From 8b69521c76722baed1a2ee90522f00a90f8473e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lucas Rayan Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 14:51:56 -0300 Subject: [PATCH] #34: fix the mail counters, the reader pane, and the state between surfaces The counts were computed inline in JSX where nothing could test them. The sidebar matched a folder by a special-use role folders do not always carry, its badges were fetched once and then froze - new mail did not raise them and reading a message did not lower it - and the list header printed the size of the loaded page, capped at 50, as the size of the folder. The rules now live in mailCounts.ts behind tests, useFolders keeps them current from the server's push and from this tab's own changes, and each filter chip carries its number. Inline images never left the server: RenderMessage dropped every part a body references as cid:, so mail written by any normal client rendered with broken icons. They now come back as bounded data URIs, refusing image/svg+xml, and the reader resolves them, sizes its frame from the message instead of a fixed 500px, and renders on the light surface mail assumes. Reading mail no longer asks for a second factor - the mailbox is behind the account's own password - while the console still requires one unconditionally, now collected by a step-up that does not ask again for the password the session in hand just proved. An admin sign-in issues the webmail session too, so leaving the console is a link rather than another login. Two defects found while testing the above: - The admin sign-in checked the password and the second factor and never the role, so any account that had enrolled a factor from its own settings could obtain an admin-audience session. - Session tokens carried nothing that varied below one second, so signing in twice within the same second minted the identical token and collided with the unique index on web_sessions.refresh_token_hash. A correct password answered 500, and a double-clicked sign-in was enough to do it. Tokens now carry a jti. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 --- services/auth/src/router.test.ts | 213 ++++++- services/auth/src/router.ts | 208 +++++-- services/auth/src/session.ts | 16 +- services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.test.ts | 139 +++++ services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.ts | 61 ++ .../application/usecase/message_render.go | 78 ++- .../usecase/message_render_test.go | 114 +++- services/webmail/messages/en.json | 16 + services/webmail/messages/es.json | 16 + services/webmail/messages/pt-BR.json | 16 + .../src/app/(auth)/admin/step-up/page.tsx | 180 ++++++ .../src/app/(auth)/user/login/page.tsx | 147 ++--- .../webmail/src/app/(user)/user/layout.tsx | 72 +-- .../app/(user)/user/mail/[folder]/page.tsx | 550 ++++++++++++------ services/webmail/src/emailBody.test.ts | 101 ++++ .../webmail/src/interface-integrity.test.ts | 5 +- services/webmail/src/lib/emailBody.ts | 97 +++ services/webmail/src/lib/mailCounts.ts | 122 ++++ services/webmail/src/lib/sanitizer.ts | 33 +- services/webmail/src/lib/surfaceGate.ts | 40 ++ services/webmail/src/lib/useFolders.ts | 58 ++ .../webmail/src/mail-state-integrity.test.ts | 150 +++++ services/webmail/src/mailCounts.test.ts | 158 +++++ services/webmail/src/middleware.ts | 13 +- services/webmail/src/surfaceGate.test.ts | 53 ++ 25 files changed, 2276 insertions(+), 380 deletions(-) create mode 100644 services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.test.ts create mode 100644 services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/admin/step-up/page.tsx create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/emailBody.test.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/lib/emailBody.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/lib/mailCounts.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/lib/surfaceGate.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/lib/useFolders.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/mail-state-integrity.test.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/mailCounts.test.ts create mode 100644 services/webmail/src/surfaceGate.test.ts diff --git a/services/auth/src/router.test.ts b/services/auth/src/router.test.ts index 4008b83..a6c3d40 100644 --- a/services/auth/src/router.test.ts +++ b/services/auth/src/router.test.ts @@ -168,12 +168,16 @@ describeDb("auth API against a real database", () => { }); // The second headline regression: any non-empty MFA code used to work. + // The challenge comes from the admin sign-in, which is the surface that + // collects a second factor. The webmail no longer does - reading your own + // mail is behind your own password - so this used to obtain its challenge + // from a path that has none. it("rejects a wrong TOTP code and accepts only the real one", { timeout: 60000 }, async () => { - const login = await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email: userEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); - const secret = await enrollTotp(USER_ID, login.body.token as unknown as string); + const login = await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email: adminEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); + await query(`DELETE FROM mfa_totp WHERE mailbox_id = $1`, [ADMIN_ID]); + const secret = await enrollTotp(ADMIN_ID, login.body.token as unknown as string); - // With a factor enrolled, login now demands it. - const challenge = await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email: userEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); + const challenge = await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/login", { email: adminEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); expect(challenge.body.mfa_required).toBe(true); const wrong = await post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify", { @@ -306,7 +310,11 @@ describeDb("auth API against a real database", () => { }, 90000); it("grants the admin console after a real second factor", { timeout: 60000 }, async () => { - // Enrollment happens on the user surface, which the admin also owns. + // Enrollment happens on the user surface, which the admin also owns. The + // existing factor is cleared first, as adminSession does: enrolling over a + // confirmed one leaves two secrets on the account and the code generated + // here is then checked against the wrong one. + await query(`DELETE FROM mfa_totp WHERE mailbox_id = $1`, [ADMIN_ID]); const userLogin = await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email: adminEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); const secret = await enrollTotp(ADMIN_ID, userLogin.body.token as unknown as string); @@ -360,12 +368,14 @@ describeDb("auth API against a real database", () => { expect(res.body.error).toBe("ACCOUNT_LOCKED"); }); + // Redeemed at the admin sign-in, which is where a second factor is collected + // now. The account is an admin for the same reason. it("consumes a recovery code exactly once", { timeout: 60000 }, async () => { const email = `rec@authtest-${DOMAIN_ID}.invalid`; const id = crypto.randomUUID(); await query( - `INSERT INTO mailboxes (id, domain_id, local_part, email_address, password_hash) - VALUES ($1, $2, 'rec', $3, $4)`, + `INSERT INTO mailboxes (id, domain_id, local_part, email_address, password_hash, role) + VALUES ($1, $2, 'rec', $3, $4, 'SUPER_ADMIN')`, [id, DOMAIN_ID, email, await hashPassword(PASSWORD)], ); @@ -378,14 +388,14 @@ describeDb("auth API against a real database", () => { const confirmed = await post("/api/v1/user/mfa/totp/confirm", { code }, login.body.token); const recoveryCode = (confirmed.body.recovery_codes as unknown as string[])[0]; - const challenge = await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email, password: PASSWORD }); + const challenge = await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/login", { email, password: PASSWORD }); const first = await post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify", { challenge_token: challenge.body.challenge_token, code: recoveryCode, }); expect(first.status).toBe(200); - const challenge2 = await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email, password: PASSWORD }); + const challenge2 = await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/login", { email, password: PASSWORD }); const second = await post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify", { challenge_token: challenge2.body.challenge_token, code: recoveryCode, @@ -663,6 +673,191 @@ describe("surface routing", () => { }); }); +/** + * What each surface costs to open, and what a session grants once opened. + * + * Two rules made the app tiresome in a way no unit test could see. Reading your + * own mail demanded a second factor, which the mailbox does not require - only + * the console does. And a session issued at the admin sign-in carried the admin + * audience alone, so leaving the console landed on the webmail's login screen, + * asking for a password from somebody who had just proven a password and a + * second factor a moment earlier. + */ +describeDb("moving between the surfaces", () => { + const stepUpEmail = () => `stepup@authtest-${DOMAIN_ID}.invalid`; + const plainEmail = () => `plainuser@authtest-${DOMAIN_ID}.invalid`; + let stepUpId = ""; + + /** Reads the Set-Cookie headers, which is where the two sessions land. */ + async function postForCookies(path: string, body: unknown, token?: string) { + const res = await fetch(`${base}${path}`, { + method: "POST", + headers: { + "Content-Type": "application/json", + ...