8dab25472988b4b71e706d99f577b8d54577152a
7
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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ee240ae227 |
#23: show real data, unify the surfaces and make enrolment scannable
The interface was reporting things that were not true. Several screens were
mockups wired to nothing, and a reader with the console in Portuguese was
served a mixture of two languages.
Fabricated data, removed:
- The outbound queue was two invented jobs held in component state. Retry and
Freeze only edited that local array, so the screen showed the same two rows
on every deployment and reported success for actions that never happened.
"Freeze" named an operation the backend has never implemented. It now reads
/api/v1/admin/queue, which was already serving the real thing, and offers
retry and cancel, which exist.
- Every dashboard KPI fell back to an invented constant (1420 received, 890
sent, 3 queued, 18.4% disk), so an unreachable API produced a dashboard of
plausible traffic for a server that might have delivered nothing. Two of
those fields were never returned by the endpoint at all, so the fake disk
figure was what everyone always saw. DMARC did the same with 1250/98%/97%.
- The domains screen showed thirteen DNS records for example.com, all marked
VERIFIED, and posted {domain_id: "default-domain"} to endpoints expecting a
real id. DKIM rotation sends "domain", not "domain_id", so its 400 was
swallowed and a made-up TXT record displayed as though a key had been
issued: rotation had never once worked from this screen.
- The TLS panel asserted a Let's Encrypt RSA 4096 certificate and verified
DANE from static markup, on a deployment currently serving a self-signed
one. It now reads the cert watcher via /api/v1/admin/tls.
- The readiness scorecard printed "10 / 10 all checks passed" regardless of
what preflight reported, including failures.
- A message trace that found nothing invented a five-step delivery - TLS 1.3
accepted, SPF pass, spam score 0.8 - for a message that does not exist.
- Both sidebars showed a fixed admin@lambdamail.local with a hardcoded
"SUPER_ADMIN (2FA)", claiming a second factor whether or not one existed.
- Settings seeded a "[Boletim]" Sieve rule. Saving posts the whole list, so
the first edit wrote that invented filter into the account's real script.
The reconcile endpoint itself answered {records_verified: 13, status:
"VERIFIED"} for any domain id, including one that does not exist, without
resolving a name. It now reports what it does, which is record the request.
Surfaces:
The root was a chooser listing webmail and the console side by side, which
asked visitors a question they should not have to answer and advertised cookie
names and audiences to anonymous readers. It now redirects into the mail
client. Accounts that may administer the server get a link to the console from
inside the app - a link to /admin/login, so crossing over still costs the
second factor the admin audience requires - and the console gets a plain link
back, since the webmail session was never given up to get there.
Enrolment:
Both enrolment screens printed the base32 secret as text and left the operator
to type 32 characters into their phone. The enrol endpoint already returned an
otpauth:// URI; it simply was not drawn. Added a shared component that renders
it as a QR locally - the seed is already in the page, and sending it to an
image service would put it in another request log for nothing.
The recovery-code step rendered its own "sign in" button while the form's
submit button stayed visible below it: two identical buttons, and no way to
copy the codes it insisted you save. It is now terminal, with copy and
continue.
Language:
translate() had no interpolation, so "Undo Send ({seconds}s remaining)" showed
the placeholder and a second hardcoded countdown was appended after it. It now
substitutes, leaving an unmatched token visible rather than blanking it.
The pt-BR bundle had lost its diacritics - "Destinatario", "Ultimo erro",
"Acoes" - from the ASCII-source rule being applied to the translations, which
are data. Restored, and the three bundles are back in key parity at 270 each,
with roughly 120 strings that were hardcoded in the source now keyed.
Healthchecks:
web had none, despite being the only service users reach directly: a wedged
Next process kept its container running and Traefik kept routing to it. Added,
using node's own fetch since the image ships no curl. rspamd and clamav gained
the timeouts and start_periods whose absence would fail them during startup.
migrate stays without one and says why: it is a one-shot job, and a probe
would report unhealthy exactly when it has succeeded.
Verified: 36 webmail tests and 41 auth tests against a real Postgres, both new
admin/me cases confirmed to fail without the route (404). lang-lint clean,
production build clean, 0 vulnerabilities, compose validates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
|
3a82d82428 |
#22: fix the admin lockout, and the regressions the UI rewrite brought back
The console demanded a second factor and refused to open without one, but
enrolment lived on the other surface - so an operator whose only account
was the administrator had no way in. The password was already verified at
that point, so the refusal now carries a short-lived grant that permits
enrolling a factor and nothing else, and the admin login screen walks
through it: secret, confirmation, recovery codes, sign in. Two tests cover
it, including that the grant opens no other endpoint.
The rewrite also undid work that was already in place:
- The postcss override was dropped and the advisory came back, along
with a critical one in vitest. postcss is a direct dependency now, so
the fix is the version plus an override scoped to Next's own copy;
vitest moves to 3.2.7. The lockfile needed regenerating for either to
take effect. Zero advisories now.
- 100 language-lint violations: the admin console had been rewritten
with its strings in Portuguese, hardcoded. That fails CI, and it also
puts those strings beyond the reach of the translation bundles - an
English or Spanish user would have read Portuguese. They are English
in the source again.
- The mail screen put a fixed 320px list beside the reader with no
breakpoint, so on a phone the viewport overflowed and the message was
a few pixels wide. One pane at a time below md, with a way back.
