The deployment sets NODE_ENV=production, and npm omits devDependencies
when it is set - so "npm ci" in the build stage installed no typescript
and "npm run build" failed with exit 127, command not found. The first
Coolify deployment died there.
The build stage now asks for them explicitly rather than depending on the
environment it happens to run in. Reproduced by building all three images
with NODE_ENV=production before and after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DKIM rotation broke the domain it was run on. It retired the live key and
inserted a placeholder as ACTIVE - private_key_enc was the literal string
"dummy-encrypted-key" - so FindActiveKeys then failed for the whole
domain and outbound mail stopped being signed, with the real key already
gone. Reproduced against a database before changing anything.
The root cause runs deeper: the auth service derives its encryption key
with a plain SHA-256 of the master key while the protocols service uses
HKDF with its own info string, so nothing the auth service seals can ever
be opened by the signer. Rotation therefore moves to the protocols
service, which owns that vault and the real key generator. It retires the
previous key with a seven-day overlap in the same transaction rather than
deleting it, because mail already sent under it is still being verified.
Domain onboarding had three defects in one function. It built the alias
destination by interpolating the domain name into the SQL text, which was
injectable; it reused one placeholder for a CITEXT and a VARCHAR column,
which made the statement fail and happened to hide the injection; and it
ignored its scope argument entirely, so any DOMAIN_ADMIN could create
domains. It also provisioned postmaster, abuse and security, missing the
dmarc and tlsrpt aliases that the published records point at - PLAN.md
section 7.4b is explicit that reports bounce without them.
The TLS panel returned fixed values: acme_status "VALID" and 72 days to
expiry, whatever the process actually held. It now reads the certificate
watcher, and a compile-time assertion keeps the wiring from silently
regressing into "disabled". The audit log and the readiness scorecard were
fixtures too, and their field names did not match the API they now read.
Two tests failed and a third asserted a fabricated constant: one depended
on test order through a shared fixture that had a second factor enrolled,
one used a fixed domain name and so passed once per database, and one
expected "records: 13" from a function that never touches DNS. All three
are fixed, and the suite now passes twice in a row against one database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sessions and password changes were the two things PLAN.md section 14.2
asks of the account area that were still missing, and the admin console
had no audit trail at all despite section 14.3 requiring one for every
mutation.
Session revocation is enforced on every request, not just recorded. A JWT
carries its own validity, so revoking a row without checking it would have
made "sign out this device" a button that did nothing until the token
expired eight hours later. Changing a password revokes every other session
for the same reason: a password change that leaves the attacker's session
alive has not locked anyone out.
Admin queries are scoped by role in the SQL rather than in the UI, as
section 14.3 requires: a DOMAIN_ADMIN calling the API directly sees only
its own domain, and a mailbox outside that scope answers 404 rather than
403 so the scope cannot be used to enumerate what exists elsewhere.
The two mutations that exist so far - enabling or disabling a mailbox, and
retrying or cancelling a queued delivery - write actor, IP and target to
audit_log, and there is an endpoint to read it back.
Covered by tests against a real database: a revoked token stops working
mid-session, a password change needs the current password and takes the
other sessions down with it, and the minimum length is enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The F4 auth service issued a valid session for any email and any password,
and accepted any non-empty string as a second factor. Reproduced against
the router before touching it: an invented password plus the code "000000"
returned a SUPER_ADMIN token that opened /api/v1/admin/dashboard.
Passwords. Hashing moves from PBKDF2 to Argon2id via hash-wasm, which is
what PLAN.md section 9 and the Go service already use - the previous
scheme meant a password set through the mail stack could never verify
here. Interoperability was checked in both directions before adopting the
library: a hash written by alexedwards/argon2id verifies in Node and one
written here verifies in Go. hash-wasm is pure WASM, so the multi-arch
Alpine images need no native build.
verifyPassword no longer falls back to comparing the password against the
stored hash. That fallback turned every stored hash into a working
credential: anyone with a database dump could authenticate by sending the
hash back. Anything that is not an argon2id PHC string is now refused.
