f801894f53718e8d25e7f5a1975488b3e52f668b
21
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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2b92abd185 |
feat(admin): paginacao na interface, edicao de utilizadores e pagina de testes
- fila e utilizadores passam a pedir uma pagina de cada vez, com pesquisa e filtros; nada e cortado no browser, porque o que faltava nunca chegou a ser buscado. A pesquisa espera que se pare de escrever: cada tecla seria mais uma consulta, e as respostas podem chegar fora de ordem - pageWindow e pageRange tem testes proprios: uma pagina fora do intervalo vem de um URL velho ou de uma lista que encolheu, e nao pode dar um paginador vazio ou negativo, nem dizer "76 a 100 de 82" - editar utilizador: papel, quota, idioma, com os apelidos que entregam naquela caixa a mostra no mesmo painel - "Caixas de e-mail" passa a chamar-se Utilizadores, que e o que sao Pagina nova /admin/tests: verificacoes que o operador corre a mao, sobre o servidor ou sobre um utilizador. Todas leem estado; nenhuma envia correio nem altera definicoes -- uma pagina de diagnostico que mexe naquilo que diagnostica e pior do que nao existir. As regras de cada verificacao sao funcoes puras com testes, separadas da recolha dos factos. Alguns casos que estes testes fixam: uma quota zero significa sem limite, e um racio marcaria todas as caixas ilimitadas como cheias; um bloqueio ja expirado nao bloqueia ninguem e nao deve mandar ninguem investigar; e uma resposta de ausencia ligada com o periodo ja passado esta ligada sem fazer nada, que e o que parece avariado a quem a pos. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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136f9f339a |
fix(tls): o painel de seguranca estava vazio em qualquer modo menos um
/admin/security mostrava "Nao foi possivel carregar os dados" porque /api/v1/admin/tls respondia 503. A rota so era ligada quando o certificado vinha do watcher do acme.json do Traefik, o unico provider que tinha metodos de estado proprios. Nesta instalacao o TRAEFIK_ACME_DIR nao esta definido e o STATIC_CERT_PATH tambem nao, portanto o servidor cai no certificado autoassinado efemero -- ou seja, o painel calava-se exactamente no estado em que o operador mais precisa de ser avisado. - ProviderStatus deriva o estado de qualquer port.CertProvider, lendo a folha do certificado que ele realmente serve - o painel passa a ser ligado sempre que ha JWT_SECRET - passa a dizer quem emitiu e se e autoassinado, com um aviso proprio: nas portas de correio um autoassinado e recusado por qualquer cliente que verifique, o que pesa mais do que uma validade ainda longe CheckSignatureFrom nao serve para detectar isto: tambem exige que o emissor seja uma CA, coisa que uma folha descartavel nunca declara, e por isso dava a fallback degradada como correctamente emitida. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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47c3700380 |
fix(dns): reconciliar reescrevia os mesmos registos a cada passagem
Duas coisas apanhadas ao correr o reconcile contra a zona real depois de a
rota passar a funcionar.
1) Nao era idempotente: 0 criados, 4 corrigidos, 11 iguais -- e outra vez 4
corrigidos na passagem seguinte, para sempre, com o temporizador a fazer o
mesmo em ciclo. Os 4 eram os SRV. A Cloudflare devolve o content de um SRV
SEM a prioridade ("1 993 host" para um registo guardado como "0 1 993
host") e guarda-a em data. O adaptador so recorria a data quando o content
vinha vazio, portanto lia sempre um valor diferente do da spec.
Para SRV e TLSA a data passa a ser a autoridade.
2) A spec de cada dominio incluia o A e o AAAA do mail host. Um segundo
dominio servido pelo mesmo servidor aponta o MX para um host que nao lhe
pertence, por isso reconciliar o cienciaembarcada.com.br tentava escrever
mail.lucasrguerra.dev.br -- zona alheia. A Cloudflare respondia "an
identical record already exists" e a consola mostrava dois erros para um
dominio que estava correcto. O mesmo valia para o TLSA, que tambem tem o
nome do mail host.
