DKIM rotation broke the domain it was run on. It retired the live key and
inserted a placeholder as ACTIVE - private_key_enc was the literal string
"dummy-encrypted-key" - so FindActiveKeys then failed for the whole
domain and outbound mail stopped being signed, with the real key already
gone. Reproduced against a database before changing anything.
The root cause runs deeper: the auth service derives its encryption key
with a plain SHA-256 of the master key while the protocols service uses
HKDF with its own info string, so nothing the auth service seals can ever
be opened by the signer. Rotation therefore moves to the protocols
service, which owns that vault and the real key generator. It retires the
previous key with a seven-day overlap in the same transaction rather than
deleting it, because mail already sent under it is still being verified.
Domain onboarding had three defects in one function. It built the alias
destination by interpolating the domain name into the SQL text, which was
injectable; it reused one placeholder for a CITEXT and a VARCHAR column,
which made the statement fail and happened to hide the injection; and it
ignored its scope argument entirely, so any DOMAIN_ADMIN could create
domains. It also provisioned postmaster, abuse and security, missing the
dmarc and tlsrpt aliases that the published records point at - PLAN.md
section 7.4b is explicit that reports bounce without them.
The TLS panel returned fixed values: acme_status "VALID" and 72 days to
expiry, whatever the process actually held. It now reads the certificate
watcher, and a compile-time assertion keeps the wiring from silently
regressing into "disabled". The audit log and the readiness scorecard were
fixtures too, and their field names did not match the API they now read.
Two tests failed and a third asserted a fabricated constant: one depended
on test order through a shared fixture that had a second factor enrolled,
one used a fixed domain name and so passed once per database, and one
expected "records: 13" from a function that never touches DNS. All three
are fixed, and the suite now passes twice in a row against one database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F4 lists real-time updates and the interface had none: an open inbox only
changed when the user reloaded it.
Events come from the transactional outbox rather than from an in-process
callback, which is what the outbox is for (PLAN.md section 9.4): the row
is written in the same transaction as the message, so an event can never
describe a delivery that rolled back, and a crash between commit and
publish loses nothing because the row is still there on restart. The relay
claims rows with SKIP LOCKED so a second instance can help without
publishing anything twice.
The hub fans events out per mailbox, keyed by the mailbox the session
resolved to, so one account's arrivals are never visible to another even
though they share the process. A subscriber that stops reading is dropped
rather than allowed to stall the relay; it reconciles on reconnect.
The client reconnects with capped exponential backoff and treats every
successful connect as a resync, refetching the folder. Without that, a
socket that dropped for a minute would leave the list quietly stale, which
is worse than having no real-time updates at all.
The upgrade goes through a Next rewrite, not the API route handler: a
route handler sees a finished request and cannot upgrade a connection.
Verified against the running stack - the handshake returns 101 through the
Next server, and a message delivered on port 25 arrives as a frame on an
already-open socket without the page asking for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mail screens had no backend at all: they rendered a hardcoded array,
and the storage service that ADR-001 assigned this to is still a health
stub. The API lands here instead, because the folder, UID, MODSEQ, flag
and blob logic already exists and is tested in this service for IMAP.
Reimplementing it in TypeScript would mean two implementations of the
same semantics and two chances to disagree about what a UID means.
Reads use a projected read model rather than hydrated aggregates, which
is the CQRS exception PLAN.md section 2 carves out for webmail queries.
Every query is scoped to the mailbox resolved from the verified session,
never to an identifier taken from the request, so one account cannot read
another's mail by guessing a UID - covered by a test that tries exactly
that and expects 404.
Sending reuses ProcessOutboundEmailUseCase, so mail written in the browser
gets the same treatment as mail submitted over 587: send limits, DKIM
signing, and the durable queue. The From address comes from the session
and never from the request body; letting the body choose it is how a
webmail becomes a relay for spoofed mail.
MIME is parsed server-side because this service already depends on a MIME
library. A message that will not parse still returns its raw text - an
unreadable message beats an inbox that refuses to open one.
Marking a message read updates the flag and the folder counter in one
transaction, and only on a real transition, so re-opening a message cannot
drive unread_count negative.
Verified against the running stack: a message delivered over port 25
appears in the list with its decoded subject and sender, opens, marks
itself read, is found by search, and a message composed in the webmail
reaches outbound_jobs with the session's address as the envelope sender.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every fix here is a case where the code and the plan disagreed, and the
code was wrong.
