8b69521c76722baed1a2ee90522f00a90f8473e6
8
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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8b69521c76 |
#34: fix the mail counters, the reader pane, and the state between surfaces
The counts were computed inline in JSX where nothing could test them. The
sidebar matched a folder by a special-use role folders do not always carry, its
badges were fetched once and then froze - new mail did not raise them and
reading a message did not lower it - and the list header printed the size of
the loaded page, capped at 50, as the size of the folder. The rules now live in
mailCounts.ts behind tests, useFolders keeps them current from the server's
push and from this tab's own changes, and each filter chip carries its number.
Inline images never left the server: RenderMessage dropped every part a body
references as cid:, so mail written by any normal client rendered with broken
icons. They now come back as bounded data URIs, refusing image/svg+xml, and the
reader resolves them, sizes its frame from the message instead of a fixed
500px, and renders on the light surface mail assumes.
Reading mail no longer asks for a second factor - the mailbox is behind the
account's own password - while the console still requires one unconditionally,
now collected by a step-up that does not ask again for the password the session
in hand just proved. An admin sign-in issues the webmail session too, so
leaving the console is a link rather than another login.
Two defects found while testing the above:
- The admin sign-in checked the password and the second factor and never the
role, so any account that had enrolled a factor from its own settings could
obtain an admin-audience session.
- Session tokens carried nothing that varied below one second, so signing in
twice within the same second minted the identical token and collided with
the unique index on web_sessions.refresh_token_hash. A correct password
answered 500, and a double-clicked sign-in was enough to do it. Tokens now
carry a jti.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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57198e0263 |
#28: stop enrolment from silently replacing a secret the authenticator already has
Enrolling a second factor could reach a state where the authenticator showed perfectly valid codes and every one of them was rejected, with the only feedback being "TOTP verification failed". The browser holds the enrolment secret in component state alone. Reloading the settings page - or leaving and coming back - brought the "enable" button back, and pressing it called the enrol endpoint again, which deleted the pending row and stored a brand new secret. The entry already saved in the authenticator then belonged to a secret the server no longer had. Nothing about that is visible from either side: the app generates codes correctly, the server compares them correctly, and they are for different keys. Enrolment now resumes. The endpoint returns the pending secret if there is one, so the QR shown after a reload is the same one already scanned and rescanning is harmless. Starting over is still possible - ?reset=1, exposed in the settings screen - because someone who deleted the entry from their app needs a secret they can actually generate codes for. A pending row that can no longer be decrypted is replaced rather than resumed, since nobody could ever confirm it. Also: the submitted code now has every non-digit stripped rather than just surrounding whitespace. Authenticators display the code grouped as "123 456", and a value typed or pasted with that space failed the six-character length check before it was ever compared - which, to someone reading the right number off their phone, looks like the server being wrong. The inputs sanitise as you type for the same reason. Ruled out first, rather than guessed at: the algorithm passes all six RFC 6238 reference vectors, base32 round-trips, and the deployment's clock is exactly in sync with real time, so neither the implementation nor drift explains it. Verified: the resume test fails without the change and passes with it; 47 auth tests green against a real Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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ee240ae227 |
#23: show real data, unify the surfaces and make enrolment scannable
The interface was reporting things that were not true. Several screens were
mockups wired to nothing, and a reader with the console in Portuguese was
served a mixture of two languages.
Fabricated data, removed:
- The outbound queue was two invented jobs held in component state. Retry and
Freeze only edited that local array, so the screen showed the same two rows
on every deployment and reported success for actions that never happened.
"Freeze" named an operation the backend has never implemented. It now reads
/api/v1/admin/queue, which was already serving the real thing, and offers
retry and cancel, which exist.
- Every dashboard KPI fell back to an invented constant (1420 received, 890
sent, 3 queued, 18.4% disk), so an unreachable API produced a dashboard of
plausible traffic for a server that might have delivered nothing. Two of
those fields were never returned by the endpoint at all, so the fake disk
figure was what everyone always saw. DMARC did the same with 1250/98%/97%.
- The domains screen showed thirteen DNS records for example.com, all marked
VERIFIED, and posted {domain_id: "default-domain"} to endpoints expecting a
real id. DKIM rotation sends "domain", not "domain_id", so its 400 was
swallowed and a made-up TXT record displayed as though a key had been
issued: rotation had never once worked from this screen.
- The TLS panel asserted a Let's Encrypt RSA 4096 certificate and verified
DANE from static markup, on a deployment currently serving a self-signed
one. It now reads the cert watcher via /api/v1/admin/tls.