Os registos de endereco passam a ser publicados so pela zona que contem o
host; o MX e os SRV, que apontam para ele, continuam a ser de cada dominio.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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9519be889d |
fix(admin): o botao de escolher dominio dizia "Adicionar"
Na lista de dominios, o botao de cada linha dizia "Adicionar" para um dominio que ja estava la, e "Status" depois de clicado. Nao faz nem uma coisa nem outra: escolhe sobre qual dominio as accoes de baixo actuam. Passa a dizer Selecionar / Selecionado. Removida tambem a string reconcileNotImplemented, que afirmava que a verificacao de registos individuais ainda nao existia. Existe desde que o endpoint de verify passou a consultar resolvedores publicos, e ja nao estava a ser usada em lado nenhum. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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2b369ab373 |
fix(dns): o botao de reconciliar nao criava registo nenhum
O painel listava os registos em falta e oferecia um botao para os criar, mas esse botao chegava a um endpoint que so escrevia uma linha de auditoria e respondia "REQUESTED". Nunca tocou no DNS. Quem tinha o token da Cloudflare era o servico de protocolos, e a unica coisa capaz de o usar corria num temporizador -- para um dominio so, o de MAIL_DOMAIN. Por isso um dominio adicionado pela consola, como o cienciaembarcada.com.br, nunca era reconciliado: os registos nao apareciam e o unico sintoma visivel era a consola dizer que faltavam, para sempre. - POST /api/v1/admin/dns/reconcile publica os registos de um dominio, agora, e devolve o que foi criado, corrigido e o que ficou em conflito - o temporizador passa a percorrer todos os dominios ativos - conflitos sao reportados, nao resolvidos: um registo do mesmo tipo e nome com outro valor pode ser correio da zona ou um servico de que ninguem se lembra, e nao e deste servidor decidir sobrepo-lo - o erro do fornecedor fica no log, nao na resposta: pode nomear a conta ou a zona Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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d403c47a71 |
feat(webmail): pastas próprias na barra lateral e regras em linguagem comum
Regras. A tela pedia um tipo de correspondência do Sieve pelo nome - :contains, :is, :matches (regex) - e colava o valor escrito diretamente num script. Punha uma linguagem de padrões à frente de quem só queria dizer "o que vem do banco vai para Faturas", e bastava uma aspa no valor para o script deixar de fazer parse, desativando silenciosamente todas as regras de uma vez. O vocabulário passa a ser o de quem escreve: um campo, uma condição em português, um valor e uma ação. Os curingas são gerados a partir de "começa com" e "termina com" - ninguém os escreve, e um asterisco escrito por acaso continua a ser um asterisco. A pasta de destino é escolhida de uma lista das pastas que existem mesmo, em vez de ser escrita à mão: antes uma regra podia nomear uma pasta inexistente e nunca disparar, sem dizer porquê. A ordem passa a ser visível e alterável, porque a primeira regra que arquiva uma mensagem decide para onde ela vai. Um script que esta tela não consegue exprimir - escrito à mão, ou por um cliente de secretária sobre ManageSieve - é mostrado tal como está, em vez de ser reescrito na coisa mais parecida que este formulário sabe dizer, o que mudaria em silêncio o que o correio de alguém faz. Pastas próprias. Existiam na base de dados e as regras podiam arquivar nelas, mas a barra lateral listava só as seis fixas, portanto não havia como ver uma - nem como criar. Criar fica onde a vontade aparece, na própria barra; apagar avisa que leva as mensagens junto, porque leva. Encontrado a escrever isto: o motor tratava "\\*" como barra seguida de curinga em vez de um asterisco literal. Como é esta tela que gera os curingas, uma regra sobre um assunto com "50% *" teria correspondido a todos os assuntos começados por "50% ". Corrigido no motor, com testes dos dois lados. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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f179cb1f27 |
fix(webmail): acertos de interface e mover mensagens entre pastas