Certificates (section 8.2, 8.4). The parser documented that it skipped
expired entries but never checked, so an expired certificate would be
served until every handshake failed. LastReload() only advanced when
acme.json changed - and it does not change for sixty days - which made
the timestamp risk R2 monitors indistinguishable from a watcher gone
blind. Expiry is now checked on every pass, LastReload records the check
and LastChange the swap, and the <7d/<24h alerts of section 8.4 exist.
ARC (section 5). buildArcSealer resolved the DKIM key at startup, before
runDnsReconciler had provisioned one. On a first boot ARC was disabled
until someone restarted the process, which the log even admitted while
offering no way for it to start. A LazySealer binds on first use instead.
Health (section 8.4). There was no degraded state at all. /health now
reports one - still 200, because restarting cannot fix a certificate
Traefik never issued.
Bounces. DSNs were sent From postmaster@lambdamail.local, a domain that
does not resolve, so the notification was itself undeliverable. They now
carry the configured mail host, a Message-ID, and Auto-Submitted so a
vacation responder cannot loop against them.
Fan-out atomicity (section 6.1). Persist ran one transaction per
recipient, so a failure halfway through an alias fan-out left earlier
recipients with a copy while the sender was told to retry - and the retry
delivered to them twice. PersistAll commits the whole delivery or none of
it. Verified against Postgres by reverting the repository to the old
behaviour and confirming the new test fails on it.
SMTP replies. The use case encoded replies in error text ("550 5.7.1 ...")
which the adapter re-parsed by prefix, so rewording a message could turn a
permanent refusal into a retry. SmtpRejection carries the decision and the
adapter renders it.
Repository tests. These only run with TEST_DATABASE_URL, which CI does
set - so the job was red: copy and expunge seeded a 68-character digest
into a CHAR(64) column, and three others used fixed digests that collide
with the UNIQUE index on any re-run. A shared testBlobDigest() helper
fixes both; the suite now passes twice in a row against one database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the second F2 sub-project on top of the merged IMAP core: full
SEARCH criteria matching (flags, dates, size, headers, body/text,
NOT/OR), EXPUNGE (soft-delete via expunged_at), COPY, and MOVE (RFC
6851, advertised via CapMove/CapUIDPlus). Verified end-to-end with a
real go-imap/v2 client against embedded Postgres.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a real :143 IMAP listener to the Go protocols service: a mailbox
owner authenticates over IMAP (Argon2id against mailboxes.password_hash,
enumeration-resistant per PLAN.md section 14.6), lists folders, selects
INBOX, fetches messages F1's SMTP path already persisted - including real
ENVELOPE/BODY[] built from the actual stored MIME bytes via go-imap/v2's
own ExtractEnvelope/ExtractBodySection helpers, not reconstructed from
denormalized columns - and sets/reads flags via STORE.
- ImapSessionUseCase orchestrates auth, folder listing/selection, message
querying, and flag mutation against new Postgres repositories (auth,
folders, message query, flags) and a local-disk blob reader.
- A github.com/emersion/go-imap/v2 (pinned v2.0.0-beta.8) Backend/Session
implements 7 real methods (Login, List, Select, Unselect, Status, Fetch,
Store) plus a correct no-op Poll; the other 10 of the interface's 18
methods (Create/Delete/Rename/Subscribe/Unsubscribe/Append/Idle/Expunge/
Search/Copy) are explicit stubs returning a clear "not yet implemented"
IMAP error - SEARCH/EXPUNGE/COPY/MOVE, IDLE/CONDSTORE, mailbox
management, and APPEND are separate follow-up sub-projects per the
design doc's agreed ordering with the user.
Verified end-to-end with a real go-imap/v2 imapclient (embedded Postgres,
no Docker needed) driving Login -> Select -> Fetch -> Store -> List
against a message seeded through F1's real SMTP use case, proving true
SMTP-write/IMAP-read interop, not just isolated unit tests.
Built via 8 sequential tasks under subagent-driven development, each
independently reviewed, plus a final whole-branch review. Two real bugs
were found and fixed before merge, both exactly the kind unit tests with
fakes cannot catch:
- Store's UID-set resolution silently no-op'd on dynamic ranges like
"UID STORE 1:*" (the common "mark all as read" operation) after an
earlier draft bypassed the folder's real message list; restored to
resolve against real messages via the same pattern Fetch already used
correctly, with tests proving both dynamic ranges and non-UID STORE.
