#32: file composed mail, and verify DNS records for real

Three things the console and the mail client were getting wrong. **Sent stayed empty and drafts would not save.** Both write through the same persistence path, and both failed on the same constraint: spf_result, dkim_result and dmarc_result are restricted to the RFC verdict vocabulary and are nullable, so "not evaluated" has to be NULL. The compose path left them at Go's zero value, which sends an empty string - satisfying neither the CHECK nor the meaning - and the insert was rejected. Filing the Sent copy is deliberately non-fatal, so it failed silently; saving a draft reported the error. Inbound mail was unaffected because it always supplies a real verdict, which is also why the existing test never caught it. **DNS reconciliation could not verify anything.** The console posted to the auth service, which has no resolver, so the endpoint recorded the request and re-read the status already in the database. The machinery to do it properly already existed - the background reconciler resolves every expected record through public resolvers - it just was not reachable from the console. Adds GET /api/v1/admin/dns/verify to the protocols service, which owns both the resolver and the record spec, and wires the domains screen to it: every expected record, its expected value, and whether it actually resolves. A proxied record is reported as present rather than matching, because behind a proxy the published answer is the provider's address and comparing values would always disagree. Reconciliation still runs afterwards so the stored status and the audit trail stay in step. The spec is read, never provisioned: opening a screen must not create DKIM keys as a side effect. Verified: the persistence test fails without the fix with the exact constraint violation (email_messages_dkim_result_check), 22 Go packages and 36 webmail tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 14:35:09 -03:00
1 parent 8cfe339d13
commit e5edee096c
@@ -120,7 +120,16 @@ func persistOne(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, input port.PersistInboundMessage
 		input.SenderAddress, []string{input.RecipientAddress}, input.Blob.SizeBytes,
 		nullIfEmpty(input.Subject), nullIfEmpty(input.Snippet), nullIfEmpty(input.FromDisplayName),
 		nullIfEmpty(input.MessageIDHeader), input.HasAttachments,
-		input.SPFResult, input.DKIMResult, input.DMARCResult)
+		// These three columns are constrained to the RFC verdict vocabulary
+		// ('pass', 'fail', 'none', ...) and are nullable, so "not evaluated"
+		// has to be NULL. Passing the Go zero value straight through sent an
+		// empty string, which satisfies neither the CHECK nor the meaning.
+		//
+		// It only ever surfaced on messages this server composed itself - the
+		// Sent copy and drafts have no authentication results by definition -
+		// and it failed the whole insert. Sent stayed empty because that write
+		// is deliberately non-fatal, and saving a draft reported an error.
+		nullIfEmpty(input.SPFResult), nullIfEmpty(input.DKIMResult), nullIfEmpty(input.DMARCResult))
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("insert email_messages: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -263,3 +263,75 @@ func TestInboundMessageRepository_FallsBackToInboxWhenFolderMissing(t *testing.T
 		t.Errorf("message landed in folder %s, want the INBOX %s", folderID, inboxID)
 	}
 }
+
+// A message this server composed - the Sent copy, or a draft - has no
+// authentication results, and the columns holding them are constrained to the
+// RFC verdict vocabulary. Passing Go's zero value sent an empty string, which
+// satisfies neither the CHECK nor the meaning, and the whole insert failed.
+//
+// The existing test above always supplied "none", so it never touched this.
+// The visible effect was a permanently empty Sent folder - that write is
+// non-fatal by design - and "could not save the draft" in the composer.
+func TestInboundMessageRepository_PersistsWithoutAuthenticationResults(t *testing.T) {
+	pool := testPool(t)
+	defer pool.Close()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	domainID := uuid.New()
+	domainName := "noauth-test-" + domainID.String() + ".invalid"
+	if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO domains (id, name, punycode_name) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
+		domainID, domainName, domainName); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed domain: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM domains WHERE id = $1`, domainID)
+
+	address := "user@" + domainName
+	mailboxID := uuid.New()
+	if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO mailboxes (id, domain_id, local_part, email_address, password_hash) VALUES ($1, $2, 'user', $3, '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=4$c29tZXNhbHQ$RdescudvJCsgt3ub+b+dWRWJTmaaJObG')`,
+		mailboxID, domainID, address); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed mailbox: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, f := range []struct{ name, use string }{{"INBOX", "inbox"}, {"Sent", "sent"}, {"Drafts", "drafts"}} {
+		if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO folders (id, mailbox_id, name, special_use) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)`,
+			uuid.New(), mailboxID, f.name, f.use); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("seed folder %s: %v", f.name, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	blobID := uuid.New()
+	if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO message_blobs (id, content_sha256, storage_driver, storage_path, size_bytes) VALUES ($1, $2, 'local', '/tmp/x', 10)`,
+		blobID, testBlobDigest()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed blob: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	repo := NewInboundMessageRepository(pool)
+	blob := port.BlobRef{ID: blobID, SHA256: "deadbeef", SizeBytes: 10}
+
+	for _, folder := range []string{"Sent", "Drafts"} {
+		uids, err := repo.PersistAll(ctx, []port.PersistInboundMessageInput{{
+			MailboxID: mailboxID, Blob: blob,
+			SenderAddress: address, RecipientAddress: address,
+			TargetFolderName: folder, Subject: "composed here",
+			// Left empty exactly as the compose path leaves them.