Cc/Cco. Os dois rótulos do compositor eram o último texto em inglês que restava, e "Bcc" tem nome próprio em português - quem não conhece a abreviatura inglesa não adivinha o que o campo faz. Larguras. A barra lateral tinha 244px fixos e nela não cabia "Console de administração", que transbordava no telemóvel e no computador: o botão passa a mostrar um rótulo curto e guarda o nome completo no tooltip. O endereço da conta usava break-words e partia-se a meio do domínio, deixando um "br" sozinho na linha de baixo; passa a truncar com o valor inteiro no tooltip. A lista tinha 404px fixos e o leitor 760px centrados, portanto num ecrã largo os assuntos eram espremidos numa coluna estreita enquanto o leitor ficava entre duas margens enormes. Ambos crescem agora com a janela. O assunto ganha overflow-wrap: os Message-ID dos relatórios do Google são uma única "palavra" sem espaços, mais longa que a coluna, e sem sítio onde quebrar saíam da linha. Imagens remotas. A escolha era reposta sempre que uma mensagem era aberta, por isso a mesma newsletter tinha de ser desbloqueada em cada leitura. A decisão passa a ser lembrada por remetente, com um segundo botão para a retirar. Bloqueado continua a ser o que acontece por omissão: uma imagem remota é um aviso de leitura que o remetente não pediu licença para receber. Assinatura. Era escrita num textarea - texto simples com quebras de linha reais - e injetada no compositor com innerHTML, onde uma quebra de linha é espaço em branco: todas desapareciam. Passa a ser um campo rico, com negrito, itálico, links e imagens, guardado como HTML e sanitizado nos dois sentidos, já que este valor é injetado como marcação na origem do webmail. Assinaturas guardadas pelo campo antigo continuam a funcionar: as suas quebras de linha são convertidas. Mover entre pastas. Faltava a única ação corrente que o leitor não tinha: arquivar uma mensagem para fora da caixa de entrada era impossível. Enviados e Rascunhos nunca são destino - descrevem como a mensagem veio a existir, não onde o leitor a arrumou - mas sair deles é permitido. Pastas criadas pelo utilizador, que não têm papel special-use, são destino como qualquer outra. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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203316f2c3 |
fix(webmail): corrige os contadores das pastas e as ações do leitor
Todos estes foram reproduzidos na interface real, com a conta em
mail.lucasrguerra.dev.br, e não em teste.
Contadores das pastas. O badge caía para o total sempre que não havia
nada por ler, no mesmo lugar e no mesmo estilo do contador de não
lidas: uma caixa de entrada com catorze mensagens lidas mostrava "14",
e ler mais uma nunca movia o número - ele nunca esteve contando o que
o leitor pensava. Os dois números agora são visualmente distintos e o
de não lidas só aparece quando existe mensagem por ler.
Em Rascunhos o badge e o total são o mesmo número por definição, então
o sidebar imprimia-o duas vezes: "Rascunhos 1 1". A regra passou para
folderBadge, onde é testada, e o tamanho da pasta é renderizado num
único sítio.
Ações do leitor. Todas as mensagens ofereciam os mesmos quatro botões,
onde a pasta devia decidir. Um e-mail que o próprio utilizador enviou
oferecia "marcar como não lida" - uma flag que nada lê numa pasta onde
nada é entregue - e um rascunho por acabar oferecia Responder e
Encaminhar, mas nenhuma forma de o terminar. Abrir um rascunho agora
abre o compositor com o que estava escrito e adota o seu UID, para que
continuar a escrever substitua esse rascunho em vez de deixar o antigo
para trás. Em Lixeira o botão de apagar diz que apaga em definitivo,
porque é o que faz.
Anexos. t("mail.attachments") era chamado sem o parâmetro que a string
declara, e a interface mostrava literalmente "Anexos ({count})" nos
três idiomas. Na lista, que sabe que há anexos mas não quantos, passa a
nomear o facto em vez de imprimir uma contagem que não tem.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas Rayan
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f330c4324e |
Add end-to-end tests for TLS RPT report ingestion and WebSocket event handling
- Implemented tests for ingesting TLS RPT reports from emails and ensuring they are stored correctly in the database. - Added tests to verify that the same report can be ingested multiple times without duplication. - Created tests for backfilling reports that were previously delivered to the inbox. - Developed WebSocket event handling tests to ensure events are correctly routed to subscribers based on mailbox ownership. - Included tests for the mail API to validate session handling, mailbox isolation, and error mapping. - Ensured that the API rejects unauthorized requests and handles malformed JSON gracefully. |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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b33fc12f08 |
#35: replace both web surfaces with the Nocturne redesign
The webmail was indigo over glass and the console was green over glass, so the
two halves of one product did not look related, and neither followed a system
anything could be checked against. This replaces the interface with the
Nocturne design system from Claude Design: a near-neutral blue-grey ground,
Inter at weight 500, solid surfaces with a 1px inset edge instead of blur, and
a single blurple accent used as a line, a mark and a glow rather than a flood.
