailHost,
-		"has_certificate":     a.source.HasCertificateFor(a.mailHost),
+		"has_certificate":   a.source.HasCertificateFor(a.mailHost),
-		"unknown_sni_total":   a.source.UnknownSNICount(),
+		"unknown_sni_total": a.source.UnknownSNICount(),
-		"last_reload":         nil,
+		"last_reload":       nil,
-		"last_change":         nil,
+		"last_change":       nil,
-		"watcher_healthy":     false,
+		// Null, not false. A source that reloads from disk reports a time and
+		// gets a verdict; one that issues its own certificate has no watcher to
+		// be unhealthy, and saying "unavailable" there is a false alarm.
+		"watcher_healthy":     nil,
 		"certificate_expires": nil,
 		"expires_in_days":     nil,
 		"state":               "UNKNOWN",

services/protocols/internal/presentation/http/admin_tls_status_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+package httppresentation
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Under TLS_MODE=acme the certificate is issued by this service, not watched
+// on disk, so there is no watcher to be healthy or unhealthy. Reporting false
+// there put a standing "unavailable" warning on a panel whose certificate was
+// perfectly fine.
+func TestTlsStatus_NoWatcherVerdictWithoutAReloadTime(t *testing.T) {
+	api := &adminTlsAPI{
+		source:     stillSource{},
+		mailHost:   "mail.example.test",
+		tlsMode:    "acme",
+		sessions:   testVerifier(interopSecret),
+		pollPeriod: time.Minute,
+	}
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/tls", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+adminSurfaceToken2())
+	api.sessions.now = func() time.Time { return time.Unix(interopIssuedAt+60, 0) }
+	api.handleStatus(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("answered %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body)
+	}
+
+	var body map[string]any
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
+	}
+	if v, present := body["watcher_healthy"]; !present || v != nil {
+		t.Errorf("watcher_healthy = %v, want null: there is no watcher to judge", v)
+	}
+}
+
+// stillSource holds a certificate but never reloads: exactly what a
+// self-issuing provider looks like.
+type stillSource struct{}
+
+func (stillSource) EarliestExpiry() (string, time.Time, bool) {
+	return "mail.example.test", time.Now().Add(60 * 24 * time.Hour), true
+}
+func (stillSource) LastReload() time.Time         { return time.Time{} }
+func (stillSource) LastChange() time.Time         { return time.Time{} }
+func (stillSource) UnknownSNICount() int64        { return 0 }
+func (stillSource) HasCertificateFor(string) bool { return true }

services/webmail/messages/en.json

@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@
     "search": "Search",
     "status": "Status",
     "unavailable": "Unavailable",
-    "userPortal": "Webmail"
+    "userPortal": "Webmail",
+    "notApplicable": "Not applicable"
   },
   "errors": {
     "forbidden": "You do not have access to this",

services/webmail/messages/es.json

@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@
     "search": "Buscar",
     "status": "Estado",
     "unavailable": "No disponible",
-    "userPortal": "Webmail"
+    "userPortal": "Webmail",
+    "notApplicable": "No aplicable"
   },
   "errors": {
     "forbidden": "No tiene acceso a esto",

services/webmail/messages/pt-BR.json

@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@
     "search": "Buscar",
     "status": "Status",
     "unavailable": "Indisponível",
-    "userPortal": "Webmail"
+    "userPortal": "Webmail",
+    "notApplicable": "Nao aplicavel"
   },
   "errors": {
     "forbidden": "Você não tem acesso a isto",

services/webmail/src/app/(admin)/admin/security/page.tsx

@@ -318,12 +318,23 @@ export default function AdminSecurityPage() {
 
               <div className="flex flex-col gap-1 rounded-xl bg-dark-card p-3.5 shadow-edge">
                 <div className="text-xs text-slate-400">{t("admin.watcherHealthy")}</div>
+                {/* Null means there is no watcher to judge - the certificate
+                    is issued by this server rather than read from disk - so no
+                    verdict is shown instead of a standing false alarm. */}
                 <div
                   className={`text-[15px] font-medium ${
-                    tlsStatus.watcher_healthy ? "text-indigo-400" : "text-amber-400"
+                    tlsStatus.watcher_healthy === null || tlsStatus.watcher_healthy === undefined
+                      ? "text-slate-400"
+                      : tlsStatus.watcher_healthy
+                        ? "text-indigo-400"
+                        : "text-amber-400"
                   }`}
                 >
-                  {tlsStatus.watcher_healthy ? t("ui.healthy") : t("common.unavailable")}
+                  {tlsStatus.watcher_healthy === null || tlsStatus.watcher_healthy === undefined
+                    ? t("common.notApplicable")
+                    : tlsStatus.watcher_healthy
+                      ? t("ui.healthy")
+                      : t("common.unavailable")}
                 </div>
                 <div className="text-[11.5px] text-slate-500">
                   {t("admin.lastReload")}:{" "}