#17: implement DANE TLSA, MTA-STS policy resolution, ARC sealing and mail authentication
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// Package tlspolicy resolves the outbound transport security policy of
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// PLAN.md section 6.2: DANE when the destination publishes DNSSEC-signed TLSA
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// records, MTA-STS when it publishes a policy over HTTPS, opportunistic TLS
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// otherwise.
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package tlspolicy
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"lambdamail/protocols/internal/application/port"
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"lambdamail/protocols/internal/domain/entity"
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"lambdamail/protocols/internal/domain/valueobject"
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)
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// policyFetchLimit bounds the policy body. RFC 8461 policies are a few
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// hundred bytes; anything larger is a resource-exhaustion attempt.
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const policyFetchLimit = 64 * 1024
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// Resolver implements port.TLSPolicyResolver.
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type Resolver struct {
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tlsa TlsaLookup
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httpClient *http.Client
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daneEnabled bool
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mtaStsEnabled bool
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mu sync.RWMutex
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cache map[string]cachedPolicy
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now func() time.Time
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}
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// TlsaLookup returns the DANE associations published for a host, and whether
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// the answer was DNSSEC-validated. An unvalidated answer must never be used:
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// unsigned TLSA records are trivially forged (PLAN.md section 5.1).
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type TlsaLookup interface {
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LookupTLSA(ctx context.Context, host string, port int) (records []valueobject.TLSARecord, authenticated bool, err error)
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}
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type cachedPolicy struct {
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policy entity.TLSPolicy
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expiresAt time.Time
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// absent records that the destination publishes no MTA-STS policy, so
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// repeated sends do not re-probe it on every message.
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absent bool
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}
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type Option func(*Resolver)
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// WithDane turns DANE resolution on. PLAN.md section 5.1 keeps it off unless
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// the deployment manages its own certificates, because a TLSA record that
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// stops matching after an ACME renewal blackholes mail permanently.
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func WithDane(enabled bool, lookup TlsaLookup) Option {
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return func(r *Resolver) {
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r.daneEnabled = enabled
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r.tlsa = lookup
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}
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}
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func WithMtaSts(enabled bool) Option {
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return func(r *Resolver) { r.mtaStsEnabled = enabled }
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}
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func WithHTTPClient(client *http.Client) Option {
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return func(r *Resolver) { r.httpClient = client }
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}
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func WithClock(now func() time.Time) Option {
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return func(r *Resolver) { r.now = now }
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}
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func NewResolver(options ...Option) *Resolver {
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r := &Resolver{
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httpClient: &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second},
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mtaStsEnabled: true,
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cache: map[string]cachedPolicy{},
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now: time.Now,
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}
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for _, option := range options {
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option(r)
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}
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return r
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}
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func (r *Resolver) Resolve(ctx context.Context, destinationDomain string, mxHost string) (entity.TLSPolicy, error) {
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// DANE first: it is authenticated by DNSSEC and outranks MTA-STS
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// (RFC 8461 section 2).
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if r.daneEnabled && r.tlsa != nil {
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records, authenticated, err := r.tlsa.LookupTLSA(ctx, mxHost, 25)
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if err != nil {
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, fmt.Errorf("lookup TLSA for %s: %w", mxHost, err)
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}
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if len(records) > 0 {
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if !authenticated {
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// Unsigned TLSA records carry no security value and acting on
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// them would let an attacker choose our policy.
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, fmt.Errorf("TLSA records for %s are not DNSSEC-validated", mxHost)
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}
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return entity.NewDanePolicy(records), nil
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}
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}
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if !r.mtaStsEnabled {
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return entity.NewTLSPolicy(false, false), nil
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}
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policy, found, err := r.mtaStsPolicy(ctx, destinationDomain)
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if err != nil {
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, err
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}
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if !found {
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return entity.NewTLSPolicy(false, false), nil
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}
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return policy, nil
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}
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func (r *Resolver) mtaStsPolicy(ctx context.Context, domain string) (entity.TLSPolicy, bool, error) {
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domain = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSuffix(domain, "."))
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if cached, ok := r.cached(domain); ok {
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return cached.policy, !cached.absent, nil
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}
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policy, maxAge, found, err := r.fetchPolicy(ctx, domain)
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if err != nil {
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, false, err
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}
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// Cache the negative answer too, but only briefly: a domain that starts
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// publishing a policy should be picked up without a long delay.
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ttl := time.Duration(maxAge) * time.Second
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if !found {
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ttl = time.Hour
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}
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r.store(domain, cachedPolicy{policy: policy, expiresAt: r.now().Add(ttl), absent: !found})
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return policy, found, nil
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}
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// fetchPolicy retrieves and parses https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
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// (RFC 8461 section 3.3).
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func (r *Resolver) fetchPolicy(ctx context.Context, domain string) (policy entity.TLSPolicy, maxAge int, found bool, err error) {
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url := fmt.Sprintf("https://mta-sts.%s/.well-known/mta-sts.txt", domain)
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, 0, false, err
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}
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resp, err := r.httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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// A destination that publishes no policy host is simply not an
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// MTA-STS destination; that is not an error for us.
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, 0, false, nil
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, 0, false, nil
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}
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body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, policyFetchLimit))
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if err != nil {
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, 0, false, nil
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}
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mode, patterns, maxAge := parsePolicy(string(body))
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if mode == "" || len(patterns) == 0 {
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, 0, false, nil
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}
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if mode == string(valueobject.MtaStsModeNone) {
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// An explicit "none" is the destination withdrawing its policy.
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return entity.TLSPolicy{}, 0, false, nil
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}
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enforce := mode == string(valueobject.MtaStsModeEnforce)
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return entity.NewMtaStsPolicy(patterns, enforce), maxAge, true, nil
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}
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// parsePolicy reads the key/value policy format of RFC 8461 section 3.2.
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func parsePolicy(body string) (mode string, mxPatterns []string, maxAge int) {
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for _, line := range strings.Split(body, "\n") {
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key, value, found := strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(line), ":")
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if !found {
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continue
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}
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key = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(key))
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value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
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switch key {
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case "mode":
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mode = strings.ToLower(value)
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case "mx":
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mxPatterns = append(mxPatterns, value)
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case "max_age":
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maxAge, _ = strconv.Atoi(value)
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}
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}
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// RFC 8461 section 3.2 caps max_age at 31557600 seconds; a missing or
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// absurd value falls back to a day so a stale policy cannot be pinned
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// forever by a malformed file.
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if maxAge <= 0 || maxAge > 31557600 {
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maxAge = 86400
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}
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return mode, mxPatterns, maxAge
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}
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func (r *Resolver) cached(domain string) (cachedPolicy, bool) {
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r.mu.RLock()
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defer r.mu.RUnlock()
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entry, ok := r.cache[domain]
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if !ok || r.now().After(entry.expiresAt) {
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return cachedPolicy{}, false
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}
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return entry, true
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}
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func (r *Resolver) store(domain string, entry cachedPolicy) {
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r.mu.Lock()
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defer r.mu.Unlock()
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r.cache[domain] = entry
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}
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// Ensure port interface compliance
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var _ port.TLSPolicyResolver = (*Resolver)(nil)
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