(token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {}), + }, + body: JSON.stringify(body), + }); + return { + status: res.status, + cookies: res.headers.getSetCookie(), + body: (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record, + }; + } + + const cookieNames = (cookies: string[]) => cookies.map((c) => c.split("=")[0]).sort(); + + /** + * One session per account, taken once. + * + * Every login costs an Argon2 verify, and this service deliberately bounds + * how many of those run at a time, so a test file that signs in per assertion + * spends its time queueing behind itself. A session does not expire during + * the run, so reusing it tests the same thing and leaves the budget for the + * assertions that need a fresh sign-in. + */ + let stepUpToken = ""; + let plainToken = ""; + let plainId = ""; + + beforeAll(async () => { + await startServer(); + await seed(); + const hash = await hashPassword(PASSWORD); + for (const [local, role] of [["stepup", "SUPER_ADMIN"], ["plainuser", "USER"]] as const) { + await query( + `INSERT INTO mailboxes (domain_id, local_part, email_address, password_hash, role) + VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5) ON CONFLICT (domain_id, local_part) DO NOTHING`, + [DOMAIN_ID, local, `${local}@authtest-${DOMAIN_ID}.invalid`, hash, role], + ); + } + stepUpId = (await query<{ id: string }>( + `SELECT id FROM mailboxes WHERE email_address = $1`, [stepUpEmail()]))[0].id; + plainId = (await query<{ id: string }>( + `SELECT id FROM mailboxes WHERE email_address = $1`, [plainEmail()]))[0].id; + + stepUpToken = (await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", + { email: stepUpEmail(), password: PASSWORD })).body.token as unknown as string; + plainToken = (await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", + { email: plainEmail(), password: PASSWORD })).body.token as unknown as string; + }, 120000); + + afterAll(async () => { + server?.close(); + await query(`DELETE FROM domains WHERE id = $1`, [DOMAIN_ID]).catch(() => undefined); + await closePool(); + }); + + // The mailbox is one account's own mail behind that account's own password. + // Demanding a code as well meant an enrolled account could not read its mail + // without its phone. + it("opens the webmail on the password alone, even with a factor enrolled", async () => { + await enrollTotp(stepUpId, stepUpToken); + + const login = await post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email: stepUpEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); + expect(login.status).toBe(200); + expect(login.body.mfa_required).toBeUndefined(); + expect(login.body.token).toBeDefined(); + + // And the session it hands out is one the API actually accepts. + expect((await get("/api/v1/user/me", login.body.token)).status).toBe(200); + }, 120000); + + // A webmail session is still not an admin session; that is the isolation the + // whole audience split exists for. + it("does not let the webmail session open the console by itself", async () => { + expect((await get("/api/v1/admin/dashboard", stepUpToken)).status).toBe(401); + }); + + // The sign-in checked the password and the second factor and never the role, + // so an ordinary account that had enrolled a factor - which any account may + // do from its own settings - could sign in at /admin/login and be handed an + // admin-audience session. The step-up checks the role; this path did not. + it("refuses an ordinary account at the admin sign-in, factor or no factor", async () => { + await query(`DELETE FROM mfa_totp WHERE mailbox_id = $1`, [plainId]); + const secret = await enrollTotp(plainId, plainToken); + + const attempt = await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/login", { email: plainEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); + expect(attempt.status).toBe(403); + expect(attempt.body.error).toBe("FORBIDDEN"); + + // And no challenge came back that could be verified into one anyway. + expect(attempt.body.challenge_token).toBeUndefined(); + void secret; + }, 120000); + + it("refuses a step-up without a webmail session behind it", async () => { + expect((await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/step-up", { code: "123456" })).status).toBe(401); + }); + + it("refuses a step-up with the wrong code, and never on the password alone", async () => { + const res = await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/step-up", { code: "000000" }, stepUpToken); + expect(res.status).toBe(401); + expect(res.body.error).toBe("INVALID_MFA_CODE"); + }); + + // The role is read from the database rather than from the token, so an + // ordinary account cannot cross over however valid its session is. + it("refuses a step-up from an account that may not open the console", async () => { + const res = await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/step-up", { code: "123456" }, plainToken); + expect(res.status).toBe(403); + }); + + // The point of the step-up: the second factor, and not the password, which + // the session in hand proved already. + it("crosses into the console on the second factor alone", async () => { + await query(`DELETE FROM mfa_totp WHERE mailbox_id = $1`, [stepUpId]); + const secret = await enrollTotp(stepUpId, stepUpToken); + + const stepUp = await postForCookies( + "/api/v1/auth/admin/step-up", + { code: generateHotp(base32Decode(secret), getCurrentStep()) }, + stepUpToken, + ); + expect(stepUp.status).toBe(200); + expect((await get("/api/v1/admin/dashboard", stepUp.body.token)).status).toBe(200); + + // Both sessions come back, which is what makes leaving the console free. + expect(cookieNames(stepUp.cookies)).toEqual(["lm_admin_session", "lm_user_session"]); + }, 120000); + + // Proving a password and a second factor is strictly more than the webmail + // asks for, so it must not leave the operator without a webmail session. + it("issues a webmail session at the admin sign-in too", async () => { + await query(`DELETE FROM mfa_totp WHERE mailbox_id = $1`, [stepUpId]); + const secret = await enrollTotp(stepUpId, stepUpToken); + + const challenge = await post("/api/v1/auth/admin/login", { email: stepUpEmail(), password: PASSWORD }); + expect(challenge.body.mfa_required).toBe(true); + + const verified = await postForCookies("/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify", { + challenge_token: challenge.body.challenge_token, + code: generateHotp(base32Decode(secret), getCurrentStep()), + }); + expect(verified.status).toBe(200); + expect(cookieNames(verified.cookies)).toEqual(["lm_admin_session", "lm_user_session"]); + + // The webmail cookie has to be a webmail token, not the admin one copied + // across: an admin-audience token is refused by every /user route. + const userCookie = verified.cookies.find((c) => c.startsWith("lm_user_session="))!; + const userToken = userCookie.slice("lm_user_session=".length).split(";")[0]; + expect((await get("/api/v1/user/me", userToken)).status).toBe(200); + }, 120000); + + // Signing in twice in the same second produced a byte-identical token, which + // collided with the unique index on web_sessions.refresh_token_hash and + // answered 500 to a correct password. A double-clicked sign-in was enough. + it("survives two sign-ins in the same second", async () => { + const [first, second] = await Promise.all([ + post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email: plainEmail(), password: PASSWORD }), + post("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { email: plainEmail(), password: PASSWORD }), + ]); + expect(first.status).toBe(200); + expect(second.status).toBe(200); + expect(first.body.token).not.toBe(second.body.token); + }, 60000); +}); + if (!hasDatabase) { // eslint-disable-next-line no-console console.warn("TEST_DATABASE_URL not set - auth API integration tests skipped"); diff --git a/services/auth/src/router.ts b/services/auth/src/router.ts index c5905ab..19c84bc 100644 --- a/services/auth/src/router.ts +++ b/services/auth/src/router.ts @@ -3,6 +3,13 @@ import crypto from "node:crypto"; import { generateTotpSecret, generateTotpUri } from "./totp.js"; import { generateRecoveryCodes, generateAppPassword } from "./mfaHelpers.js"; import { createJwt, verifyJwt, isSurfaceAuthorized, type SessionTokenPayload } from "./session.js"; +import { + secondFactorRequired, + surfacesGrantedBy, + cookieNameFor, + stepUpNeedsSecondFactor, + type Surface, +} from "./surfaceAccess.js"; import * as repo from "./repository.js"; const CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 300; @@ -125,6 +132,10 @@ async function route(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, url: string): Pr if (url === "/api/v1/auth/user/login" && method === "POST") return login(req, res, "user"); if (url === "/api/v1/auth/admin/login" && method === "POST") return login(req, res, "admin"); if (url === "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify" && method === "POST") return mfaVerify(req, res); + // Under /auth/ rather than /admin/: the caller does not hold an admin + // session yet - obtaining one is the whole point - so the admin guard above + // must not stand in front of it. + if (url === "/api/v1/auth/admin/step-up" && method === "POST") return adminStepUp(req, res); if (url === "/api/v1/auth/logout" && method === "POST") return logout(res); if (url === "/api/v1/user/me" && method === "GET") return me(res, session!); @@ -230,30 +241,35 @@ async function login(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, surface: "user" const { mailbox, mfaRequired } = outcome; - // An admin whose second factor is not enrolled must not fall through to a - // full session: the admin surface requires MFA unconditionally. - if (surface === "admin" && !(await repo.hasConfirmedTotp(mailbox.id))) { - const enrolmentToken = createJwt( - { - sub: mailbox.id, - email: mailbox.email_address, - role: mailbox.role, - domainId: mailbox.domain_id, - surface: "user", - aud: "lambdamail:user", - mfaSatisfied: false, - purpose: "mfa_enrollment", - }, - ENROLMENT_TTL_SECONDS, - ); + // The console is for the roles that may operate it. This checked the password + // and the second factor and never the role, so an ordinary account that had + // enrolled a factor - which any account may do from its own settings - was + // handed an admin-audience session, and the routes that do not re-check the + // role opened for it. Refused before the challenge, so no token exists that + // could be verified into one. + if (surface === "admin" && mailbox.role !== "SUPER_ADMIN" && mailbox.role !== "DOMAIN_ADMIN") { return sendJson(res, 403, { - error: "MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED", - message: "The admin console requires a second factor. Enrol one to continue.", - enrollment_token: enrolmentToken, + error: "FORBIDDEN", + message: "This account may not open the admin console", }); } - if (mfaRequired) { + // An admin whose second factor is not enrolled must not fall through to a + // full session: the admin surface requires MFA unconditionally. + if (surface === "admin" && !