# LambdaMail A self-hosted mail server with an integrated webmail and admin console, built to run on [Coolify](https://coolify.io) from a single `docker-compose.yaml`. SMTP, IMAP, POP3 and ManageSieve, with SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ARC, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT, DNS automation through Cloudflare, and spam and virus filtering. No paid tiers and no artificial limits on domains or mailboxes. > **Status: pre-release.** The mail path, the security posture and the web > interfaces work end to end, and there is an automated test suite behind them. > See [What is not finished](#what-is-not-finished) before putting real mail > through it. --- ## What it does | Area | | | :--- | :--- | | **Protocols** | SMTP MX (25), Submission (587 STARTTLS, 465 implicit TLS), IMAP (143/993) with UID, flags, IDLE and CONDSTORE, POP3 (110/995), ManageSieve (4190) | | **Authentication** | SPF, DKIM (Ed25519 + RSA dual signature), DMARC, ARC sealing, DANE/TLSA and MTA-STS on delivery, TLS-RPT ingestion | | **Filtering** | Rspamd scoring with greylisting, RBLs and rate limiting; ClamAV; Sieve | | **Delivery** | Durable outbound queue in Postgres with the retry ladder and RFC 3464 bounces; smarthost fallback for hosts with port 25 blocked | | **DNS** | Cloudflare reconciliation of the expected records for every active domain, idempotent, with per-record verification against public resolvers | | **Filing** | Sieve rules built in the UI, custom folders, and an RFC 5230 vacation responder that replies in thread and once per sender per week | | **Identity** | Per-user profile photos with a circular crop editor, shown inside the webmail; BIMI logo hosting and validation for the mark external clients render | | **Web** | Webmail at `/user/*` and an admin console at `/admin/*`, isolated by session audience, with TOTP two-factor, recovery codes, app passwords, and English, Portuguese and Spanish | | **Console** | Server-side paging and filtering, user editing (role, quota, language, password, second factor), per-user aliases, and a diagnostics page at `/admin/tests` | ## Architecture Two runtimes, split by what each is good at: - **`protocols`** (Go) — every protocol listener, the delivery worker, TLS certificate handling, DNS reconciliation, and the webmail's mail API. It owns folder, UID, flag and blob semantics. - **`auth`** (TypeScript) — logins, sessions, two-factor, account management and the admin console API. - **`web`** (Next.js) — both web surfaces, and the proxy that gives the browser a single origin. - **`storage`** (TypeScript) — health only today. Postgres is the source of truth for everything, including the outbound queue. Redis is a cache and dispatch index; losing it loses no mail. ``` ┌──────────┐ browser ─────────▶│ web │──┬─▶ auth (sessions, accounts, admin) └──────────┘ └─▶ protocols (mail read/send, DKIM, TLS) │ internet ──25/587/465/143/993──────────┘ │ Postgres ─┴─ Redis ─ Rspamd ─ ClamAV ``` ## Deploying For a real VPS, follow **[docs/DEPLOYMENT.md](docs/DEPLOYMENT.md)**. It covers the three things no code can do for you — reverse DNS, the DNSSEC delegation and getting port 25 unblocked — and the order the rest has to happen in. The short version: ```bash cp .env.production.example .env # then replace every CHANGE make preflight # checks port 25, PTR, RBLs, token scope docker compose up -d make create-admin EMAIL=you@example.com PASSWORD='...' ``` `make create-admin` is not optional: a fresh install has no mailbox, and every route into the console needs one. ### Ports Everything below is TCP. "Inbound" is what the host's firewall and the provider's security group must allow; "outbound" is what the host must be able to reach. | Port | Direction | Who connects | Required? | Notes | | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | 25 | in | Any sending MTA | **Yes** to receive mail | Must be open to the world. Rate-limited, not authenticated — that is how SMTP works. | | 25 | **out** | This host → remote MTAs | **Yes** to send mail | The one most providers block. Without it, set a relay (`RELAY_HOST`); see [docs/DEPLOYMENT.md](docs/DEPLOYMENT.md). | | 80 | in | Let's Encrypt, browsers | **Yes** | ACME HTTP-01 challenge, and the redirect to HTTPS. Closing it means no certificate. | | 443 | in | Browsers | **Yes** | Webmail, admin console, MTA-STS policy, autodiscover. | | 587 | in | Mail clients | Recommended | Submission with STARTTLS. The port clients should use. | | 465 | in | Mail clients | Optional | Submission with implicit TLS, for clients that insist. | | 143 | in | Mail clients | Optional | IMAP with STARTTLS. Prefer 993. | | 993 | in | Mail clients | Recommended | IMAPS. | | 110 / 995 | in | Mail clients | Optional | POP3 / POP3S. Leave closed unless something needs POP3. | | 4190 | in | Mail clients | Optional | ManageSieve, for editing filters from a desktop client. | | 53 | out | This host → resolver | **Yes** | MX, SPF, DKIM, DANE and MTA-STS lookups. UDP **and** TCP — DNSSEC answers overflow UDP. | | 443 | out | This host → APIs | If used | Cloudflare DNS automation, MTA-STS policy fetch, ClamAV signature updates. | Ports 110, 995 and 4190 are published by the compose file but are worth closing at the firewall unless a client actually needs them — every open port is one more thing to keep patched. ### What the host has to allow - **Reverse DNS (PTR)** for the public IPv4 must resolve to `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST`, and that name must resolve back to the same address. Set by whoever owns the IP block — your provider's panel, never Cloudflare. Gmail and Outlook spam-folder or refuse mail without it. If the host has a public IPv6 and publishes an AAAA record, it needs a PTR too: senders that connect over IPv6 are judged on the IPv6 reverse. - **Outbound port 25 unblocked.