The webmail creates app passwords (shown once, stored hashed, with scopes) but
the protocol servers only compared a login against mailboxes.password_hash, so
an app password was always refused with 535 / authentication failed. They exist
because mail clients cannot do a second factor.
- port.MailboxAuth carries the mailbox's app passwords (newest 20) with their
scopes; the Postgres repository loads them and stamps last_used_at on use
- verifyCredential accepts the mailbox password or an app password that holds
the scope of the protocol; SMTP, IMAP and POP3 use it. ManageSieve keeps the
mailbox password only, as no default scope covers it
- a malformed app password hash is skipped instead of failing the login; a
malformed mailbox hash still surfaces as the server-side error it was
Tests: unit cases for scopes and malformed hashes, the three entry points,
repository tests against Postgres, and an end-to-end test on the real
submission server that fails with 535 without the fix and passes with it.
Full `go test ./...` with TEST_DATABASE_URL, go vet and lang-lint are clean.