The palette is remapped at the source rather than renamed at every call site.
tailwind.config.js points slate, indigo, emerald, teal and the rest at the
Nocturne ramps, and globals.css carries the same values as variables, so a
utility class and a token cannot drift apart and no colour can enter the
interface from outside the system. The console's green is gone because it
resolves to the one accent; that was the point.
Structurally, both surfaces now share one rail - the same brand mark, the same
3px accent mark on the active item, the same account tile - with a segmented
control for crossing between them. Crossing into the console still goes to the
step-up rather than the admin sign-in, and leaving it is still a plain link.
Settings moves from eight stacked panels to a tab strip, so enabling a second
factor and writing a filter are no longer separated by everything else.
Nothing is sized by the length of its text any more. Labels wrap, tab strips
wrap instead of scrolling, subjects and queue diagnostics wrap instead of
truncating, and the message list's snippet is clamped to two lines rather than
one. That is what broke when the interface was read in Portuguese or Spanish.
Defects found while doing it:
- The queue and DMARC screens styled their status pills with "badge-danger",
"badge-warning" and "badge-verified" - three class names no stylesheet in
this project defines - so every verdict rendered as identical unstyled
text. They are Badge variants now, which exist.
- The DMARC screen printed the literal string "quarantine" as the
enforcement level whatever the domains publish. The report endpoint returns
no policy at all, so it was asserting a configuration nobody had made. It
shows the DMARC pass ratio it genuinely has.
- Half the mailboxes screen and two lines of the audit trace were hardcoded
strings, some Portuguese and some English, so they stayed in one language
whatever the interface was set to. They come from the bundle now, with the
new keys added to all three locales.
- Avatars printed email[0], so every account at one domain collapsed onto the
same letter. initialsFor takes two letters from the local part's own word
boundaries, behind tests.
Trivy reported one HIGH: nanoid 3.3.16, pulled in transitively by postcss,
vulnerable to a denial of service via an infinite loop in ID generation
(CVE-2026-67213). Pinned to ^3.3.18 through the overrides block the package
already uses for sharp and postcss.
Verified: 98 webmail tests green, tsc clean, production build clean, and the
compiled stylesheet serves the Nocturne values with no stock Tailwind indigo,
emerald or slate hex left in it. Trivy fs with the CI scanners, severities and
skip-dirs exits 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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8b69521c76 |
#34: fix the mail counters, the reader pane, and the state between surfaces
The counts were computed inline in JSX where nothing could test them. The
sidebar matched a folder by a special-use role folders do not always carry, its
badges were fetched once and then froze - new mail did not raise them and
reading a message did not lower it - and the list header printed the size of
the loaded page, capped at 50, as the size of the folder. The rules now live in
mailCounts.ts behind tests, useFolders keeps them current from the server's
push and from this tab's own changes, and each filter chip carries its number.
Inline images never left the server: RenderMessage dropped every part a body
references as cid:, so mail written by any normal client rendered with broken
icons. They now come back as bounded data URIs, refusing image/svg+xml, and the
reader resolves them, sizes its frame from the message instead of a fixed
500px, and renders on the light surface mail assumes.
Reading mail no longer asks for a second factor - the mailbox is behind the
account's own password - while the console still requires one unconditionally,
now collected by a step-up that does not ask again for the password the session
in hand just proved. An admin sign-in issues the webmail session too, so
leaving the console is a link rather than another login.
Two defects found while testing the above:
- The admin sign-in checked the password and the second factor and never the
role, so any account that had enrolled a factor from its own settings could
obtain an admin-audience session.