(await repo.hasConfirmedTotp(mailbox.id))) { + return sendJson(res, 403, { + error: "MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED", + message: "The admin console requires a second factor. Enrol one to continue.", + enrollment_token: enrolmentGrant(mailbox), + }); + } + + // Only the console collects a second factor at sign-in. The webmail is one + // account's own mail behind that account's own password, and demanding a code + // to read it made every message cost a phone - while the surface that can + // rewrite other people's mailboxes is the one that needs it. An enrolled + // factor is still asked for on the way into the console, by step-up. + if (mfaRequired && secondFactorRequired(surface)) { const challengeToken = createJwt( { sub: mailbox.id, @@ -270,48 +286,144 @@ async function login(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, surface: "user" return sendJson(res, 200, { mfa_required: true, challenge_token: challengeToken }); } - // No factor enrolled yet. The session is issued so the user can reach the - // settings screen and enroll; when policy obliges them to, the response says - // so and the UI keeps them on that screen. + // The session is issued so the user can reach the settings screen and enroll; + // when policy obliges them to, the response says so and the UI keeps them on + // that screen. await issueSession(req, res, mailbox, surface, repo.isMfaEnrollmentRequired(mailbox)); } +/** + * Crosses a signed-in webmail session over into the console. + * + * The password is not asked for again: the session presented here already + * proved it, minutes ago. What the console adds over the webmail is the second + * factor, so that is all this collects. Without this endpoint the only way over + * was the admin sign-in form, which is why crossing surfaces used to mean + * typing the password a second time. + */ +async function adminStepUp(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise { + const token = extractToken(req, "/api/v1/user/"); + if (!stepUpNeedsSecondFactor(token)) { + return sendJson(res, 401, { error: "UNAUTHORIZED", message: "A signed-in webmail session is required" }); + } + const payload = verifyJwt(token)!; + + const mailbox = await repo.findMailboxByEmail(payload.email); + if (!mailbox || !mailbox.is_active) { + return sendJson(res, 401, { error: "INVALID_CREDENTIALS", message: "Account unavailable" }); + } + // Role is read from the database rather than from the token: a role changed + // since sign-in must take effect on the surface that acts on it. + if (mailbox.role !== "SUPER_ADMIN" && mailbox.role !== "DOMAIN_ADMIN") { + return sendJson(res, 403, { error: "FORBIDDEN", message: "This account may not open the admin console" }); + } + + // No factor to ask for yet. The same grant the admin sign-in hands out is + // returned, so the caller can enrol one and come straight back. + if (!(await repo.hasConfirmedTotp(mailbox.id))) { + return sendJson(res, 403, { + error: "MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED", + message: "The admin console requires a second factor. Enrol one to continue.", + enrollment_token: enrolmentGrant(mailbox), + }); + } + + const body = await parseJsonBody(req); + const code = typeof body?.code === "string" ? body.code.trim() : ""; + if (!code) { + return sendJson(res, 400, { error: "CODE_REQUIRED", message: "Verification code required" }); + } + + const accepted = /^\d{6}$/.test(code) + ? await repo.verifyTotpForLogin(mailbox.id, code) + : await repo.consumeRecoveryCode(mailbox.id, code, clientIp(req)); + if (!accepted) { + return sendJson(res, 401, { error: "INVALID_MFA_CODE", message: "Invalid verification code" }); + } + + await issueSession(req, res, mailbox, "admin"); +} + +/** The short-lived grant that permits enrolling a factor and nothing else. */ +function enrolmentGrant(mailbox: repo.MailboxRecord): string { + return createJwt( + { + sub: mailbox.id, + email: mailbox.email_address, + role: mailbox.role, + domainId: mailbox.domain_id, + surface: "user", + aud: "lambdamail:user", + mfaSatisfied: false, + purpose: "mfa_enrollment", + }, + ENROLMENT_TTL_SECONDS, + ); +} + +/** + * Issues the sessions a sign-in on `surface` earns, and sets their cookies. + * + * An admin sign-in yields a webmail session as well. The two audiences are + * separate tokens - a token minted for the console is refused by every /user + * route, by design - so granting both means minting both. Doing so is what + * turns leaving the console into a plain link: whoever proved a password and a + * second factor has more than the webmail asks for, and being sent back to a + * password prompt on the way out was the app forgetting that. + * + * mfaSatisfied records what was actually proven, so it is true only where a + * factor was collected. isSurfaceAuthorized requires it for the console alone. + */ async function issueSession( req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, mailbox: repo.MailboxRecord, - surface: "user" | "admin", + surface: Surface, enrollmentRequired = false, + // Whether a second factor was actually collected on the way here. It defaults + // to what the surface demands; mfaVerify passes it explicitly, because + // recording a proven factor as unproven would make isStepUpMfaRequired fire + // straight away. + factorProven = secondFactorRequired(surface), ): Promise { - const sessionToken = createJwt({ - sub: mailbox.id, - email: mailbox.email_address, - role: mailbox.role, - domainId: mailbox.domain_id, - surface, - aud: surface === "admin" ? "lambdamail:admin" : "lambdamail:user", - mfaSatisfied: true, - mfaSatisfiedAt: Date.now(), - purpose: "session", - }); + const cookies: string[] = []; + let primaryToken = ""; - await repo.recordSession( - mailbox.id, - surface, - crypto.createHash("sha256").update(sessionToken).digest("hex"), - new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_TTL_SECONDS * 1000), - clientIp(req), - req.headers["user-agent"] ?? null, - ); + for (const granted of surfacesGrantedBy(surface)) { + const token = createJwt({ + sub: mailbox.id, + email: mailbox.email_address, + role: mailbox.role, + domainId: mailbox.domain_id, + surface: granted, + aud: granted === "admin" ? "lambdamail:admin" : "lambdamail:user", + mfaSatisfied: factorProven, + ...(factorProven ? { mfaSatisfiedAt: Date.now() } : {}), + purpose: "session", + }); + if (!primaryToken) primaryToken = token; - const cookieName = surface === "admin" ? "lm_admin_session" : "lm_user_session"; - res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", sessionCookie(cookieName, sessionToken, SESSION_TTL_SECONDS, isSecureRequest())); + // Each token is recorded separately, or "sign out this device" would revoke + // one audience and leave the other working. + await repo.recordSession( + mailbox.id, + granted, + crypto.createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex"), + new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_TTL_SECONDS * 1000), + clientIp(req), + req.headers["user-agent"] ?? null, + ); + + cookies.push(sessionCookie(cookieNameFor(granted), token, SESSION_TTL_SECONDS, isSecureRequest())); + } + + res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", cookies); sendJson(res, 200, { - token: sessionToken, + token: primaryToken, surface, role: mailbox.role, locale: mailbox.locale, - mfa_satisfied: true, + mfa_satisfied: factorProven, mfa_enrollment_required: enrollmentRequired, }); } @@ -349,7 +461,7 @@ async function mfaVerify(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise, expiresInSeconds = 28800): string { +export function createJwt( + payload: Omit, + expiresInSeconds = 28800, +): string { const header = { alg: "HS256", typ: "JWT" }; const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000); const fullPayload: SessionTokenPayload = { ...payload, + // Minted here rather than by each caller, so no path can forget it and + // reintroduce the collision described on the field. + jti: crypto.randomUUID(), iat: now, exp: now + expiresInSeconds, }; diff --git a/services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.test.ts b/services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38f372b --- /dev/null +++ b/services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest"; + +process.env.JWT_SECRET ||= "a-test-signing-secret-long-enough-for-the-guard"; + +const { createJwt, verifyJwt, isSurfaceAuthorized } = await import("./session.js"); +const { secondFactorRequired, surfacesGrantedBy, cookieNameFor, stepUpNeedsSecondFactor } = + await import("./surfaceAccess.js"); + +/** + * Which surface a login opens, and what it costs to cross between them. + * + * The rules used to be spread through the login handler and got two things + * wrong that made the app tiresome to use. Reading mail demanded a second + * factor, which the mailbox does not require - only the console does. And a + * session issued at the admin sign-in granted the admin audience alone, so + * leaving the console landed on the webmail's login screen even though the + * operator had authenticated a moment earlier, with a stronger factor. + */ + +describe("what each surface costs to open", () => { + // The webmail is the account's own mail behind the account's own password. + it("does not demand a second factor to read mail", () => { + expect(secondFactorRequired("user")).toBe(false); + }); + + // The console changes other people's mailboxes, domains and DNS. + it("always demands one for the admin console", () => { + expect(secondFactorRequired("admin")).toBe(true); + }); +}); + +describe("what a session grants", () => { + it("gives a webmail sign-in the webmail and nothing more", () => { + expect(surfacesGrantedBy("user")).toEqual(["user"]); + }); + + // Proving a second factor is strictly more than the webmail asks for, so + // being sent back to a password prompt on the way out of the console was + // asking for something already provided. + it("gives an admin sign-in the webmail as well, since it costs strictly more", () => { + expect(surfacesGrantedBy("admin")).toEqual(["admin", "user"]); + }); + + it("names a separate cookie per surface, so neither overwrites the other", () => { + expect(cookieNameFor("user")).toBe("lm_user_session"); + expect(cookieNameFor("admin")).toBe("lm_admin_session"); + }); +}); + +describe("crossing from the webmail into the console", () => { + const userSession = () => + createJwt({ + sub: "1", email: "a@b.test", role: "SUPER_ADMIN", domainId: "d", + surface: "user", aud: "lambdamail:user", mfaSatisfied: false, purpose: "session", + }); + + // The point of the step-up: the password was already proven by the session in + // hand, so only the factor the console adds is asked for. + it("asks for the second factor and not for the password again", () => { + const decision = stepUpNeedsSecondFactor(userSession()); + expect(decision).toBe(true); + }); + + it("refuses to step up from a challenge token, which proves only a password", () => { + const challenge = createJwt({ + sub: "1", email: "a@b.test", role: "SUPER_ADMIN", domainId: "d", + surface: "user", aud: "lambdamail:user", mfaSatisfied: false, purpose: "mfa_challenge", + }); + expect(stepUpNeedsSecondFactor(challenge)).toBe(false); + }); + + it("refuses to step up from nothing at all", () => { + expect(stepUpNeedsSecondFactor(null)).toBe(false); + expect(stepUpNeedsSecondFactor("not-a-token")).