Files
LambdaMail/services/protocols/internal/presentation/http/bimi_api.go
T
Lucas RayanandClaude Sonnet 5.5 109b8360dd feat(bimi): hold the certificate, check the whole setup, serve the VMC
A Verified Mark Certificate cannot be made here: an authority issues it after
checking the organisation. What the service can do is hold the file the
authority returns, serve it where the DNS record points, and refuse one that
would make receivers ignore BIMI without a word.

- migration 0015: domain_bimi keeps the PEM chain next to the logo
- bimi.InspectCertificate reads a chain and reports every reason it would not
  work: private key blocks refused outright, the brand-indicator usage, the
  validity period, the domain (exact, wildcard or organisational), and that
  the logo embedded in the certificate (gzipped data URI in the logotype
  extension) is byte for byte the logo being published. Tested against two
  real public VMCs (eBay via DigiCert, CNN via Valimail) plus mutations
- GET /.well-known/bimi/vmc.pem (public, conditional, cacheable for an hour),
  and PUT/DELETE /api/v1/admin/bimi/certificate; the GET of the logo now
  reports the certificate as it stands against the logo being served, and
  replacing a logo under a held certificate says it no longer matches
- GET /api/v1/admin/bimi/check looks at what a receiver would: the logo, DMARC
  enforcement, the BIMI record, the public logo URL, the certificate and its
  public URL. Its HTTP client is HTTPS only and refuses non-public addresses
  after DNS, since the URLs come from DNS and an operator field
- the DNS record points a= at the held certificate when there is one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 16:50:33 -03:00