Logins are decided against the database, with the failure counter and the
temporary lockout of PLAN.md section 5.2. An unknown address and a wrong
password give the same answer, and the unknown case still pays for a hash
so response time does not enumerate valid addresses.
Second factor. The TOTP secret is generated server-side, stored encrypted
and never accepted back from the client - the confirm step used to take
whichever secret the caller sent, so anyone could confirm with their own.
Recovery codes are Argon2id, single-use, and consumed under a guard so two
concurrent requests cannot spend the same one. App passwords are issued
and revoked through real endpoints instead of browser state.
Sessions gain a "purpose" claim. Without it the challenge token - handed
out after the password but before the second factor - satisfied every
check a real session did, which skipped MFA entirely.
The dev seed carried a hand-written password_hash whose digest was 24
bytes instead of 32, so it matched no password at all. Nothing noticed
while passwords went unverified; it is a real hash now.
Verified with 30 tests, 13 of them against a real Postgres: wrong password,
unknown account, pass-the-hash, wrong TOTP code, challenge token replay,
lockout, single-use recovery codes, and the surface isolation that F4's
acceptance criteria require.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI gains a security job (Trivy fs: vuln, secret and misconfig) and an
image job that builds each of the four services and scans the result. The
secret scanner earns its place here: a DKIM key or Cloudflare token
committed by accident is a full compromise of every domain served.
release.yml publishes on a merge into main and on v* tags. Four services
on two architectures is eight build jobs pushing by digest, then four
publish jobs joining each pair into one manifest list, tagged latest, sha
and semver. github.repository is lowercased first because GHCR rejects an
uppercase path and this repository is lucasrguerra/LambdaMail.
Both scanners failed on first run, so this commit also fixes what they
found rather than shipping a workflow that is red on arrival:
- All four images ran as root (DS-0002), which section 17 risk R5
explicitly argues against. They now run unprivileged; protocols keeps
its eight ports below 1024 through cap_net_bind_service on the binary
rather than through being root.
- A HIGH advisory in postcss, reached only through Next. "npm audit fix
--force" would have resolved it by downgrading Next from 15 to 9, so
it is pinned with an override instead.
- The Node images copied the build stage's node_modules wholesale,
shipping typescript, eslint and vitest into production, and the base
image's own bundled npm accounted for the rest of the CVEs. Runtime
dependencies now come from npm ci --omit=dev and npm is removed from
the final layer.
- compose-up could never have passed: the proxy network is external
because Coolify owns it on the deploy host, and nothing creates it in
CI, so compose refused to start the stack at all.
Verified locally: actionlint clean, all ten action refs confirmed to
exist, Trivy fs and all four image scans exit 0, the full stack reaches
Healthy on every container, and the containers run as uid 10001/1000 with
all eight privileged ports bound and SMTP answering on 25. The arm64
build itself is unverified - this machine has no buildx - and will first
be exercised by release.yml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stands up the LambdaMail monorepo per PLAN.md's F0 milestone: local dev
scaffolding (.env.example, Makefile, .gitignore excluding PLAN.md/docs/
.superpowers/), the full initial Postgres schema as a golang-migrate
migration, the complete Go domain layer for services/protocols (value
objects, entities, domain events - zero external imports beyond
github.com/google/uuid) with unit tests, health-checked service skeletons
for auth/storage (TypeScript) and webmail (Next.js), a local
docker-compose.yaml wiring all services together, a language-enforcement
lint script, and a GitHub Actions CI workflow.
Built via 11 sequential tasks under subagent-driven development, each with
an independent implementer + reviewer cycle. Fixes applied during review:
DomainName.IsPunycode() added to satisfy the promised interface; ioredis
default-import typing under NodeNext; next.js bumped 15.0.3->15.5.21 to
resolve high/critical CVEs; lang-lint.mjs corrected to not flag its own
banned-terms list; web service healthcheck added so compose --wait
actually waits on it; webmail Dockerfile's missing public/ directory:
protocols go.mod version aligned with CI's Go 1.22 pin.
Known follow-ups for later phases (not blocking F0): go-arch-lint isn't
wired into CI yet; live docker compose up and migration apply have not
been exercised in this dev environment (no Docker/psql available here)
and will get their first real run in CI, which does have Docker.
