DKIM rotation broke the domain it was run on. It retired the live key and
inserted a placeholder as ACTIVE - private_key_enc was the literal string
"dummy-encrypted-key" - so FindActiveKeys then failed for the whole
domain and outbound mail stopped being signed, with the real key already
gone. Reproduced against a database before changing anything.
The root cause runs deeper: the auth service derives its encryption key
with a plain SHA-256 of the master key while the protocols service uses
HKDF with its own info string, so nothing the auth service seals can ever
be opened by the signer. Rotation therefore moves to the protocols
service, which owns that vault and the real key generator. It retires the
previous key with a seven-day overlap in the same transaction rather than
deleting it, because mail already sent under it is still being verified.
Domain onboarding had three defects in one function. It built the alias
destination by interpolating the domain name into the SQL text, which was
injectable; it reused one placeholder for a CITEXT and a VARCHAR column,
which made the statement fail and happened to hide the injection; and it
ignored its scope argument entirely, so any DOMAIN_ADMIN could create
domains. It also provisioned postmaster, abuse and security, missing the
dmarc and tlsrpt aliases that the published records point at - PLAN.md
section 7.4b is explicit that reports bounce without them.
The TLS panel returned fixed values: acme_status "VALID" and 72 days to
expiry, whatever the process actually held. It now reads the certificate
watcher, and a compile-time assertion keeps the wiring from silently
regressing into "disabled". The audit log and the readiness scorecard were
fixtures too, and their field names did not match the API they now read.
Two tests failed and a third asserted a fabricated constant: one depended
on test order through a shared fixture that had a second factor enrolled,
one used a fixed domain name and so passed once per database, and one
expected "records: 13" from a function that never touches DNS. All three
are fixed, and the suite now passes twice in a row against one database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F4's acceptance criterion asks for the three translations to be 100%
complete with the language lint green. The bundles had parity but the
admin screens and the account area were still hardcoded English: 63
visible strings that no locale could reach.
They now come from a shared ui namespace, so the three bundles cannot
drift apart, and all three carry 126 keys.
The language lint also caught this branch's own Go tests: the RFC 2047
cases need accented output to be worth anything, and the delivery test
had Portuguese fixture text. The expectations are written as Go escapes
instead, which keeps the assertions and leaves the source ASCII, and the
fixture text is English.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F4 lists real-time updates and the interface had none: an open inbox only
changed when the user reloaded it.
Events come from the transactional outbox rather than from an in-process
callback, which is what the outbox is for (PLAN.md section 9.4): the row
is written in the same transaction as the message, so an event can never
describe a delivery that rolled back, and a crash between commit and
publish loses nothing because the row is still there on restart. The relay
claims rows with SKIP LOCKED so a second instance can help without
publishing anything twice.
The hub fans events out per mailbox, keyed by the mailbox the session
resolved to, so one account's arrivals are never visible to another even
though they share the process. A subscriber that stops reading is dropped
rather than allowed to stall the relay; it reconciles on reconnect.
The client reconnects with capped exponential backoff and treats every
successful connect as a resync, refetching the folder. Without that, a
socket that dropped for a minute would leave the list quietly stale, which
is worse than having no real-time updates at all.
The upgrade goes through a Next rewrite, not the API route handler: a
route handler sees a finished request and cannot upgrade a connection.
Verified against the running stack - the handshake returns 101 through the
Next server, and a message delivered on port 25 arrives as a frame on an
already-open socket without the page asking for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mail list rendered two hardcoded messages and the reader showed their
canned HTML; compose ran a countdown and then navigated away without ever
submitting anything. Both now use the API, including search, the unread
badges in the sidebar (which were the literals "3" and "1", so an empty
inbox still advertised unread mail), and marking a message read on open.
The undo window now means what it says: the message is held in the browser
and only submitted when the countdown elapses, so cancelling it means
nothing was ever queued rather than trying to recall it afterwards.
Message bodies render in an iframe with an empty sandbox - no scripts, no
same-origin - and remote references are stripped until the reader asks for
images, so a tracking pixel cannot fire on open. The previous sandbox
allowed popups.
The admin page titles and the language switcher labels now come from the
bundles. The labels live there rather than in the source because PLAN.md
R9 keeps non-ASCII out of code, and each language should be named the way
that language names it.
ADR-001 assigned the mail API to the TypeScript storage service; the
reasoning for putting it in Go instead is recorded in PLAN.md, which
.gitignore deliberately keeps out of the repository, so that revision
lives only in the working copy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three separate gaps, all of which made the F4 interface non-functional or
unprotected:
The admin console rendered for anyone. There was no middleware and no
guard in the layout, so /admin/dashboard returned 200 unauthenticated -
only its data calls failed. middleware.ts now redirects both surfaces to
their login when the session cookie is missing, expired, carries the wrong
audience, or is a pre-MFA challenge token. It reads the claims without
verifying the signature on purpose: the signing key belongs to the auth
service and must not reach the browser bundle. That is sound because this
is not the boundary - every /api/v1 request is verified for real upstream.