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe("every issued session is its own session", () => { + const claims = { + sub: "1", email: "a@b.test", role: "USER" as const, domainId: "d", + surface: "user" as const, aud: "lambdamail:user" as const, + mfaSatisfied: false, purpose: "session" as const, + }; + + /** + * Signing in twice in the same second used to mint the identical token. + * + * Nothing in the payload varied below one second - iat and exp are in + * seconds - so two sessions hashed to the same value and the second insert + * hit the unique index on web_sessions.refresh_token_hash. The user saw a + * 500 from a correct password, which is what a double-clicked sign-in does. + */ + it("mints a different token for two sign-ins in the same second", () => { + expect(createJwt(claims)).not.toBe(createJwt(claims)); + }); + + // The two audiences an admin sign-in issues are recorded as separate rows, + // so they must not collide with each other either. + it("mints a different token per surface within one sign-in", () => { + const admin = createJwt({ ...claims, surface: "admin", aud: "lambdamail:admin" }); + expect(admin).not.toBe(createJwt(claims)); + }); + + // The identity has to survive verification, or a revoked session could not + // be told apart from a reissued one. + it("carries a distinct identifier through verification", () => { + const first = verifyJwt(createJwt(claims)); + const second = verifyJwt(createJwt(claims)); + expect(first?.jti).toBeTruthy(); + expect(first?.jti).not.toBe(second?.jti); + }); +}); + +describe("the guard on each surface", () => { + const session = (surface: "user" | "admin", mfaSatisfied: boolean) => + createJwt({ + sub: "1", email: "a@b.test", role: "SUPER_ADMIN", domainId: "d", + surface, + aud: surface === "admin" ? "lambdamail:admin" : "lambdamail:user", + mfaSatisfied, + purpose: "session", + }); + + // The webmail guard must agree with the login it issues, or a password-only + // sign-in would produce a session its own API refuses. + it("admits a webmail session that never proved a second factor", () => { + const payload = JSON.parse( + Buffer.from(session("user", false).split(".")[1], "base64url").toString(), + ); + expect(isSurfaceAuthorized(payload, "user")).toBe(true); + }); + + it("still refuses the console without one", () => { + const payload = JSON.parse( + Buffer.from(session("admin", false).split(".")[1], "base64url").toString(), + ); + expect(isSurfaceAuthorized(payload, "admin")).toBe(false); + }); +}); diff --git a/services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.ts b/services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9448bc --- /dev/null +++ b/services/auth/src/surfaceAccess.ts @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +import { verifyJwt } from "./session.js"; + +/** + * Which surface a login opens, and what crossing between them costs. + * + * These rules were spread through the login handler, where two of them were + * wrong in a way no test could reach: + * + * - Reading your own mail demanded a second factor. The mailbox is already + * behind the account's password; it is the console that needs more. + * - A session issued at the admin sign-in carried the admin audience alone, so + * leaving the console landed on the webmail's login screen - asking for a + * password from somebody who had just proven a password *and* a second + * factor. Proving more must never grant less. + */ + +export type Surface = "user" | "admin"; + +/** + * Whether the surface may only open once a second factor has been proven. + * + * The console can change any mailbox, any domain and the DNS records the mail + * flow depends on, which is why PLAN.md section 14.5 makes it unconditional + * there. The webmail is one account's own mail, so the password that owns it is + * the bar. An account may still enrol a factor and be asked for it on the way + * into the console. + */ +export function secondFactorRequired(surface: Surface): boolean { + return surface === "admin"; +} + +/** + * The surfaces a sign-in on `surface` should hand out sessions for. + * + * An admin sign-in also yields a webmail session because it satisfied strictly + * more than the webmail asks for. Issuing both at once is what makes leaving + * the console a plain link instead of another sign-in. + */ +export function surfacesGrantedBy(surface: Surface): Surface[] { + return surface === "admin" ? ["admin", "user"] : ["user"]; +} + +/** Cookies are per surface, so an admin session cannot displace a webmail one. */ +export function cookieNameFor(surface: Surface): string { + return surface === "admin" ? "lm_admin_session" : "lm_user_session"; +} + +/** + * Whether this token is a webmail session that may be stepped up to the + * console by presenting a second factor and nothing else. + * + * A challenge or enrolment token is refused: neither proves more than that a + * password was typed, and accepting one here would turn the step-up into a + * second way of skipping the factor it exists to collect. + */ +export function stepUpNeedsSecondFactor(token: string | null | undefined): boolean { + if (!token) return false; + const payload = verifyJwt(token); + if (!payload) return false; + return payload.purpose === "session" && payload.aud === "lambdamail:user"; +} diff --git a/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render.go b/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render.go index 1fe71ee..1871015 100644 --- a/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render.go +++ b/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package usecase import ( "bytes" + "encoding/base64" "io" "strings" @@ -15,6 +16,12 @@ import ( // an out-of-memory kill. const maxRenderedPartBytes = 2 << 20 // 2 MiB +// maxInlineImageBytes bounds one inline image. Inline parts travel to the +// browser as data: URIs inside the JSON body, so an unbounded one would be +// held in memory here, base64-expanded on the wire and held again in the tab. +// Past this size the reader shows the alt text, which beats a stalled pane. +const maxInlineImageBytes = 2 << 20 // 2 MiB + // RenderedMessage is a message prepared for display: headers the reader shows // and the two body flavours, already decoded from their transfer encoding. type RenderedMessage struct { @@ -27,6 +34,15 @@ type RenderedMessage struct { Text string `json:"text"` HTML string `json:"html"` Attachments []string `json:"attachments"` + // InlineImages maps a part's Content-ID - without the angle brackets, the + // way the HTML body spells it in src="cid:..." - to a self-contained + // data: URI. + // + // Without this the reader had nothing to resolve cid: against, so every + // message written by a normal mail client displayed broken images. They + // are inlined rather than served from an endpoint so that the reader pane + // stays a sandboxed frame with no network identity of its own. + InlineImages map[string]string `json:"inline_images"` } // RenderMessage turns raw RFC 5322 bytes into what the reader pane needs. @@ -37,7 +53,10 @@ type RenderedMessage struct { // still yields its raw text rather than an error - unreadable formatting beats // an inbox that refuses to open a message. func RenderMessage(raw []byte, uid uint32) RenderedMessage { - out := RenderedMessage{UID: uid, To: []string{}, Cc: []string{}, Attachments: []string{}} + out := RenderedMessage{ + UID: uid, To: []string{}, Cc: []string{}, + Attachments: []string{}, InlineImages: map[string]string{}, + } entity, err := message.Read(bytes.NewReader(raw)) if err != nil { @@ -89,8 +108,25 @@ func collectParts(entity *message.Entity, out *RenderedMessage) { mediaType = "text/plain" } - if disposition, params, err := entity.Header.ContentDisposition(); err == nil && disposition == "attachment" { - name := params["filename"] + disposition, dispParams, dispErr := entity.Header.ContentDisposition() + if dispErr != nil { + disposition = "" + } + + // An inline image is part of the body, not a file to download: it is + // resolved into the HTML and deliberately left out of the attachment list, + // or every message with a logo in its signature grows a download chip. + if isInlineImageCandidate(disposition, mediaType, entity.Header.Get("Content-ID")) { + if collectInlineImage(entity, mediaType, out) { + return + } + } + + // "inline" counts as an attachment for anything that is not an inline + // image: a client that attaches a PDF without saying "attachment" still + // sent a file the reader has to be able to fetch. + if disposition == "attachment" || (disposition == "inline" && dispParams["filename"] != "") { + name := dispParams["filename"] if name == "" { name = "attachment" } @@ -111,6 +147,42 @@ func collectParts(entity *message.Entity, out *RenderedMessage) { } } +// isInlineImageCandidate reports whether this part is an image the body can +// reference. A Content-ID is what makes it referenceable; image/svg+xml