+		}})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("PersistAll into %s with no authentication results: %v", folder, err)
+		}
+		if len(uids) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("want one uid for %s, got %v", folder, uids)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Stored as NULL, not as an empty string: "not evaluated" and "evaluated
+	// to nothing" are different answers.
+	var nulls int
+	if err := pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		SELECT count(*) FROM email_messages
+		 WHERE mailbox_id = $1 AND spf_result IS NULL AND dkim_result IS NULL AND dmarc_result IS NULL
+	`, mailboxID).Scan(&nulls); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("query: %v", err)
+	}
+	if nulls != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("want 2 rows with NULL authentication results, got %d", nulls)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package httppresentation
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+
+	"lambdamail/protocols/internal/domain/entity"
+)
+
+// DnsRecordVerifier answers whether one expected record is actually published.
+// Implemented by the same public-resolver verifier the reconciler uses, so the
+// console and the background sync agree on what "verified" means.
+type DnsRecordVerifier interface {
+	VerifyRecord(ctx context.Context, record entity.DnsRecord) (bool, string)
+}
+
+// DnsSpecSource builds the records a domain is expected to publish. It lives
+// behind an interface because assembling the spec needs the DKIM public keys,
+// which only the service holding the vault can read.
+type DnsSpecSource interface {
+	ExpectedRecords(ctx context.Context, domain string) ([]entity.DnsRecord, error)
+}
+
+type adminDnsAPI struct {
+	spec     DnsSpecSource
+	verifier DnsRecordVerifier
+	sessions *WebSessionVerifier
+}
+
+// handleVerify checks every expected record against public resolvers and
+// reports each one individually.
+//
+// This is the endpoint the admin console's reconcile button had no equivalent
+// of. The auth service answered it by writing an audit row and re-reading the
+// stored status, because it has no resolver - so the console could only ever
+// repeat what the database already believed. Verification belongs here, with
+// the resolver and the record spec.
+func (a *adminDnsAPI) handleVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	token := bearerOrCookie(r, "lm_admin_session")
+	if token == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Admin session required")
+		return
+	}
+	if _, err := a.sessions.RequireSurface(token, "admin"); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Admin session required")
+		return
+	}
+
+	domain := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("domain"))
+	if domain == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "DOMAIN_REQUIRED", "A domain is required")
+		return
+	}
+
+	expected, err := a.spec.ExpectedRecords(r.Context(), domain)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "SPEC_FAILED", "Could not assemble the expected records")
+		return
+	}
+
+	type result struct {
+		Type     string `json:"type"`
+		Name     string `json:"name"`
+		Expected string `json:"expected"`
+		Verified bool   `json:"verified"`
+		Detail   string `json:"detail"`
+		Proxied  bool   `json:"proxied"`
+	}
+
+	results := make([]result, 0, len(expected))
+	verified := 0
+	for _, record := range expected {
+		ok, detail := a.verifier.VerifyRecord(r.Context(), record)
+		if ok {
+			verified++
+		}
+		results = append(results, result{
+			Type:     record.Type,
+			Name:     record.Name,
+			Expected: record.Value,
+			Verified: ok,
+			Detail:   detail,
+			// Reported so the console can explain why a proxied record is
+			// checked for presence only: behind a proxy the published answer
+			// is the provider's address, never the value we asked for.
+			Proxied: record.Proxied,
+		})
+	}
+
+	status := "VERIFIED"
+	switch {
+	case len(results) == 0:
+		status = "UNKNOWN"
+	case verified == 0:
+		status = "MISSING"
+	case verified < len(results):
+		status = "PARTIAL"
+	}
+
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+		"domain":   domain,
+		"status":   status,
+		"verified": verified,
+		"total":    len(results),
+		"records":  results,
+	})
+}
+
+// SetAdminDnsAPI wires per-record DNS verification. Without a session secret
+// the route answers 503 rather than opening unauthenticated.
+func (r *Router) SetAdminDnsAPI(spec DnsSpecSource, verifier DnsRecordVerifier, sessionSecret string) {
+	if spec == nil || verifier == nil || sessionSecret == "" {
+		return
+	}
+	r.dns = &adminDnsAPI{spec: spec, verifier: verifier, sessions: NewWebSessionVerifier(sessionSecret)}
+}
+
+func (r *Router) handleAdminDnsVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+	if r.dns == nil {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "DNS_API_DISABLED",
+			"DNS verification needs JWT_SECRET and a configured domain")
+		return
+	}
+	r.dns.handleVerify(w, req)
+}
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ type Router struct {
 	dkim *adminDkimAPI
 	// tls reports what the certificate watcher sees, rather than a constant.
 	tls *adminTlsAPI
+	// dns verifies the published records against public resolvers. It lives
+	// here because this is the process with the resolver and the record spec.
+	dns *adminDnsAPI
 	// degradedFunc reports a condition that leaves the service running but
 	// not fit for production, the clearest case being a self-signed
 	// certificate standing in for one Traefik never issued
@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ func (r *Router) registerRoutes() {
 	r.mux.HandleFunc("/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml", r.handleOutlookAutodiscover)
 	r.mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/events", r.handleEvents)
 	r.mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/admin/tls", r.handleAdminTls)
+	r.mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/admin/dns/verify", r.handleAdminDnsVerify)
 	r.mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/admin/dkim/keys", r.handleAdminDkimKeys)
 	r.mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/admin/dkim/rotate", r.handleAdminDkimRotate)
 	r.mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/mail/folders", r.handleMailFolders)