Nothing served /api/v1/*. next.config.ts had no rewrites and there were no
route handlers, so every call the pages made 404'd against the Next
server, while AUTH_SERVICE_URL sat unused. A catch-all route now proxies
to the auth service, forwarding the client address and preserving multiple
Set-Cookie headers, which logout needs to clear both surfaces. Session
cookies also move to Path=/, since a cookie pinned to /user or /admin was
never sent with the /api/v1 requests that needed it.
i18n existed only as files. The three bundles had perfect key parity and
real translations, but no library, no imports and no switcher: the UI was
hardcoded English and i18n.test.ts compared keys while the feature was
absent. There is now a provider, a hook, a language switcher, and
server-side Accept-Language negotiation that honours q-values and matches
a bare "pt" to pt-BR. Logins, both layouts and the settings screen consume
it; the admin pages still have English titles.
The settings screen invented app passwords in the browser with Math.random
and never stored them. It now calls the API, which returns the password
once and keeps only its hash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI gains a security job (Trivy fs: vuln, secret and misconfig) and an
image job that builds each of the four services and scans the result. The
secret scanner earns its place here: a DKIM key or Cloudflare token
committed by accident is a full compromise of every domain served.
release.yml publishes on a merge into main and on v* tags. Four services
on two architectures is eight build jobs pushing by digest, then four
publish jobs joining each pair into one manifest list, tagged latest, sha
and semver. github.repository is lowercased first because GHCR rejects an
uppercase path and this repository is lucasrguerra/LambdaMail.
Both scanners failed on first run, so this commit also fixes what they
found rather than shipping a workflow that is red on arrival:
- All four images ran as root (DS-0002), which section 17 risk R5
explicitly argues against. They now run unprivileged; protocols keeps
its eight ports below 1024 through cap_net_bind_service on the binary
rather than through being root.
- A HIGH advisory in postcss, reached only through Next. "npm audit fix
--force" would have resolved it by downgrading Next from 15 to 9, so
it is pinned with an override instead.
- The Node images copied the build stage's node_modules wholesale,
shipping typescript, eslint and vitest into production, and the base
image's own bundled npm accounted for the rest of the CVEs. Runtime
dependencies now come from npm ci --omit=dev and npm is removed from
the final layer.
- compose-up could never have passed: the proxy network is external
because Coolify owns it on the deploy host, and nothing creates it in
CI, so compose refused to start the stack at all.
Verified locally: actionlint clean, all ten action refs confirmed to
exist, Trivy fs and all four image scans exit 0, the full stack reaches
Healthy on every container, and the containers run as uid 10001/1000 with
all eight privileged ports bound and SMTP answering on 25. The arm64
build itself is unverified - this machine has no buildx - and will first
be exercised by release.yml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified live via WSL Docker (docker compose up --wait): every other F0
service came up healthy, but web stayed unhealthy. Root cause was two
compounding issues, both invisible to static review:
1. Docker auto-sets HOSTNAME to the container ID; Next's standalone
server.js honors that env var and binds only to it instead of all
interfaces. Fixed by explicitly setting ENV HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0 in the
Dockerfile, after Docker's automatic assignment.
2. Even bound to 0.0.0.0 (IPv4), the healthcheck's `wget http://localhost`
resolved localhost to ::1 (IPv6) first inside the container, where
nothing was listening. Fixed by pointing the healthcheck at
127.0.0.1 explicitly instead of localhost.
Full stack (db, redis, migrate, auth, storage, protocols, web) now
reaches healthy end-to-end under docker compose up --wait.
Stands up the LambdaMail monorepo per PLAN.md's F0 milestone: local dev
scaffolding (.env.example, Makefile, .gitignore excluding PLAN.md/docs/
.superpowers/), the full initial Postgres schema as a golang-migrate
migration, the complete Go domain layer for services/protocols (value
objects, entities, domain events - zero external imports beyond
github.com/google/uuid) with unit tests, health-checked service skeletons
for auth/storage (TypeScript) and webmail (Next.js), a local
docker-compose.yaml wiring all services together, a language-enforcement
lint script, and a GitHub Actions CI workflow.
Built via 11 sequential tasks under subagent-driven development, each with
an independent implementer + reviewer cycle. Fixes applied during review:
DomainName.IsPunycode() added to satisfy the promised interface; ioredis
default-import typing under NodeNext; next.js bumped 15.0.3->15.5.21 to
resolve high/critical CVEs; lang-lint.mjs corrected to not flag its own
banned-terms list; web service healthcheck added so compose --wait
actually waits on it; webmail Dockerfile's missing public/ directory:
protocols go.mod version aligned with CI's Go 1.22 pin.
Known follow-ups for later phases (not blocking F0): go-arch-lint isn't
wired into CI yet; live docker compose up and migration apply have not
been exercised in this dev environment (no Docker/psql available here)
and will get their first real run in CI, which does have Docker.