- The readiness scorecard printed "10 / 10 all checks passed" regardless of
what preflight reported, including failures.
- A message trace that found nothing invented a five-step delivery - TLS 1.3
accepted, SPF pass, spam score 0.8 - for a message that does not exist.
- Both sidebars showed a fixed admin@lambdamail.local with a hardcoded
"SUPER_ADMIN (2FA)", claiming a second factor whether or not one existed.
- Settings seeded a "[Boletim]" Sieve rule. Saving posts the whole list, so
the first edit wrote that invented filter into the account's real script.
The reconcile endpoint itself answered {records_verified: 13, status:
"VERIFIED"} for any domain id, including one that does not exist, without
resolving a name. It now reports what it does, which is record the request.
Surfaces:
The root was a chooser listing webmail and the console side by side, which
asked visitors a question they should not have to answer and advertised cookie
names and audiences to anonymous readers. It now redirects into the mail
client. Accounts that may administer the server get a link to the console from
inside the app - a link to /admin/login, so crossing over still costs the
second factor the admin audience requires - and the console gets a plain link
back, since the webmail session was never given up to get there.
Enrolment:
Both enrolment screens printed the base32 secret as text and left the operator
to type 32 characters into their phone. The enrol endpoint already returned an
otpauth:// URI; it simply was not drawn. Added a shared component that renders
it as a QR locally - the seed is already in the page, and sending it to an
image service would put it in another request log for nothing.
The recovery-code step rendered its own "sign in" button while the form's
submit button stayed visible below it: two identical buttons, and no way to
copy the codes it insisted you save. It is now terminal, with copy and
continue.
Language:
translate() had no interpolation, so "Undo Send ({seconds}s remaining)" showed
the placeholder and a second hardcoded countdown was appended after it. It now
substitutes, leaving an unmatched token visible rather than blanking it.
The pt-BR bundle had lost its diacritics - "Destinatario", "Ultimo erro",
"Acoes" - from the ASCII-source rule being applied to the translations, which
are data. Restored, and the three bundles are back in key parity at 270 each,
with roughly 120 strings that were hardcoded in the source now keyed.
Healthchecks:
web had none, despite being the only service users reach directly: a wedged
Next process kept its container running and Traefik kept routing to it. Added,
using node's own fetch since the image ships no curl. rspamd and clamav gained
the timeouts and start_periods whose absence would fail them during startup.
migrate stays without one and says why: it is a one-shot job, and a probe
would report unhealthy exactly when it has succeeded.
Verified: 36 webmail tests and 41 auth tests against a real Postgres, both new
admin/me cases confirmed to fail without the route (404). lang-lint clean,
production build clean, 0 vulnerabilities, compose validates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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3a82d82428 |
#22: fix the admin lockout, and the regressions the UI rewrite brought back
The console demanded a second factor and refused to open without one, but
enrolment lived on the other surface - so an operator whose only account
was the administrator had no way in. The password was already verified at
that point, so the refusal now carries a short-lived grant that permits
enrolling a factor and nothing else, and the admin login screen walks
through it: secret, confirmation, recovery codes, sign in. Two tests cover
it, including that the grant opens no other endpoint.
The rewrite also undid work that was already in place:
- The postcss override was dropped and the advisory came back, along
with a critical one in vitest. postcss is a direct dependency now, so
the fix is the version plus an override scoped to Next's own copy;
vitest moves to 3.2.7. The lockfile needed regenerating for either to
take effect. Zero advisories now.
- 100 language-lint violations: the admin console had been rewritten
with its strings in Portuguese, hardcoded. That fails CI, and it also
puts those strings beyond the reach of the translation bundles - an
English or Spanish user would have read Portuguese. They are English
in the source again.
- The mail screen put a fixed 320px list beside the reader with no
breakpoint, so on a phone the viewport overflowed and the message was
a few pixels wide. One pane at a time below md, with a way back.
- The icon-only navigation toggles had nothing for a screen reader to
announce.
The layouts' own mobile navigation and every previously fixed behaviour
survived the rewrite - checked rather than assumed.