- go-imap/v2's server calls Session.Poll() implicitly before the status
response of nearly every authenticated command (FETCH/STORE/SEARCH/
APPEND/COPY), not just IDLE as assumed - a hard-stubbed Poll broke every
real command through this path; fixed to a correct no-op.
- List had zero test coverage despite being committed scope; added unit
tests for wildcard/delimiter matching plus a real E2E LIST assertion.
Known follow-up, not blocking: a pre-existing test-fixture hygiene gap
(hardcoded content_sha256 blob hashes with no cleanup, shared across
several Postgres integration test files including one new to this
branch) causes local-dev test collisions on repeated runs against a
persistent database - invisible to CI (fresh Postgres per run) but worth
a cleanup pass.
Adds a real :25 SMTP listener to the Go protocols service, giving F1's
"Nucleo SMTP" milestone its first working sub-project: application,
infrastructure, and presentation layers on top of F0's domain-only
Clean Architecture.
- ProcessInboundEmailUseCase resolves recipients against Postgres and
persists accepted mail (blob dedup by content hash, transactional
UID allocation + outbox event, never sending 250 OK before durable
commit per PLAN.md section 6.1).
- Postgres repositories via pgx/v5 (replacing lib/pq entirely).
- Local-disk blob storage with content-hash dedup, rename-before-commit
ordering so a DB row can never reference a file that isn't actually
on disk.
- A local-file TLS cert provider for STARTTLS, with an ephemeral
self-signed fallback so a missing/misconfigured cert degrades
gracefully instead of crash-looping the service (PLAN.md section 8.4).
- A github.com/emersion/go-smtp Backend/Session adapting real SMTP
traffic to the use case: unknown recipients get 550 5.1.1 before
DATA, duplicate RCPT TO for the same address is deduplicated, TLS is
hardened to the project's required PFS-only cipher/curve policy.
- A dev-seed script and Makefile target for local testing.
Explicitly out of scope (separate follow-up sub-projects): alias
resolution, SPF/DKIM/DMARC/ARC verification, Rspamd/ClamAV, Submission
ports with SASL auth, DKIM signing, outbound delivery, and the real
Traefik acme.json cert watcher.
Verified live end-to-end via WSL Docker: the full compose stack (db,
redis, migrate, auth, storage, protocols, web) reaches healthy, and a
real swaks SMTP session is accepted and durably persisted with correct
sequential UIDs, while an unknown recipient is correctly rejected with
550 5.1.1 and zero rows persisted. Built via 10 sequential tasks under
subagent-driven development, each independently reviewed, plus a final
whole-branch review that caught and fixed a TLS-crash bug, a blob
commit-ordering bug, missing TLS hardening, and missing CI integration
coverage before merge.
Known follow-up, not blocking: email_messages' partition only covers
July 2026 and needs a partition-management job before 2026-08-01.
Stands up the LambdaMail monorepo per PLAN.md's F0 milestone: local dev
scaffolding (.env.example, Makefile, .gitignore excluding PLAN.md/docs/
.superpowers/), the full initial Postgres schema as a golang-migrate
migration, the complete Go domain layer for services/protocols (value
objects, entities, domain events - zero external imports beyond
github.com/google/uuid) with unit tests, health-checked service skeletons
for auth/storage (TypeScript) and webmail (Next.js), a local
docker-compose.yaml wiring all services together, a language-enforcement
lint script, and a GitHub Actions CI workflow.
Built via 11 sequential tasks under subagent-driven development, each with
an independent implementer + reviewer cycle. Fixes applied during review:
DomainName.IsPunycode() added to satisfy the promised interface; ioredis
default-import typing under NodeNext; next.js bumped 15.0.3->15.5.21 to
resolve high/critical CVEs; lang-lint.mjs corrected to not flag its own
banned-terms list; web service healthcheck added so compose --wait
actually waits on it; webmail Dockerfile's missing public/ directory:
protocols go.mod version aligned with CI's Go 1.22 pin.
Known follow-ups for later phases (not blocking F0): go-arch-lint isn't
wired into CI yet; live docker compose up and migration apply have not
been exercised in this dev environment (no Docker/psql available here)
and will get their first real run in CI, which does have Docker.