is +// excluded because an SVG is a document that carries script, and it is the one +// image type a data: URI must never smuggle into the reader pane. +func isInlineImageCandidate(disposition, mediaType, contentID string) bool { + if contentID == "" && disposition != "inline" { + return false + } + if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(mediaType), "image/") { + return false + } + return !strings.EqualFold(mediaType, "image/svg+xml") +} + +// collectInlineImage records one part as a data: URI, and reports whether it +// took ownership of the part. An image too large to inline is claimed as well: +// falling through would list it as an attachment, which is not what the sender +// meant by embedding it in the body. +func collectInlineImage(entity *message.Entity, mediaType string, out *RenderedMessage) bool { + contentID := strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(entity.Header.Get("Content-ID")), "<>") + if contentID == "" { + return false + } + + // One byte past the limit is read so that an oversized part is recognised + // as oversized rather than silently truncated into a corrupt image. + body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(entity.Body, maxInlineImageBytes+1)) + if err != nil || len(body) > maxInlineImageBytes { + return true + } + + out.InlineImages[contentID] = "data:" + strings.ToLower(mediaType) + ";base64," + + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(body) + return true +} + // ExtractAttachment walks the MIME tree and returns bytes and content-type for a named attachment. func ExtractAttachment(entity *message.Entity, targetName string) ([]byte, string) { if multipart := entity.MultipartReader(); multipart != nil { diff --git a/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render_test.go b/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render_test.go index 72977e4..cc55543 100644 --- a/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render_test.go +++ b/services/protocols/internal/application/usecase/message_render_test.go @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ package usecase -import "testing" +import ( + "bytes" + "testing" + + "github.com/emersion/go-message" +) func TestRenderMessage_ExtractsHeadersAndText(t *testing.T) { raw := "From: Alice \r\n" + @@ -57,3 +62,110 @@ func TestRenderMessage_FallsBackToRawOnParseFailure(t *testing.T) { t.Error("a malformed message produced no body at all") } } + +// An inline image is referenced from the HTML body as cid:. Neither +// the part nor its identifier used to leave this function, so every message +// written by a normal mail client rendered with broken image placeholders and +// no way for the reader to resolve them. +func TestRenderMessage_ReturnsInlineImagesKeyedByContentID(t *testing.T) { + // "iVBORw0KGgo=" is the leading bytes of a PNG, base64 encoded. + raw := "From: a@b.test\r\nSubject: s\r\n" + + "Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=B\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n

\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: image/png\r\n" + + "Content-ID: \r\n" + + "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"logo.png\"\r\n" + + "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\r\n\r\niVBORw0KGgo=\r\n--B--\r\n" + + got := RenderMessage([]byte(raw), 1) + + // Keyed without the angle brackets, which is how the HTML spells it. + src, ok := got.InlineImages["logo@x"] + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("InlineImages = %v, want an entry for logo@x", got.InlineImages) + } + if src != "" { + t.Errorf("InlineImages[logo@x] = %q", src) + } +} + +// An inline image already shown in the body is not a file the reader has to +// download; listing it as an attachment puts a chip under every signature. +func TestRenderMessage_DoesNotListInlineImagesAsAttachments(t *testing.T) { + raw := "From: a@b.test\r\nSubject: s\r\n" + + "Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=B\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: image/gif\r\n" + + "Content-ID: \r\nContent-Disposition: inline; filename=\"sig.gif\"\r\n" + + "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\r\n\r\nR0lGOD==\r\n--B--\r\n" + + if got := RenderMessage([]byte(raw), 1); len(got.Attachments) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Attachments = %v, want none", got.Attachments) + } +} + +// A file sent inline that is not an image - a PDF a client attached without a +// disposition of "attachment" - is still something the reader must be able to +// download, so it belongs in the attachment list. +func TestRenderMessage_ListsNonImageInlinePartsAsAttachments(t *testing.T) { + raw := "From: a@b.test\r\nSubject: s\r\n" + + "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=B\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nbody\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: application/pdf; name=\"report.pdf\"\r\n" + + "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"report.pdf\"\r\n\r\nPDFDATA\r\n--B--\r\n" + + got := RenderMessage([]byte(raw), 1) + if len(got.Attachments) != 1 || got.Attachments[0] != "report.pdf" { + t.Errorf("Attachments = %v, want [report.pdf]", got.Attachments) + } +} + +// An image big enough to matter is not worth inlining into a JSON response +// that the browser holds in memory; the reader shows the alt text instead. +func TestRenderMessage_SkipsOversizedInlineImages(t *testing.T) { + huge := make([]byte, maxInlineImageBytes+1024) + for i := range huge { + huge[i] = 'A' + } + raw := "From: a@b.test\r\nSubject: s\r\n" + + "Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=B\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: image/png\r\nContent-ID: \r\n\r\n" + string(huge) + "\r\n--B--\r\n" + + if got := RenderMessage([]byte(raw), 1); len(got.InlineImages) != 0 { + t.Errorf("InlineImages has %d entries, want none", len(got.InlineImages)) + } +} + +// image/svg+xml is a document: it carries script and is the one image type a +// data: URI must never smuggle onto the reader pane. +func TestRenderMessage_RefusesToInlineSvg(t *testing.T) { + raw := "From: a@b.test\r\nSubject: s\r\n" + + "Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=B\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: image/svg+xml\r\nContent-ID: \r\n\r\n\r\n--B--\r\n" + + if got := RenderMessage([]byte(raw), 1); len(got.InlineImages) != 0 { + t.Errorf("InlineImages = %v, want svg refused", got.InlineImages) + } +} + +// The chip the reader draws for an inline PDF links at the download endpoint, +// which resolves the name through here. Matching only on a disposition of +// "attachment" made every one of those chips 404. +func TestExtractAttachment_FindsInlineNamedParts(t *testing.T) { + raw := "From: a@b.test\r\nSubject: s\r\n" + + "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=B\r\n\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nbody\r\n" + + "--B\r\nContent-Type: application/pdf\r\n" + + "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"report.pdf\"\r\n\r\nPDFDATA\r\n--B--\r\n" + + entity, err := message.Read(bytes.NewReader([]byte(raw))) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("parse: %v", err) + } + data, ctype := ExtractAttachment(entity, "report.pdf") + if string(data) != "PDFDATA" || ctype != "application/pdf" { + t.Errorf("ExtractAttachment = %q/%q", data, ctype) + } +} diff --git a/services/webmail/messages/en.json b/services/webmail/messages/en.json index 7062c81..60a82ef 100644 --- a/services/webmail/messages/en.json +++ b/services/webmail/messages/en.json @@ -89,11 +89,15 @@ "genericError": "Something went wrong", "invalidCredentials": "Invalid email or password", "mfaRequired": "Enter the six-digit code from your authenticator app.", + "orRecoveryCode": "Lost your phone? A recovery code works here too.", "passwordLabel": "Password", "qrCodeAlt": "QR code for two-factor setup", "scanQr": "Scan this code with Google Authenticator, Aegis, Authy or 1Password.", "signInButton": "Sign in", "signOutOfAdmin": "Leave admin", + "stepUpIntro": "You are already signed in, so only your second factor is needed. Your password is not asked for again.", + "stepUpSignedInAs": "Signed in as {email}", + "stepUpTitle": "Open the admin console", "totpCodeLabel": "Authentication code", "userLoginTitle": "Sign in to your mailbox", "verificationFailed": "Verification failed", @@ -145,7 +149,9 @@ "draftSaved": "Draft saved automatically", "draftSaving": "Saving draft...", "drafts": "Drafts", + "emptyBody": "This message has no text body.", "forward": "Forward", + "imagesEnabled": "Images loaded", "hideCcBcc": "- Hide Cc/Bcc", "inbox": "Inbox", "insertLink": "Insert link", @@ -153,9 +159,18 @@ "italic": "Italic", "junk": "Spam", "loadImages": "Load images", + "markRead": "Mark as read", + "markUnread": "Mark as unread", + "messagesInFolder": "{count} messages", + "noMatches": "Nothing matched that search", "noMessages": "No messages", + "noSubject": "(No subject)", "numberedList": "Numbered list", + "remoteContentBlocked": "Remote images were blocked so this message cannot track you.", "reply": "Reply", + "searchMatches": "{count} found", + "searchPlaceholder": "Search (from:, subject:)...", + "selectAMessage": "Select a message to read it", "sendMessage": "Send message", "sending": "Sending...", "sent": "Sent", @@ -232,6 +247,7 @@ "appPasswordsSection": "App passwords", "attempts": "Attempts", "bounceRate": "Bounce rate", + "ccRecipients": "Cc", "changePassword": "Change password", "clientIp": "Client IP", "copyPasswordNow": "Copy it now. It is not shown again.", diff --git a/services/webmail/messages/es.json b/services/webmail/messages/es.json index fe00849..a4bd6dc 100644 --- a/services/webmail/messages/es.json +++ b/services/webmail/messages/es.json @@ -89,11 +89,15 @@ "genericError": "Algo salió mal", "invalidCredentials": "Correo o contraseña inválidos", "mfaRequired": "Introduzca el código de seis dígitos de su aplicación de autenticación.", + "orRecoveryCode": "¿Perdiste el teléfono? Aquí también sirve un código de recuperación.", "passwordLabel": "Contraseña", "qrCodeAlt": "Código QR para configurar la verificación en dos pasos", "scanQr": "Escanee este código con Google Authenticator, Aegis, Authy