Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Lucas RayanandClaude Sonnet 5.5 67d0c8aa5a feat(protocols): conversations - thread_id and in_reply_to written at delivery, list and read APIs
A reply now joins the conversation of the message it answers (Message-ID,
In-Reply-To, References), falling back to the subject for replies with no
headers. /mail/threads lists a folder as conversations and /mail/thread/{id}
returns one. Replying from the webmail flags the answered message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 16:38:36 -03:00
Lucas Rayan 9c8b9c00fc fix(smtp): keep a copy of every submitted message in the sender's Sent folder
A message sent over SMTP submission was delivered but left nothing behind: the
account's Sent folder stayed empty. Webmail files its own copy after sending,
and a mail client cannot do it either, since IMAP APPEND is not implemented, so
nothing ever filled Sent for SMTP clients.

- ProcessOutboundEmailInput.FileSentCopy asks Submit to file the signed message
  in the sender's Sent folder, as read (not unread), sharing the blob the
  delivery jobs already reference; one copy per submission, not per recipient
- the SMTP submission session sets it; the webmail leaves it off because it
  files its own copy without the Bcc line, and asking twice would duplicate it
- filed only after the message is durably queued, so a submission refused by the
  send limit leaves nothing behind; a failure to file is logged, never returned,
  because the mail is already on its way and the client would send it again

Tests: unit cases (asked/not asked, shared blob, failure swallowed, limit
refusal, no repository) and an end-to-end test on the real submission server
that fails with "Sent holds 0 messages" without the fix. Full go test ./...
(25 packages) with TEST_DATABASE_URL, go vet and lang-lint are clean.
2026-10-16 12:51:46 -03:00
Lucas Rayan 110a240cd9 fix(auth): app passwords now sign in SMTP, IMAP and POP3
The webmail creates app passwords (shown once, stored hashed, with scopes) but
the protocol servers only compared a login against mailboxes.password_hash, so
an app password was always refused with 535 / authentication failed. They exist
because mail clients cannot do a second factor.

- port.MailboxAuth carries the mailbox's app passwords (newest 20) with their
  scopes; the Postgres repository loads them and stamps last_used_at on use
- verifyCredential accepts the mailbox password or an app password that holds
  the scope of the protocol; SMTP, IMAP and POP3 use it. ManageSieve keeps the
  mailbox password only, as no default scope covers it
- a malformed app password hash is skipped instead of failing the login; a
  malformed mailbox hash still surfaces as the server-side error it was

Tests: unit cases for scopes and malformed hashes, the three entry points,
repository tests against Postgres, and an end-to-end test on the real
submission server that fails with 535 without the fix and passes with it.
Full `go test ./...` with TEST_DATABASE_URL, go vet and lang-lint are clean.
2026-10-16 09:21:08 -03:00
Lucas Rayan bd0af98076 #17: implement DANE TLSA, MTA-STS policy resolution, ARC sealing and mail authentication 2026-08-01 22:48:38 -03:00