** Ask the provider; a timeout rather than a refusal when connecting to a remote MX is the signature of a block. - **Docker** with the compose plugin, and a user in the `docker` group or root. - **Ports below 1024** are bound by Docker's proxy on the host, so the daemon needs the privilege — the default on a normal install. The containers themselves run unprivileged. - **The proxy's certificate directory**, under `TLS_MODE=traefik` only — see [Certificates](#certificates) below, and prefer `TLS_MODE=acme` if you can. - **Disk** for the mail spool (`protocols_spool`) and Postgres. Mail is stored once and reference-counted, but plan for growth. - **A firewall that does not rate-limit port 25 into uselessness.** Some providers apply aggressive SYN limits that look like intermittent delivery failures. ## Running locally ```bash cp .env.example .env make gen-dev-cert # self-signed certificate for the listeners make up # builds from source via the build overlay make seed # a postmaster@example.test fixture ``` The webmail is on `http://localhost:3000`. The seeded password is `dev-password-only` — it is a fixture, not a credential. ## Testing ```bash make test # Go suite, auth and webmail make lint # go vet, tsc, and the language lint ``` The Go and auth suites include integration tests that need Postgres. They skip without `TEST_DATABASE_URL` and run against a real database in CI, which is where the security regressions are enforced — wrong password, wrong TOTP code, session revocation, surface isolation, cross-mailbox reads. ## Configuration Every variable is documented inline in [`.env.production.example`](.env.production.example). The ones without a safe default: | Variable | | | :--- | :--- | | `JWT_SECRET` | Signs sessions. At least 32 characters; the service refuses to start below that rather than fall back to a constant. | | `LAMBDAMAIL_MASTER_KEY` | Encrypts DKIM keys, TOTP secrets and provider tokens. **Back it up separately from the database** — losing it makes every stored secret unrecoverable. | | `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `REDIS_PASSWORD` | No defaults; compose fails without them. | | `MAIL_DOMAIN`, `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST`, `PUBLIC_IPV4` | Identity. `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST` must match the PTR of `PUBLIC_IPV4`. | ### Certificates Two modes, and the choice matters more than it looks. **`TLS_MODE=acme` (recommended).** LambdaMail obtains its own certificate for `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST`, `mta-sts.` and `autoconfig.` over DNS-01, using the Cloudflare token already configured for DNS. It needs `LAMBDAMAIL_MASTER_KEY` to seal the account and certificate keys, and `ACME_EMAIL`. It is the only mode DANE can run in, because it is the only one where the key for the next certificate exists before that certificate does. **`TLS_MODE=traefik`.** The mail listeners read the certificate the reverse proxy already obtained, from `COOLIFY_PROXY_DIR`, mounted read-only. Two things have to be true, and neither is obvious when they are not: - the proxy must have a router for `PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST`, or that name never appears in `acme.json` and no certificate exists to read; - `acme.json` must be readable by the container's non-root user. Left at mode `600` owned by root — which is how the proxy writes it — it cannot be. Either failure is silent in the same way: HTTPS keeps working, because the proxy is serving it, while the mail listeners fall back to a **self-signed certificate** and every client that verifies refuses SMTP, IMAP and POP3. It reads as a certificate problem and is usually a permissions problem. `/admin/security` names the issuer and says outright when the certificate is self-signed, which is the fastest way to tell the two apart. ### Profile photos and BIMI These are two different things, and the difference is the whole story. A **profile photo** is per user and is shown inside LambdaMail. No external mail client reads it, and no protocol exists that would let one: the avatar Gmail or Outlook shows beside a message comes from the *recipient's* own contacts, or from the sender's Google or Microsoft account. A self-hosted server cannot put an image there. **BIMI** is what external clients do read, and it is per domain: one mark for everyone who sends from it. Publishing one needs three things, and the console (`/admin/domains`, under the domain) handles each: 1. **The logo.