o 1Password.", "signInButton": "Iniciar sesión", "signOutOfAdmin": "Salir de administración", + "stepUpIntro": "Ya has iniciado sesión, así que solo hace falta tu segundo factor. No se te pide la contraseña otra vez.", + "stepUpSignedInAs": "Sesión iniciada como {email}", + "stepUpTitle": "Abrir la consola de administración", "totpCodeLabel": "Código de autenticación", "userLoginTitle": "Acceda a su buzón", "verificationFailed": "Fallo en la verificación", @@ -145,7 +149,9 @@ "draftSaved": "Borrador guardado automáticamente", "draftSaving": "Guardando borrador...", "drafts": "Borradores", + "emptyBody": "Este mensaje no tiene cuerpo de texto.", "forward": "Reenviar", + "imagesEnabled": "Imágenes cargadas", "hideCcBcc": "- Ocultar Cc/Cco", "inbox": "Bandeja de entrada", "insertLink": "Insertar enlace", @@ -153,9 +159,18 @@ "italic": "Cursiva", "junk": "Spam", "loadImages": "Cargar imágenes", + "markRead": "Marcar como leído", + "markUnread": "Marcar como no leído", + "messagesInFolder": "{count} mensajes", + "noMatches": "Nada coincide con esa búsqueda", "noMessages": "Sin mensajes", + "noSubject": "(Sin asunto)", "numberedList": "Lista numerada", + "remoteContentBlocked": "Se bloquearon las imágenes remotas para que este mensaje no pueda rastrearte.", "reply": "Responder", + "searchMatches": "{count} encontrados", + "searchPlaceholder": "Buscar (from:, subject:)...", + "selectAMessage": "Selecciona un mensaje para leerlo", "sendMessage": "Enviar mensaje", "sending": "Enviando...", "sent": "Enviados", @@ -232,6 +247,7 @@ "appPasswordsSection": "Contraseñas de aplicación", "attempts": "Intentos", "bounceRate": "Tasa de rebote", + "ccRecipients": "Cc", "changePassword": "Cambiar contraseña", "clientIp": "IP del cliente", "copyPasswordNow": "Cópiela ahora. No se mostrará de nuevo.", diff --git a/services/webmail/messages/pt-BR.json b/services/webmail/messages/pt-BR.json index 90bd292..1ae1bd0 100644 --- a/services/webmail/messages/pt-BR.json +++ b/services/webmail/messages/pt-BR.json @@ -89,11 +89,15 @@ "genericError": "Algo deu errado", "invalidCredentials": "E-mail ou senha inválidos", "mfaRequired": "Digite o código de seis dígitos do seu aplicativo autenticador.", + "orRecoveryCode": "Perdeu o celular? Um código de recuperação também funciona aqui.", "passwordLabel": "Senha", "qrCodeAlt": "Código QR para configurar a verificação em duas etapas", "scanQr": "Escaneie este código com o Google Authenticator, Aegis, Authy ou 1Password.", "signInButton": "Entrar", "signOutOfAdmin": "Sair da administração", + "stepUpIntro": "Você já está autenticado, então basta o segundo fator. A senha não é pedida de novo.", + "stepUpSignedInAs": "Autenticado como {email}", + "stepUpTitle": "Abrir o console administrativo", "totpCodeLabel": "Código de autenticação", "userLoginTitle": "Entre na sua caixa de e-mail", "verificationFailed": "Falha na verificação", @@ -145,7 +149,9 @@ "draftSaved": "Rascunho salvo automaticamente", "draftSaving": "Salvando rascunho...", "drafts": "Rascunhos", + "emptyBody": "Esta mensagem não tem corpo de texto.", "forward": "Encaminhar", + "imagesEnabled": "Imagens carregadas", "hideCcBcc": "- Ocultar Cc/Cco", "inbox": "Caixa de entrada", "insertLink": "Inserir link", @@ -153,9 +159,18 @@ "italic": "Itálico", "junk": "Spam", "loadImages": "Carregar imagens", + "markRead": "Marcar como lida", + "markUnread": "Marcar como não lida", + "messagesInFolder": "{count} mensagens", + "noMatches": "Nada corresponde a essa busca", "noMessages": "Nenhuma mensagem", + "noSubject": "(Sem assunto)", "numberedList": "Lista numerada", + "remoteContentBlocked": "As imagens remotas foram bloqueadas para que esta mensagem não possa rastrear você.", "reply": "Responder", + "searchMatches": "{count} encontradas", + "searchPlaceholder": "Buscar (from:, subject:)...", + "selectAMessage": "Selecione uma mensagem para ler", "sendMessage": "Enviar mensagem", "sending": "Enviando...", "sent": "Enviados", @@ -232,6 +247,7 @@ "appPasswordsSection": "Senhas de aplicativo", "attempts": "Tentativas", "bounceRate": "Taxa de devolução", + "ccRecipients": "Cc", "changePassword": "Alterar senha", "clientIp": "IP do cliente", "copyPasswordNow": "Copie agora. Ela não será exibida novamente.", diff --git a/services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/admin/step-up/page.tsx b/services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/admin/step-up/page.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a9d64c --- /dev/null +++ b/services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/admin/step-up/page.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +"use client"; + +import React, { useState } from "react"; +import Link from "next/link"; +import { KeyRound, ShieldCheck, AlertCircle, Sliders } from "lucide-react"; +import { useTranslations } from "../../../../i18n/provider"; +import { useAccount } from "../../../../lib/useAccount"; +import { TotpEnrolment, RecoveryCodes } from "../../../../components/TotpEnrolment"; + +/** + * Crossing from the webmail into the console. + * + * The password is not asked for again - the session that got here proved it - + * so this collects the one thing the console adds over the webmail: the second + * factor. Sending an operator who was already signed in to a full sign-in form + * was the app forgetting what it had already been told. + * + * An account with no factor yet is walked through enrolling one here rather + * than being sent off to find the settings screen. + */ +export default function AdminStepUpPage() { + const t = useTranslations(); + const account = useAccount("user"); + + const [code, setCode] = useState(""); + const [error, setError] = useState(null); + const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false); + const [enrolmentToken, setEnrolmentToken] = useState(null); + const [enrolSecret, setEnrolSecret] = useState(null); + const [enrolUri, setEnrolUri] = useState(null); + const [recoveryCodes, setRecoveryCodes] = useState(null); + + const submit = async (event: React.FormEvent) => { + event.preventDefault(); + setError(null); + setLoading(true); + + try { + // Confirming a fresh enrolment, using the grant the step-up handed back. + if (enrolmentToken) { + const res = await fetch("/api/v1/user/mfa/totp/confirm", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: `Bearer ${enrolmentToken}` }, + body: JSON.stringify({ code }), + }); + const data = await res.json(); + if (!res.ok) throw new Error(data.message || t("auth.verificationFailed")); + setRecoveryCodes(data.recovery_codes ?? []); + setEnrolmentToken(null); + setEnrolSecret(null); + setCode(""); + return; + } + + const res = await fetch("/api/v1/auth/admin/step-up", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ code }), + }); + const data = await res.json(); + + // No factor enrolled. The grant that comes back permits enrolling one and + // nothing else, so the operator can do it without leaving this screen. + if (res.status === 403 && data.error === "MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED" && data.enrollment_token) { + const enroll = await fetch("/api/v1/user/mfa/totp/enroll", { + method: "POST", + headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${data.enrollment_token}` }, + }); + const enrolData = await enroll.json(); + if (!enroll.ok) throw new Error(enrolData.message || t("auth.enrolmentFailed")); + setEnrolmentToken(data.enrollment_token); + setEnrolSecret(enrolData.secret); + setEnrolUri(enrolData.uri); + setCode(""); + return; + } + + // A session with no webmail session behind it cannot step up; the sign-in + // is where that starts. + if (res.status === 401) { + window.location.href = "/user/login?next=/admin/step-up"; + return; + } + if (!res.ok) throw new Error(data.message || t("auth.verificationFailed")); + + window.location.href = "/admin/dashboard"; + } catch (err: unknown) { + setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : t("auth.genericError")); + } finally { + setLoading(false); + } + }; + + return ( +
+
+
+
+ +
+
+

{t("auth.stepUpTitle")}

+

+ {account?.email ? t("auth.stepUpSignedInAs", { email: account.email }) : t("common.loading")} +

+
+
+ + {error && ( +
+ + {error} +
+ )} + + {recoveryCodes ? ( + setRecoveryCodes(null)} + continueLabel={t("common.continue")} + /> + ) : ( +
+ {enrolSecret ? ( +
+
+ {t("auth.enrolmentIntro")} +
+ +
+ ) : ( +
+ + {t("auth.stepUpIntro")} +
+ )} + +
+ +
+ + setCode(e.target.value.replace(/\s/g, ""))} + placeholder="123456" + required + className="w-full rounded-xl border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 pl-10 pr-4 py-3 text-center font-mono text-lg tracking-widest text-white focus:border-emerald-500 focus:outline-none" + /> +
+ {/* A recovery code is the way in when the phone is gone, and + nothing on the old screens said so. */} +

{t("auth.orRecoveryCode")}

+
+ + +
+ )} + +
+ + {t("admin.backToWebmail")} + +
+
+