- Session tokens carried nothing that varied below one second, so signing in
twice within the same second minted the identical token and collided with
the unique index on web_sessions.refresh_token_hash. A correct password
answered 500, and a double-clicked sign-in was enough to do it. Tokens now
carry a jti.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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e5edee096c |
#32: file composed mail, and verify DNS records for real
Three things the console and the mail client were getting wrong. **Sent stayed empty and drafts would not save.** Both write through the same persistence path, and both failed on the same constraint: spf_result, dkim_result and dmarc_result are restricted to the RFC verdict vocabulary and are nullable, so "not evaluated" has to be NULL. The compose path left them at Go's zero value, which sends an empty string - satisfying neither the CHECK nor the meaning - and the insert was rejected. Filing the Sent copy is deliberately non-fatal, so it failed silently; saving a draft reported the error. Inbound mail was unaffected because it always supplies a real verdict, which is also why the existing test never caught it. **DNS reconciliation could not verify anything.** The console posted to the auth service, which has no resolver, so the endpoint recorded the request and re-read the status already in the database. The machinery to do it properly already existed - the background reconciler resolves every expected record through public resolvers - it just was not reachable from the console. Adds GET /api/v1/admin/dns/verify to the protocols service, which owns both the resolver and the record spec, and wires the domains screen to it: every expected record, its expected value, and whether it actually resolves. A proxied record is reported as present rather than matching, because behind a proxy the published answer is the provider's address and comparing values would always disagree. Reconciliation still runs afterwards so the stored status and the audit trail stay in step. The spec is read, never provisioned: opening a screen must not create DKIM keys as a side effect. Verified: the persistence test fails without the fix with the exact constraint violation (email_messages_dkim_result_check), 22 Go packages and 36 webmail tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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57198e0263 |
#28: stop enrolment from silently replacing a secret the authenticator already has
Enrolling a second factor could reach a state where the authenticator showed perfectly valid codes and every one of them was rejected, with the only feedback being "TOTP verification failed". The browser holds the enrolment secret in component state alone. Reloading the settings page - or leaving and coming back - brought the "enable" button back, and pressing it called the enrol endpoint again, which deleted the pending row and stored a brand new secret. The entry already saved in the authenticator then belonged to a secret the server no longer had. Nothing about that is visible from either side: the app generates codes correctly, the server compares them correctly, and they are for different keys. Enrolment now resumes. The endpoint returns the pending secret if there is one, so the QR shown after a reload is the same one already scanned and rescanning is harmless. Starting over is still possible - ?reset=1, exposed in the settings screen - because someone who deleted the entry from their app needs a secret they can actually generate codes for. A pending row that can no longer be decrypted is replaced rather than resumed, since nobody could ever confirm it. Also: the submitted code now has every non-digit stripped rather than just surrounding whitespace. Authenticators display the code grouped as "123 456", and a value typed or pasted with that space failed the six-character length check before it was ever compared - which, to someone reading the right number off their phone, looks like the server being wrong. The inputs sanitise as you type for the same reason. Ruled out first, rather than guessed at: the algorithm passes all six RFC 6238 reference vectors, base32 round-trips, and the deployment's clock is exactly in sync with real time, so neither the implementation nor drift explains it. Verified: the resume test fails without the change and passes with it; 47 auth tests green against a real Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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d8e2de2e11 |
#24: deliver what the composer wrote, keep a copy, and store drafts
Four faults, all in the path between the compose screen and the mailbox.
**Every message sent from the webmail had an empty body.** The HTTP handler
read a field named "body"; the composer has always sent "html". The two never
matched, so the payload handed to the queue contained headers and nothing
else. The handler now reads html and text, and still accepts body so an older
client is not broken. Sending was otherwise working, which is why this went
unnoticed: the mail left, it just said nothing.
**Bcc was discarded.** The field was absent from the request struct and from
ComposeInput, so a blind copy typed into the webmail reached nobody. It now
joins the envelope recipients and is deliberately kept out of the headers,
which is what makes it blind.
**HTML was labelled text/plain.** Even once the body was carried, the composer
produces markup and the message declared text/plain, so a recipient would see
raw tags. Messages with HTML now go out as multipart/alternative with a
plain-text part derived from the markup and ordered first per RFC 2046 5.1.4.
An empty or missing text alternative is itself a spam signal.