- The icon-only navigation toggles had nothing for a screen reader to
announce.
The layouts' own mobile navigation and every previously fixed behaviour
survived the rewrite - checked rather than assumed.
Also fixes a marker collision I introduced: the E2E helper locates the
repository by a migrations directory, and services/migrations satisfied
that one directory too early. It now requires the SQL to actually be
there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
|
30014f0f41 |
#21: fix the DKIM, onboarding and console defects found reviewing the new work
DKIM rotation broke the domain it was run on. It retired the live key and inserted a placeholder as ACTIVE - private_key_enc was the literal string "dummy-encrypted-key" - so FindActiveKeys then failed for the whole domain and outbound mail stopped being signed, with the real key already gone. Reproduced against a database before changing anything. The root cause runs deeper: the auth service derives its encryption key with a plain SHA-256 of the master key while the protocols service uses HKDF with its own info string, so nothing the auth service seals can ever be opened by the signer. Rotation therefore moves to the protocols service, which owns that vault and the real key generator. It retires the previous key with a seven-day overlap in the same transaction rather than deleting it, because mail already sent under it is still being verified. Domain onboarding had three defects in one function. It built the alias destination by interpolating the domain name into the SQL text, which was injectable; it reused one placeholder for a CITEXT and a VARCHAR column, which made the statement fail and happened to hide the injection; and it ignored its scope argument entirely, so any DOMAIN_ADMIN could create domains. It also provisioned postmaster, abuse and security, missing the dmarc and tlsrpt aliases that the published records point at - PLAN.md section 7.4b is explicit that reports bounce without them. The TLS panel returned fixed values: acme_status "VALID" and 72 days to expiry, whatever the process actually held. It now reads the certificate watcher, and a compile-time assertion keeps the wiring from silently regressing into "disabled". The audit log and the readiness scorecard were fixtures too, and their field names did not match the API they now read. Two tests failed and a third asserted a fabricated constant: one depended on test order through a shared fixture that had a second factor enrolled, one used a fixed domain name and so passed once per database, and one expected "records: 13" from a function that never touches DNS. All three are fixed, and the suite now passes twice in a row against one database. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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b57854107e |
#21: finish the three translations across every screen
F4's acceptance criterion asks for the three translations to be 100% complete with the language lint green. The bundles had parity but the admin screens and the account area were still hardcoded English: 63 visible strings that no locale could reach. They now come from a shared ui namespace, so the three bundles cannot drift apart, and all three carry 126 keys. The language lint also caught this branch's own Go tests: the RFC 2047 cases need accented output to be worth anything, and the delivery test had Portuguese fixture text. The expectations are written as Go escapes instead, which keeps the assertions and leaves the source ASCII, and the fixture text is English. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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3e60852551 |
#21: put real mail on the webmail screens
The mail list rendered two hardcoded messages and the reader showed their canned HTML; compose ran a countdown and then navigated away without ever submitting anything. Both now use the API, including search, the unread badges in the sidebar (which were the literals "3" and "1", so an empty inbox still advertised unread mail), and marking a message read on open. The undo window now means what it says: the message is held in the browser and only submitted when the countdown elapses, so cancelling it means nothing was ever queued rather than trying to recall it afterwards. Message bodies render in an iframe with an empty sandbox - no scripts, no same-origin - and remote references are stripped until the reader asks for images, so a tracking pixel cannot fire on open. The previous sandbox allowed popups. The admin page titles and the language switcher labels now come from the bundles. The labels live there rather than in the source because PLAN.md R9 keeps non-ASCII out of code, and each language should be named the way that language names it. ADR-001 assigned the mail API to the TypeScript storage service; the reasoning for putting it in Go instead is recorded in PLAN.md, which .gitignore deliberately keeps out of the repository, so that revision lives only in the working copy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
|
132cecd41c |
#21: guard the web surfaces and connect them to the auth service
Three separate gaps, all of which made the F4 interface non-functional or unprotected: The admin console rendered for anyone. There was no middleware and no guard in the layout, so /admin/dashboard returned 200 unauthenticated - only its data calls failed. middleware.ts now redirects both surfaces to their login when the session cookie is missing, expired, carries the wrong audience, or is a pre-MFA challenge token. It reads the claims without verifying the signature on purpose: the signing key belongs to the auth service and must not reach the browser bundle. That is sound because this is not the boundary - every /api/v1 request is verified for real upstream. Nothing served /api/v1/*. next.config.ts had no rewrites and there were no route handlers, so every call the pages made 404'd against the Next server, while AUTH_SERVICE_URL sat unused. A catch-all route now proxies to the auth service, forwarding the client address and preserving multiple Set-Cookie headers, which logout needs to clear both surfaces. Session cookies also move to Path=/, since a cookie pinned to /user or /admin was never sent with the /api/v1 requests that needed it. i18n existed only as files. The three bundles had perfect key parity and real translations, but no library, no imports and no switcher: the UI was hardcoded English and i18n.test.ts compared keys while the feature was absent. There is now a provider, a hook, a language switcher, and server-side Accept-Language negotiation that honours q-values and matches a bare "pt" to pt-BR. Logins, both layouts and the settings screen consume it; the admin pages still have English titles. The settings screen invented app passwords in the browser with Math.random and never stored them. It now calls the API, which returns the password once and keeps only its hash. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas Rayan
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6e01fc7ffb | #20: implement F4 webmail, admin console, 2FA TOTP, surface isolation, and i18n |