+ ); +} diff --git a/services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/user/login/page.tsx b/services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/user/login/page.tsx index 5ecc471..c3299bc 100644 --- a/services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/user/login/page.tsx +++ b/services/webmail/src/app/(auth)/user/login/page.tsx @@ -1,14 +1,7 @@ "use client"; import React, { useState } from "react"; -import Link from "next/link"; -import { - Mail, - Lock, - ShieldCheck, - KeyRound, - AlertCircle, -} from "lucide-react"; +import { Mail, Lock, AlertCircle } from "lucide-react"; import { useTranslations } from "../../../../i18n/provider"; import { Card } from "../../../../components/ui/Card"; import { Button } from "../../../../components/ui/Button"; @@ -17,46 +10,40 @@ export default function UserLoginPage() { const t = useTranslations(); const [email, setEmail] = useState(""); const [password, setPassword] = useState(""); - const [mfaCode, setMfaCode] = useState(""); - const [challengeToken, setChallengeToken] = useState(null); const [error, setError] = useState(null); const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false); + /** + * One step, because the mailbox is one step. + * + * Reading your own mail is behind your own password; the second factor guards + * the console, and is collected on the way in there. This screen used to have + * a code step as well, so an account that had enrolled a factor could not open + * its inbox without its phone. + */ const handleLogin = async (e: React.FormEvent) => { e.preventDefault(); setError(null); setLoading(true); try { - if (challengeToken) { - // Step 2: Verify TOTP code - const res = await fetch("/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify", { - method: "POST", - headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, - body: JSON.stringify({ challenge_token: challengeToken, code: mfaCode }), - }); - const data = await res.json(); - if (!res.ok) throw new Error(data.message || "Two-factor verification failed"); - window.location.href = "/user/mail/inbox"; - return; - } - - // Step 1: Password authentication const res = await fetch("/api/v1/auth/user/login", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ email, password }), }); const data = await res.json(); - if (!res.ok) throw new Error(data.message || "Invalid credentials"); + if (!res.ok) throw new Error(data.message || t("auth.invalidCredentials")); - if (data.mfa_required) { - setChallengeToken(data.challenge_token); - } else { - window.location.href = "/user/mail/inbox"; - } + // The destination the middleware attached when it sent an unauthenticated + // visitor here, so a deep link survives the sign-in. + // A path on this origin only: "//evil.test" also begins with a slash, and + // following it would turn the sign-in into an open redirect. + const next = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get("next"); + const safe = next && next.startsWith("/") && !next.startsWith("//"); + window.location.href = safe ? next : "/user/mail/inbox"; } catch (err: unknown) { - setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Ocorreu um erro ao autenticar"); + setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : t("auth.genericError")); } finally { setLoading(false); } @@ -87,68 +74,46 @@ export default function UserLoginPage() { )}
- {!challengeToken ? ( - <> -
- -
- - setEmail(e.target.value)} - placeholder="user@domain.com" - required - className="w-full pl-10 pr-4 py-2.5 rounded-xl bg-slate-900/90 border border-slate-800 text-white placeholder-slate-500 focus:outline-none focus:border-indigo-500 transition-colors" - /> -
-
- -
- -
- - setPassword(e.target.value)} - placeholder="************" - required - className="w-full pl-10 pr-4 py-2.5 rounded-xl bg-slate-900/90 border border-slate-800 text-white placeholder-slate-500 focus:outline-none focus:border-indigo-500 transition-colors" - /> -
-
- - ) : ( -
-
- - {t("auth.mfaRequired")} -
- -
- - setMfaCode(e.target.value.replace(/\D/g, "").slice(0, 6))} - placeholder="123456" - maxLength={7} - required - className="w-full pl-10 pr-4 py-3 rounded-xl bg-slate-900/90 border border-slate-800 text-white text-center tracking-widest text-lg font-mono focus:outline-none focus:border-indigo-500 transition-colors" - /> -
+
+ +
+ + setEmail(e.target.value)} + placeholder="user@domain.com" + required + className="w-full pl-10 pr-4 py-2.5 rounded-xl bg-slate-900/90 border border-slate-800 text-white placeholder-slate-500 focus:outline-none focus:border-indigo-500 transition-colors" + />
- )} +
- diff --git a/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/layout.tsx b/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/layout.tsx index 647ba1f..c81f0e7 100644 --- a/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/layout.tsx +++ b/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/layout.tsx @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ "use client"; -import React, { useEffect, useState } from "react"; +import React, { useState } from "react"; import Link from "next/link"; import { usePathname } from "next/navigation"; import { motion, AnimatePresence } from "framer-motion"; @@ -24,29 +24,17 @@ import { import { useTranslations } from "../../../i18n/provider"; import { LanguageSwitcher } from "../../../i18n/LanguageSwitcher"; import { useAccount, isAdminRole } from "../../../lib/useAccount"; - -interface FolderCount { - special_use: string; - name: string; - unread_count: number; -} +import { useFolders } from "../../../lib/useFolders"; +import { badgeCount, folderMetrics } from "../../../lib/mailCounts"; export default function UserWebmailLayout({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) { const t = useTranslations(); const pathname = usePathname(); - const [folders, setFolders] = useState([]); const [mobileOpen, setMobileOpen] = useState(false); const account = useAccount("user"); - - useEffect(() => { - void fetch("/api/v1/mail/folders") - .then((res) => (res.ok ? res.json() : [])) - .then(setFolders) - .catch(() => undefined); - }, []); - - const unreadFor = (role: string) => - folders.find((f) => f.special_use === role || f.name.toLowerCase() === role)?.unread_count ?? 0; + // Live, not fetched once: these badges used to freeze at the value they had + // when the tab was opened. + const { folders } = useFolders(); const navItems = [ { href: "/user/mail/inbox", label: t("mail.inbox"), icon: Inbox, role: "inbox" }, @@ -93,31 +81,43 @@ export default function UserWebmailLayout({ children }: { children: React.ReactN {navItems.map((item) => { const Icon = item.icon; const isActive = pathname === item.href || (item.role === "inbox" && pathname === "/user/mail"); - const unread = unreadFor(item.role); + // Drafts counts what is waiting rather than what is unread; see + // badgeCount, which is where that rule is tested. + const badge = badgeCount(folders, item.role); + const { total } = folderMetrics(folders, item.role); return ( 0 ? t("mail.messagesInFolder", { count: total }) : item.label} className={`flex items-center justify-between px-3.5 py-2.5 rounded-xl transition-all duration-150 ${ isActive ? "bg-indigo-600/20 text-indigo-300 border border-indigo-500/30 shadow-sm" : "text-slate-400 hover:text-slate-200 hover:bg-slate-800/40 border border-transparent" }`} > -
- - {item.label} +
+ + {item.label} +
+
+ {/* The folder's size, shown quietly beside the badge: the + sidebar reported unread only, so there was nowhere in the + interface that said how much mail a folder holds. */} + {total > 0 && ( + {total} + )} + {badge > 0 && ( + + {badge} + + )}
- {unread > 0 && ( - - {unread} - - )} ); })} @@ -139,13 +139,13 @@ export default function UserWebmailLayout({ children }: { children: React.ReactN
{/* The console is reachable from inside the app for the accounts that - may open it, which is why there is no longer a surface chooser in - front of the sign-in. It is a plain link to the admin sign-in, not a - direct jump: the admin audience is a separate token, so crossing - over means proving the second factor again. */} + may open it. It goes to the step-up rather than to the admin sign-in: + the admin audience is a separate token, so crossing over costs a + second factor - but not the password, which the session in hand + proved already. */} {isAdminRole(account?.role) && ( diff --git a/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/mail/[folder]/page.tsx b/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/mail/[folder]/page.tsx index b16cf56..84ca9b4 100644 --- a/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/mail/[folder]/page.tsx +++ b/services/webmail/src/app/(user)/user/mail/[folder]/page.tsx @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ "use client"; -import React, { use, useCallback, useEffect, useState } from "react"; +import React, { use, useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react"; import Link from "next/link"; import { motion, AnimatePresence } from "framer-motion"; import { @@ -9,17 +9,26 @@ import { Reply, Forward, Inbox, - Filter, Image as ImageIcon, Mail, Clock, - User, - ExternalLink, + MailOpen, + Download, + X, } from "lucide-react"; -import { useTranslations } from "../../../../../i18n/provider"; +import { useI18n } from "../../../../../i18n/provider"; import { useMailEvents } from "../../../../../lib/useMailEvents"; +import { useFolders, notifyMailStateChanged } from "../../../../../lib/useFolders"; +import { + folderMetrics, + filterMessages, + messageCounts, + listHeaderCount, + applySeen, + type ListFilter, +} from "../../../../../lib/mailCounts"; import { sanitizeEmailHtml, blockRemoteImages, unblockRemoteImages } from "../../../../../lib/sanitizer"; -import { Badge } from "../../../../../components/ui/Badge"; +import { resolveInlineImages, buildReaderDocument, type InlineImages } from "../../../../../lib/emailBody"; import { Button } from "../../../../../components/ui/Button"; interface MessageSummary { @@ -46,19 +55,69 @@ interface RenderedMessage { text: string; html: string; attachments: string[]; + // The message's own pictures, keyed by Content-ID. Without these every + // cid: reference in the body is unresolvable and renders as a broken icon. + inline_images: InlineImages; +} + +/** The initials shown in the sender avatar, from a display name or an address. */ +function initials(name: string, address: string): string { + const source = (name || address || "?").trim(); + const parts = source.replace(/[<>"]/g, "").split(/[\s.