**Sent mail left no trace.** Nothing wrote to the Sent folder, so a delivered
message vanished from the sender's view entirely. A copy is now filed after
the message is durably queued - not before, or a send refused by the rate
limit would still leave a copy - reusing the inbound persistence path so it
gets a real IMAP UID and appears over IMAP too. A failure to file is logged
and swallowed: the mail is already on its way, and reporting failure would
invite the user to send it twice.
**Drafts were never saved.** There was no endpoint at all. The composer showed
"draft saved automatically" from a setTimeout with no request behind it, so
closing the tab lost the message the screen had just promised was safe. Adds
POST /api/v1/mail/draft, storing the draft as a whole RFC 5322 message in the
Drafts folder, and debounces the composer onto it.
The composer also navigated to Sent whether or not the send succeeded, which
is how a rejected message disappears silently. It now reports the error and
stays put.
**Delay notifications were being filed as spam.** A DSN this server writes is
injected through the same inbound path as mail from the internet, but without
a client IP - so SPF can only be "none" - and its bounce-shaped content scores
highly. The warning telling you your mail was delayed landed in your own Junk
folder. Messages the server generates itself now skip content scanning; the
exemption is narrow, and a test covers that ordinary mail is still scanned so
this cannot become a way past the filter. The DSN also declared
Auto-Submitted: auto-replied, which belongs to vacation responders; a delivery
report is auto-generated (RFC 3834 section 5), and filters read that header.
Not fixed here, because it is not a code fault: outbound port 25 is blocked by
the provider, which is what the delay notification was reporting
("i/o timeout" to Google's MX - a timeout, not a refusal, is the signature of
a block). Receiving is unaffected and queued mail keeps retrying. Documented
with the two ways out, including the relay path, which is verified working
code rather than another stub.
Verified: 22 Go packages pass, 5 new compose tests and 3 for the DSN handling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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ee240ae227 |
#23: show real data, unify the surfaces and make enrolment scannable
The interface was reporting things that were not true. Several screens were
mockups wired to nothing, and a reader with the console in Portuguese was
served a mixture of two languages.
Fabricated data, removed:
- The outbound queue was two invented jobs held in component state. Retry and
Freeze only edited that local array, so the screen showed the same two rows
on every deployment and reported success for actions that never happened.
"Freeze" named an operation the backend has never implemented. It now reads
/api/v1/admin/queue, which was already serving the real thing, and offers
retry and cancel, which exist.
- Every dashboard KPI fell back to an invented constant (1420 received, 890
sent, 3 queued, 18.4% disk), so an unreachable API produced a dashboard of
plausible traffic for a server that might have delivered nothing. Two of
those fields were never returned by the endpoint at all, so the fake disk
figure was what everyone always saw. DMARC did the same with 1250/98%/97%.
- The domains screen showed thirteen DNS records for example.com, all marked
VERIFIED, and posted {domain_id: "default-domain"} to endpoints expecting a
real id. DKIM rotation sends "domain", not "domain_id", so its 400 was
swallowed and a made-up TXT record displayed as though a key had been
issued: rotation had never once worked from this screen.
- The TLS panel asserted a Let's Encrypt RSA 4096 certificate and verified
DANE from static markup, on a deployment currently serving a self-signed
one. It now reads the cert watcher via /api/v1/admin/tls.
- The readiness scorecard printed "10 / 10 all checks passed" regardless of
what preflight reported, including failures.
- A message trace that found nothing invented a five-step delivery - TLS 1.3
accepted, SPF pass, spam score 0.8 - for a message that does not exist.
- Both sidebars showed a fixed admin@lambdamail.local with a hardcoded
"SUPER_ADMIN (2FA)", claiming a second factor whether or not one existed.
- Settings seeded a "[Boletim]" Sieve rule. Saving posts the whole list, so
the first edit wrote that invented filter into the account's real script.
The reconcile endpoint itself answered {records_verified: 13, status:
"VERIFIED"} for any domain id, including one that does not exist, without
resolving a name. It now reports what it does, which is record the request.
Surfaces:
The root was a chooser listing webmail and the console side by side, which
asked visitors a question they should not have to answer and advertised cookie
names and audiences to anonymous readers. It now redirects into the mail
client. Accounts that may administer the server get a link to the console from
inside the app - a link to /admin/login, so crossing over still costs the
second factor the admin audience requires - and the console gets a plain link
back, since the webmail session was never given up to get there.