Also fixes a marker collision I introduced: the E2E helper locates the
repository by a migrations directory, and services/migrations satisfied
that one directory too early. It now requires the SQL to actually be
there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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30014f0f41 |
#21: fix the DKIM, onboarding and console defects found reviewing the new work
DKIM rotation broke the domain it was run on. It retired the live key and inserted a placeholder as ACTIVE - private_key_enc was the literal string "dummy-encrypted-key" - so FindActiveKeys then failed for the whole domain and outbound mail stopped being signed, with the real key already gone. Reproduced against a database before changing anything. The root cause runs deeper: the auth service derives its encryption key with a plain SHA-256 of the master key while the protocols service uses HKDF with its own info string, so nothing the auth service seals can ever be opened by the signer. Rotation therefore moves to the protocols service, which owns that vault and the real key generator. It retires the previous key with a seven-day overlap in the same transaction rather than deleting it, because mail already sent under it is still being verified. Domain onboarding had three defects in one function. It built the alias destination by interpolating the domain name into the SQL text, which was injectable; it reused one placeholder for a CITEXT and a VARCHAR column, which made the statement fail and happened to hide the injection; and it ignored its scope argument entirely, so any DOMAIN_ADMIN could create domains. It also provisioned postmaster, abuse and security, missing the dmarc and tlsrpt aliases that the published records point at - PLAN.md section 7.4b is explicit that reports bounce without them. The TLS panel returned fixed values: acme_status "VALID" and 72 days to expiry, whatever the process actually held. It now reads the certificate watcher, and a compile-time assertion keeps the wiring from silently regressing into "disabled". The audit log and the readiness scorecard were fixtures too, and their field names did not match the API they now read. Two tests failed and a third asserted a fabricated constant: one depended on test order through a shared fixture that had a second factor enrolled, one used a fixed domain name and so passed once per database, and one expected "records: 13" from a function that never touches DNS. All three are fixed, and the suite now passes twice in a row against one database. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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eec4a4e520 |
#21: complete the account area and audit every admin mutation
Sessions and password changes were the two things PLAN.md section 14.2 asks of the account area that were still missing, and the admin console had no audit trail at all despite section 14.3 requiring one for every mutation. Session revocation is enforced on every request, not just recorded. A JWT carries its own validity, so revoking a row without checking it would have made "sign out this device" a button that did nothing until the token expired eight hours later. Changing a password revokes every other session for the same reason: a password change that leaves the attacker's session alive has not locked anyone out. Admin queries are scoped by role in the SQL rather than in the UI, as section 14.3 requires: a DOMAIN_ADMIN calling the API directly sees only its own domain, and a mailbox outside that scope answers 404 rather than 403 so the scope cannot be used to enumerate what exists elsewhere. The two mutations that exist so far - enabling or disabling a mailbox, and retrying or cancelling a queued delivery - write actor, IP and target to audit_log, and there is an endpoint to read it back. Covered by tests against a real database: a revoked token stops working mid-session, a password change needs the current password and takes the other sessions down with it, and the minimum length is enforced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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833dc76c2e |
#21: make the auth service actually authenticate
The F4 auth service issued a valid session for any email and any password, and accepted any non-empty string as a second factor. Reproduced against the router before touching it: an invented password plus the code "000000" returned a SUPER_ADMIN token that opened /api/v1/admin/dashboard. Passwords. Hashing moves from PBKDF2 to Argon2id via hash-wasm, which is what PLAN.md section 9 and the Go service already use - the previous scheme meant a password set through the mail stack could never verify here. Interoperability was checked in both directions before adopting the library: a hash written by alexedwards/argon2id verifies in Node and one written here verifies in Go. hash-wasm is pure WASM, so the multi-arch Alpine images need no native build. verifyPassword no longer falls back to comparing the password against the stored hash. That fallback turned every stored hash into a working credential: anyone with a database dump could authenticate by sending the hash back. Anything that is not an argon2id PHC string is now refused. Logins are decided against the database, with the failure counter and the temporary lockout of PLAN.md section 5.2. An unknown address and a wrong password give the same answer, and the unknown case still pays for a hash so response time does not enumerate valid addresses. Second factor. The TOTP secret is generated server-side, stored encrypted and never accepted back from the client - the confirm step used to take whichever secret the caller sent, so anyone could confirm with their own. Recovery codes are Argon2id, single-use, and consumed under a guard so two concurrent requests cannot spend the same one. App passwords are issued and revoked through real endpoints instead of browser state. Sessions gain a "purpose" claim. Without it the challenge token - handed out after the password but before the second factor - satisfied every check a real session did, which skipped MFA entirely. The dev seed carried a hand-written password_hash whose digest was 24 bytes instead of 32, so it matched no password at all. Nothing noticed while passwords went unverified; it is a real hash now. Verified with 30 tests, 13 of them against a real Postgres: wrong password, unknown account, pass-the-hash, wrong TOTP code, challenge token replay, lockout, single-use recovery codes, and the surface isolation that F4's acceptance criteria require. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas Rayan
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6e01fc7ffb | #20: implement F4 webmail, admin console, 2FA TOTP, surface isolation, and i18n |