@_-]+/).filter(Boolean); + const letters = parts.slice(0, 2).map((p) => p[0]); + return (letters.join("") || "?").toUpperCase(); +} + +/** + * A timestamp as a mail client shows one: the time for today, the date for + * anything older. A fixed time-only format made every message in the list look + * like it arrived today. + */ +function listTimestamp(iso: string, locale: string): string { + const date = new Date(iso); + if (Number.isNaN(date.getTime())) return ""; + const now = new Date(); + const sameDay = + date.getDate() === now.getDate() && + date.getMonth() === now.getMonth() && + date.getFullYear() === now.getFullYear(); + return sameDay + ? date.toLocaleTimeString(locale, { hour: "2-digit", minute: "2-digit" }) + : date.toLocaleDateString(locale, { day: "2-digit", month: "short" }); +} + +function formatBytes(bytes: number): string { + if (!bytes || bytes < 0) return ""; + const units = ["B", "KB", "MB", "GB"]; + let value = bytes; + let unit = 0; + while (value >= 1024 && unit < units.length - 1) { + value /= 1024; + unit += 1; + } + return `${value < 10 && unit > 0 ? value.toFixed(1) : Math.round(value)} ${units[unit]}`; } export default function MailFolderPage({ params }: { params: Promise<{ folder: string }> }) { const { folder } = use(params); - const t = useTranslations(); + // The locale is needed alongside the translator: timestamps are formatted + // against it, and a fixed format is why the list rendered every date the same + // way whatever language the interface was in. + const { t, locale } = useI18n(); const [messages, setMessages] = useState([]); const [selected, setSelected] = useState(null); const [loadRemoteImages, setLoadRemoteImages] = useState(false); const [searchQuery, setSearchQuery] = useState(""); - const [activeFilter, setActiveFilter] = useState(null); + const [activeFilter, setActiveFilter] = useState(null); const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true); const [error, setError] = useState(null); + // The frame is sized from the message rather than pinned to a guess: 500px + // clipped every long message and left white space under every short one. + const [readerHeight, setReaderHeight] = useState(420); + + const { folders } = useFolders(); + const metrics = folderMetrics(folders, folder); const loadMessages = useCallback( async (search: string) => { @@ -66,7 +125,7 @@ export default function MailFolderPage({ params }: { params: Promise<{ folder: s setError(null); try { const query = new URLSearchParams({ folder, ...(search ? { q: search } : {}) }); - const res = await fetch(`/api/v1/mail/messages?${query}`); + const res = await fetch(`/api/v1/mail/messages?${query}`, { cache: "no-store" }); if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = "/user/login"; return; @@ -82,10 +141,6 @@ export default function MailFolderPage({ params }: { params: Promise<{ folder: s [folder, t] ); - useEffect(() => { - void loadMessages(""); - }, [loadMessages]); - useMailEvents( useCallback( (event) => { @@ -97,87 +152,168 @@ export default function MailFolderPage({ params }: { params: Promise<{ folder: s ) ); + // One effect drives both the first load and the search, debounced. Having a + // separate mount effect as well meant every folder change fired two requests + // and the later one could be the stale answer. useEffect(() => { - const handle = setTimeout(() => void loadMessages(searchQuery), 250); + const handle = setTimeout(() => void loadMessages(searchQuery), searchQuery ? 250 : 0); return () => clearTimeout(handle); }, [searchQuery, loadMessages]); + // The reader frame reports its own height; nothing outside a sandboxed frame + // can measure it. + useEffect(() => { + const onMessage = (event: MessageEvent) => { + const data = event.data as { type?: string; height?: number } | null; + if (data?.type !== "lm:reader-height" || typeof data.height !== "number") return; + // Clamped so a message that reports something absurd cannot produce a + // frame kilometres tall or one collapsed to nothing. + setReaderHeight(Math.min(20000, Math.max(200, Math.ceil(data.height)))); + }; + window.addEventListener("message", onMessage); + return () => window.removeEventListener("message", onMessage); + }, []); + + /** + * Records a read-state change on the server and everywhere it is displayed. + * + * Opening a message already marked it read server-side, but the list held its + * own optimistic copy and the sidebar badge held another, so the three + * disagreed until the page was reloaded. + */ + const setSeen = useCallback( + async (uid: number, seen: boolean, { persist }: { persist: boolean }) => { + setMessages((current) => applySeen(current, uid, seen)); + notifyMailStateChanged(); + if (!persist) return; + try { + await fetch("/api/v1/mail/seen", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ folder, uid, seen }), + }); + } catch { + // The server is the authority; the next push or reload corrects this. + } finally { + notifyMailStateChanged(); + } + }, + [folder] + ); + const openMessage = async (uid: number) => { setLoadRemoteImages(false); + setReaderHeight(420); try { - const res = await fetch(`/api/v1/mail/message/${uid}?folder=${encodeURIComponent(folder)}`); + const res = await fetch(`/api/v1/mail/message/${uid}?folder=${encodeURIComponent(folder)}`, { + cache: "no-store", + }); if (!res.ok) throw new Error(t("errors.serverError")); - const data = await res.json(); - setSelected(data); - setMessages((current) => current.map((m) => (m.uid === uid ? { ...m, seen: true } : m))); + setSelected(await res.json()); + // Fetching the message is what marks it read on the server, so this only + // brings the list and the badges into line with what already happened. + void setSeen(uid, true, { persist: false }); } catch (err) { setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : t("errors.serverError")); } }; - const filteredMessages = messages.filter((msg) => { - if (activeFilter === "unread") return !msg.seen; - if (activeFilter === "attachment") return msg.has_attachments; - return true; + const filteredMessages = filterMessages(messages, activeFilter); + const counts = messageCounts(messages); + const header = listHeaderCount({ + folder: metrics, + loaded: counts.loaded, + searching: searchQuery.trim().length > 0, }); + const selectedRow = messages.find((m) => m.uid === selected?.uid); - const sanitizedHtml = selected?.html ? sanitizeEmailHtml(selected.html) : null; - const bodyHtml = sanitizedHtml - ? loadRemoteImages - ? unblockRemoteImages(sanitizedHtml) - : blockRemoteImages(sanitizedHtml) - : null; + /** + * The document the reader frame renders. + * + * Order matters: sanitise first so nothing downstream handles untrusted + * markup, then resolve the message's own inline parts, then block or restore + * remote sources - which is the only part the reader chooses. + */ + const readerDocument = useMemo(() => { + if (!selected) return null; + if (!selected.html) return null; + const sanitized = sanitizeEmailHtml(selected.html); + if (!sanitized) return null; + const withInline = resolveInlineImages(sanitized, selected.inline_images ?? {}); + const body = loadRemoteImages ? unblockRemoteImages(withInline) : blockRemoteImages(withInline); + return buildReaderDocument(body); + }, [selected, loadRemoteImages]); + + // Whether anything was actually held back, so the privacy banner is not shown + // over a message that has no remote content at all. + const hasBlockedContent = useMemo(() => { + if (!selected?.html) return false; + const sanitized = resolveInlineImages( + sanitizeEmailHtml(selected.html), + selected.inline_images ?? {} + ); + return blockRemoteImages(sanitized) !== sanitized; + }, [selected]); + + const chips: { key: ListFilter; label: string; count: number }[] = [ + { key: null, label: t("mail.allMessages"), count: header.count }, + { key: "unread", label: t("mail.unreadFilter"), count: counts.unread }, + { key: "attachment", label: t("mail.attachmentsFilter"), count: counts.withAttachments }, + ]; return (
{/* Messages List Column */}
+ {/* Folder heading, with the counts that belong to the folder rather + than to the page of it that happens to be loaded. */} +
+

{folder}

+ + {header.isFolderTotal + ? t("mail.messagesInFolder", { count: header.count }) + : t("mail.searchMatches", { count: header.count })} + {metrics.unread > 0 && ( + · {t("mail.unreadCount", { count: metrics.unread })} + )} + +
+ {/* Search Bar & Filter Chips */}
setSearchQuery(e.target.value)} - placeholder={`${t("common.search")} (from:, subject:)...`} + placeholder={t("mail.searchPlaceholder")} + aria-label={t("common.search")} className="w-full pl-9 pr-3 py-2 text-xs rounded-xl bg-slate-900/90 border border-slate-800 text-white placeholder-slate-500 focus:outline-none focus:border-indigo-500 transition-colors" />
- - - + {chips.map((chip) => ( + + ))}
@@ -193,9 +329,9 @@ export default function MailFolderPage({ params }: { params: Promise<{ folder: s {error}
) : filteredMessages.length === 0 ? ( -
+
- {t("mail.noMessages")} + {searchQuery ? t("mail.noMatches") : t("mail.noMessages")}
) : ( filteredMessages.map((msg) => { @@ -204,43 +340,54 @@ export default function MailFolderPage({ params }: { params: Promise<{ folder: s ); }) @@ -250,142 +397,179 @@ export default function MailFolderPage({ params }: { params: Promise<{ folder: s {/* Message Reader Column */}
- {selected && ( - - )} {selected ? ( - - {/* Header & Reply/Forward Actions */} -
-
-

- {selected.subject || "(Sem assunto)"} -

+ {/* Toolbar: closing, replying and read state all in one row, so + the reader is not the only pane with no way out of itself. */} +
+ - {/* Action Buttons */} -
- - - - - - - -
+
+ + + + + {/* Forward carries the subject but no recipient: it used to + prefill the original sender, which sends the message + straight back to whoever wrote it. */} + + +
+
-
-
-
- -
-
-
{selected.from}
- {selected.to.length > 0 && ( -
- Para: {selected.to.join(", ")} -
- )} -
+
+

+ {selected.subject || t("mail.noSubject")} +

+ +
+
+ {initials(selectedRow?.from_display_name ?? "", selected.from)}
-
- {selected.date ? new Date(selected.date).toLocaleString() : ""} +
+
+ {selected.from} + + {selected.date + ? new Date(selected.date).toLocaleString(locale) + : selectedRow + ? new Date(selectedRow.received_at).toLocaleString(locale) + : ""} + +
+ {/* Recipients are labelled with translated headings; they + used to be introduced by a Portuguese word regardless of + the interface language. */} + {selected.to.length > 0 && ( +
+ {t("ui.toRecipients")}: + {selected.to.join(", ")} +
+ )} + {selected.cc.length > 0 && ( +
+ {t("ui.ccRecipients")}: + {selected.cc.join(", ")} +
+ )} + {selectedRow && selectedRow.size_bytes > 0 && ( +
+ {formatBytes(selectedRow.size_bytes)} +
+ )}
{/* Attachment Download Chips */} {selected.attachments.length > 0 && ( -
+
{selected.attachments.map((filename, idx) => ( - - {filename} - + + {filename} + ))}
)} -
+
- {/* Remote Images Privacy Banner */} - {selected.html && ( -
-
- - {t("mail.loadImages")} (sanitised) -
+ {/* Remote content banner, shown only when something was actually + held back rather than over every message. */} + {hasBlockedContent && ( +
+ + + {t("mail.remoteContentBlocked")} +
)} - {/* Message Body Container */} - {bodyHtml ? ( -
+ {/* Message Body */} + {readerDocument ? ( +