Enrolment:
Both enrolment screens printed the base32 secret as text and left the operator
to type 32 characters into their phone. The enrol endpoint already returned an
otpauth:// URI; it simply was not drawn. Added a shared component that renders
it as a QR locally - the seed is already in the page, and sending it to an
image service would put it in another request log for nothing.
The recovery-code step rendered its own "sign in" button while the form's
submit button stayed visible below it: two identical buttons, and no way to
copy the codes it insisted you save. It is now terminal, with copy and
continue.
Language:
translate() had no interpolation, so "Undo Send ({seconds}s remaining)" showed
the placeholder and a second hardcoded countdown was appended after it. It now
substitutes, leaving an unmatched token visible rather than blanking it.
The pt-BR bundle had lost its diacritics - "Destinatario", "Ultimo erro",
"Acoes" - from the ASCII-source rule being applied to the translations, which
are data. Restored, and the three bundles are back in key parity at 270 each,
with roughly 120 strings that were hardcoded in the source now keyed.
Healthchecks:
web had none, despite being the only service users reach directly: a wedged
Next process kept its container running and Traefik kept routing to it. Added,
using node's own fetch since the image ships no curl. rspamd and clamav gained
the timeouts and start_periods whose absence would fail them during startup.
migrate stays without one and says why: it is a one-shot job, and a probe
would report unhealthy exactly when it has succeeded.
Verified: 36 webmail tests and 41 auth tests against a real Postgres, both new
admin/me cases confirmed to fail without the route (404). lang-lint clean,
production build clean, 0 vulnerabilities, compose validates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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3a82d82428 |
#22: fix the admin lockout, and the regressions the UI rewrite brought back
The console demanded a second factor and refused to open without one, but
enrolment lived on the other surface - so an operator whose only account
was the administrator had no way in. The password was already verified at
that point, so the refusal now carries a short-lived grant that permits
enrolling a factor and nothing else, and the admin login screen walks
through it: secret, confirmation, recovery codes, sign in. Two tests cover
it, including that the grant opens no other endpoint.
The rewrite also undid work that was already in place:
- The postcss override was dropped and the advisory came back, along
with a critical one in vitest. postcss is a direct dependency now, so
the fix is the version plus an override scoped to Next's own copy;
vitest moves to 3.2.7. The lockfile needed regenerating for either to
take effect. Zero advisories now.
- 100 language-lint violations: the admin console had been rewritten
with its strings in Portuguese, hardcoded. That fails CI, and it also
puts those strings beyond the reach of the translation bundles - an
English or Spanish user would have read Portuguese. They are English
in the source again.
- The mail screen put a fixed 320px list beside the reader with no
breakpoint, so on a phone the viewport overflowed and the message was
a few pixels wide. One pane at a time below md, with a way back.
- The icon-only navigation toggles had nothing for a screen reader to
announce.
The layouts' own mobile navigation and every previously fixed behaviour
survived the rewrite - checked rather than assumed.