** Upload a PNG or an SVG. The studio converts it to what BIMI accepts, SVG Tiny Portable/Secure on a square canvas of at most 32 KB with nothing active or external in it, and lets you place it the way the profile photo editor does: drag, zoom, background colour, with a preview inside the circle or rounded square clients draw. An SVG has what the format forbids removed (scripts, links, embedded bitmaps, editor metadata) and says what; a PNG is traced into vector paths, which loses some detail, so send the SVG when you have it. The server validates the result again against every rule at once, because a receiver that rejects a mark simply shows nothing. 2. **DMARC at `p=quarantine` or `p=reject`** with `pct=100`, which this server already sets. 3. **A certificate, for Gmail and Apple Mail to render it.** A Verified Mark Certificate (VMC, for a registered trademark) or a Common Mark Certificate (CMC, for a mark in use) is **issued by a certificate authority** (DigiCert, Entrust, SSL.com and others) after it checks the organisation. It cannot be generated here from an image, and nothing signed here would be trusted. What the console does: gives you the exact SVG to send the authority, takes the `.pem` it returns, and refuses one that would not work (the logo inside it must be byte for byte the published one, it must cover the domain, be in date, and never contain a private key). It then serves it from `https:///.well-known/bimi/vmc.pem` and points the `a=` tag there. Without a certificate the record is still valid and some clients use it; Gmail and Apple Mail do not. "Verificar configuracao" in the panel looks at what a receiver would: the logo file, DMARC, the BIMI record in DNS, the public URL of the logo, the certificate and its public URL, and names the one that is wrong. The logo is served from `https:///.well-known/bimi/default.svg` and the record is published with the rest of the zone. Replacing the logo under a held certificate breaks the certificate, and the console says so. A changed profile photo shows up at once everywhere in the webmail: every photo carries a version that is bumped on save, in this tab and the others. The server lets a browser reuse one for a minute and then revalidates it. ### DANE Off by default, and worth understanding before turning on: a TLSA record that does not match the key being served does not degrade delivery, it **stops** it at every validating sender. Two things have to be true first. - **DNSSEC on the zone, with the DS record published at the registrar.** DANE trusts the TLSA record because DNSSEC signs it; without the chain there is nothing to trust, and validators treat the record as absent. - **`TLS_MODE=acme`.** LambdaMail has to own the key to publish the association for the *next* one before switching to it. Under `TLS_MODE=traefik` the proxy renews on its own schedule and the record would silently stop matching. Then set `OUTBOUND_DANE_ENABLED=true`. The manager publishes `3 1 1` — DANE-EE over the SubjectPublicKeyInfo, the only usage a receiving MTA should offer — and handles the rollover by publishing the current and next associations together, waiting for propagation before issuing against the new key. `/admin/security` shows the digest of the certificate actually being served. That number and the TLSA record in DNS must be the same; when they drift, mail is refused and nothing else reports why: ```bash dig +short TLSA _25._tcp.mail.example.com ``` ## Operating | | | | :--- | :--- | | `make preflight` | Port 25 egress, PTR and FCrDNS, RBL listings, Cloudflare token scope, certificate presence | | `make create-admin EMAIL=… PASSWORD='…'` | First administrator on a fresh install | | `make reset-password EMAIL=… PASSWORD='…'` | Recovers a locked-out account and signs out its sessions | | `docker compose logs -f protocols` | Delivery, TLS and DNS reconciliation | | `GET /health` on `protocols` | `200` healthy, `200` with `X-LambdaMail-Health: degraded` when a certificate needs attention, `503` when a dependency is down | [docs/OPERATIONS.md](docs/OPERATIONS.md) covers backups, certificate rotation, what the alerts mean and how to read a delivery failure. ## What is not finished Stated plainly, because a mail server that half works loses mail: - **Read-only console panels.** The guided domain onboarding checklist reports on state rather than driving it. - **Not implemented.** JMAP, CalDAV/CardDAV, multi-node. Backups are documented but not automated. - **DANE** is off by default. See [DANE](#dane) for turning it on; under `TLS_MODE=traefik` it stays off deliberately, because the proxy's key changes at every renewal and the published TLSA record stops matching. ## Contributing - All code, comments and identifiers are in English. `make lint` enforces it. - Tests come with the change that needs them; the suites above must stay green. - Commits reference their issue: `#N: what changed and why`. ## License MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).