Also fixes a marker collision I introduced: the E2E helper locates the
repository by a migrations directory, and services/migrations satisfied
that one directory too early. It now requires the SQL to actually be
there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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30014f0f41 |
#21: fix the DKIM, onboarding and console defects found reviewing the new work
DKIM rotation broke the domain it was run on. It retired the live key and inserted a placeholder as ACTIVE - private_key_enc was the literal string "dummy-encrypted-key" - so FindActiveKeys then failed for the whole domain and outbound mail stopped being signed, with the real key already gone. Reproduced against a database before changing anything. The root cause runs deeper: the auth service derives its encryption key with a plain SHA-256 of the master key while the protocols service uses HKDF with its own info string, so nothing the auth service seals can ever be opened by the signer. Rotation therefore moves to the protocols service, which owns that vault and the real key generator. It retires the previous key with a seven-day overlap in the same transaction rather than deleting it, because mail already sent under it is still being verified. Domain onboarding had three defects in one function. It built the alias destination by interpolating the domain name into the SQL text, which was injectable; it reused one placeholder for a CITEXT and a VARCHAR column, which made the statement fail and happened to hide the injection; and it ignored its scope argument entirely, so any DOMAIN_ADMIN could create domains. It also provisioned postmaster, abuse and security, missing the dmarc and tlsrpt aliases that the published records point at - PLAN.md section 7.4b is explicit that reports bounce without them. The TLS panel returned fixed values: acme_status "VALID" and 72 days to expiry, whatever the process actually held. It now reads the certificate watcher, and a compile-time assertion keeps the wiring from silently regressing into "disabled". The audit log and the readiness scorecard were fixtures too, and their field names did not match the API they now read. Two tests failed and a third asserted a fabricated constant: one depended on test order through a shared fixture that had a second factor enrolled, one used a fixed domain name and so passed once per database, and one expected "records: 13" from a function that never touches DNS. All three are fixed, and the suite now passes twice in a row against one database. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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b57854107e |
#21: finish the three translations across every screen
F4's acceptance criterion asks for the three translations to be 100% complete with the language lint green. The bundles had parity but the admin screens and the account area were still hardcoded English: 63 visible strings that no locale could reach. They now come from a shared ui namespace, so the three bundles cannot drift apart, and all three carry 126 keys. The language lint also caught this branch's own Go tests: the RFC 2047 cases need accented output to be worth anything, and the delivery test had Portuguese fixture text. The expectations are written as Go escapes instead, which keeps the assertions and leaves the source ASCII, and the fixture text is English. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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3e60852551 |
#21: put real mail on the webmail screens
The mail list rendered two hardcoded messages and the reader showed their canned HTML; compose ran a countdown and then navigated away without ever submitting anything. Both now use the API, including search, the unread badges in the sidebar (which were the literals "3" and "1", so an empty inbox still advertised unread mail), and marking a message read on open. The undo window now means what it says: the message is held in the browser and only submitted when the countdown elapses, so cancelling it means nothing was ever queued rather than trying to recall it afterwards. Message bodies render in an iframe with an empty sandbox - no scripts, no same-origin - and remote references are stripped until the reader asks for images, so a tracking pixel cannot fire on open. The previous sandbox allowed popups. The admin page titles and the language switcher labels now come from the bundles. The labels live there rather than in the source because PLAN.md R9 keeps non-ASCII out of code, and each language should be named the way that language names it. ADR-001 assigned the mail API to the TypeScript storage service; the reasoning for putting it in Go instead is recorded in PLAN.md, which .gitignore deliberately keeps out of the repository, so that revision lives only in the working copy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
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132cecd41c |
#21: guard the web surfaces and connect them to the auth service
Three separate gaps, all of which made the F4 interface non-functional or unprotected: The admin console rendered for anyone. There was no middleware and no guard in the layout, so /admin/dashboard returned 200 unauthenticated - only its data calls failed. middleware.ts now redirects both surfaces to their login when the session cookie is missing, expired, carries the wrong audience, or is a pre-MFA challenge token. It reads the claims without verifying the signature on purpose: the signing key belongs to the auth service and must not reach the browser bundle. That is sound because this is not the boundary - every /api/v1 request is verified for real upstream. Nothing served /api/v1/*. next.config.ts had no rewrites and there were no route handlers, so every call the pages made 404'd against the Next server, while AUTH_SERVICE_URL sat unused. A catch-all route now proxies to the auth service, forwarding the client address and preserving multiple Set-Cookie headers, which logout needs to clear both surfaces. Session cookies also move to Path=/, since a cookie pinned to /user or /admin was never sent with the /api/v1 requests that needed it. i18n existed only as files. The three bundles had perfect key parity and real translations, but no library, no imports and no switcher: the UI was hardcoded English and i18n.test.ts compared keys while the feature was absent. There is now a provider, a hook, a language switcher, and server-side Accept-Language negotiation that honours q-values and matches a bare "pt" to pt-BR. Logins, both layouts and the settings screen consume it; the admin pages still have English titles. The settings screen invented app passwords in the browser with Math.random and never stored them. It now calls the API, which returns the password once and keeps only its hash. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Lucas Rayan
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6e01fc7ffb | #20: implement F4 webmail, admin console, 2FA TOTP, surface isolation, and i18n |