467 lines
16 KiB
Go

package httppresentation
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"lambdamail/protocols/internal/domain/bimi"
)
// BimiStore holds the mark a domain publishes, and the certificate that
// vouches for it.
type BimiStore interface {
Save(ctx context.Context, domain string, svg []byte, vmcURL string) (string, error)
Load(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*BimiLogo, error)
Delete(ctx context.Context, domain string) error
// SaveCertificate reports false when the domain has no logo to attach it to.
SaveCertificate(ctx context.Context, domain string, pem []byte) (bool, error)
DeleteCertificate(ctx context.Context, domain string) error
}
// BimiLogo is a stored mark as this layer sees it.
type BimiLogo struct {
SVG []byte
ETag string
VmcURL string
// VmcPEM is the certificate chain held here, if the operator uploaded one.
VmcPEM []byte
}
type bimiAPI struct {
store BimiStore
sessions *WebSessionVerifier
// domainOf maps the host a request arrived on to the mail domain whose
// logo should answer, so one deployment can serve several.
defaultDomain string
// mailHost is where the logo and the certificate are served from: the host
// the DNS record names.
mailHost string
now func() time.Time
dns bimi.Resolver
fetch bimi.Fetcher
}
// SetBimiAPI wires the BIMI logo store.
func (r *Router) SetBimiAPI(store BimiStore, sessionSecret, defaultDomain, mailHost string) {
if store == nil {
return
}
r.bimi = &bimiAPI{
store: store,
defaultDomain: defaultDomain,
mailHost: mailHost,
now: time.Now,
dns: netResolver{},
fetch: newBimiFetcher(),
}
if sessionSecret != "" {
r.bimi.sessions = NewWebSessionVerifier(sessionSecret)
}
}
// handlePublicLogo serves the mark itself.
//
// Deliberately open: this is fetched by receiving mail providers evaluating a
// message, which hold no session here and never will. It is also the only
// thing in this service that is meant to be read by strangers, so it answers
// nothing but the stored bytes.
func (r *Router) handleBimiLogo(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if r.bimi == nil {
http.NotFound(w, req)
return
}
if req.Method != http.MethodGet && req.Method != http.MethodHead {
writeError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED", "GET required")
return
}
domain := r.bimi.domainFor(req)
logo, err := r.bimi.store.Load(req.Context(), domain)
if err != nil || logo == nil {
http.NotFound(w, req)
return
}
if req.Header.Get("If-None-Match") == `"`+logo.ETag+`"` {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml")
w.Header().Set("ETag", `"`+logo.ETag+`"`)
// Public and long: receivers fetch this for every message they evaluate,
// and the mark changes about as often as a company rebrands.
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=86400")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
// The document is served from the same origin as the console, and an SVG
// is a document a browser will happily execute. Nothing in a validated
// Tiny PS mark is active, but the header costs nothing and covers the case
// where validation is one day loosened.
w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")
if req.Method == http.MethodHead {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write(logo.SVG)
}
func (a *bimiAPI) domainFor(req *http.Request) string {
host := extractHost(req.Host)
// mail.example.test serves example.test's mark; anything else falls back
// to the domain this deployment was configured with.
if trimmed := strings.TrimPrefix(host, "mail."); trimmed != host && trimmed != "" {
return trimmed
}
return a.defaultDomain
}
// requireBimiAdmin answers the admin session and domain checks shared by every
// BIMI console route. It writes the refusal itself and returns false.
func (r *Router) requireBimiAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (string, bool) {
if r.bimi == nil || r.bimi.sessions == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "BIMI_DISABLED",
"The BIMI panel needs JWT_SECRET and a database")
return "", false
}
token := bearerOrCookie(req, "lm_admin_session")
if token == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Admin session required")
return "", false
}
if _, err := r.bimi.sessions.RequireSurface(token, "admin"); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Admin session required")
return "", false
}
domain := strings.TrimSpace(req.URL.Query().Get("domain"))
if domain == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "DOMAIN_REQUIRED", "A domain is required")
return "", false
}
return domain, true
}
// handleBimiAdmin uploads, inspects or removes a domain's mark.
func (r *Router) handleBimiAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
domain, ok := r.requireBimiAdmin(w, req)
if !ok {
return
}
switch req.Method {
case http.MethodGet:
r.bimi.get(w, req, domain)
case http.MethodPut:
r.bimi.put(w, req, domain)
case http.MethodDelete:
if err := r.bimi.store.Delete(req.Context(), domain); err != nil {
log.Printf("bimi: could not delete the logo for %s: %v", domain, err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "DELETE_FAILED", "Could not remove the logo")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
default:
writeError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED", "GET, PUT or DELETE")
}
}
// handleBimiCertificate serves the certificate chain, like the logo: fetched
// by receiving providers that hold no session.
func (r *Router) handleBimiCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if r.bimi == nil {
http.NotFound(w, req)
return
}
if req.Method != http.MethodGet && req.Method != http.MethodHead {
writeError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED", "GET required")
return
}
logo, err := r.bimi.store.Load(req.Context(), r.bimi.domainFor(req))
if err != nil || logo == nil || len(logo.VmcPEM) == 0 {
http.NotFound(w, req)
return
}
sum := sha256.Sum256(logo.VmcPEM)
etag := `"` + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) + `"`
if req.Header.Get("If-None-Match") == etag {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-pem-file")
w.Header().Set("ETag", etag)
// Shorter than the logo: a renewed certificate should reach receivers
// within the hour, not the day.
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=3600")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
if req.Method == http.MethodHead {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write(logo.VmcPEM)
}
// handleBimiCertificateAdmin uploads or removes the certificate chain.
func (r *Router) handleBimiCertificateAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
domain, ok := r.requireBimiAdmin(w, req)
if !ok {
return
}
switch req.Method {
case http.MethodPut:
r.bimi.putCertificate(w, req, domain)
case http.MethodDelete:
if err := r.bimi.store.DeleteCertificate(req.Context(), domain); err != nil {
log.Printf("bimi: could not delete the certificate for %s: %v", domain, err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "DELETE_FAILED", "Could not remove the certificate")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
default:
writeError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED", "PUT or DELETE")
}
}
// handleBimiCheck looks at everything a receiver would look at, and says which
// part is wrong.
func (r *Router) handleBimiCheck(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
domain, ok := r.requireBimiAdmin(w, req)
if !ok {
return
}
if req.Method != http.MethodGet {
writeError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED", "GET required")
return
}
logo, err := r.bimi.store.Load(req.Context(), domain)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "LOAD_FAILED", "Could not read the logo")
return
}
if logo == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"configured": false, "checks": []any{}})
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(req.Context(), 25*time.Second)
defer cancel()
in := bimi.Inputs{
Domain: domain,
LogoURL: BimiLogoURL(r.bimi.mailHost),
SVG: logo.SVG,
CertificatePEM: logo.VmcPEM,
ExternalCertificateURL: logo.VmcURL,
Now: r.bimi.now(),
}
// The record must name the certificate that is actually served
switch {
case len(logo.VmcPEM) > 0:
in.CertificateURL = BimiVmcURL(r.bimi.mailHost)
default:
in.CertificateURL = logo.VmcURL
}
results := bimi.RunChecks(ctx, in, r.bimi.dns, r.bimi.fetch)
checks := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(results))
ready := true
for _, c := range results {
checks = append(checks, map[string]string{"id": c.ID, "status": string(c.Status), "detail": c.Detail})
// A missing certificate is a warning, not a fault: some receivers show the logo without one
if c.Status == bimi.StatusFail {
ready = false
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"configured": true, "ready": ready, "checks": checks})
}
func (a *bimiAPI) get(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, domain string) {
logo, err := a.store.Load(req.Context(), domain)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "LOAD_FAILED", "Could not read the logo")
return
}
if logo == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"configured": false})
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"configured": true,
"etag": logo.ETag,
"vmc_url": logo.VmcURL,
"bytes": len(logo.SVG),
"svg": string(logo.SVG),
"logo_url": BimiLogoURL(a.mailHost),
"certificate_url": BimiVmcURL(a.mailHost),
"certificate": a.describeCertificate(domain, logo),
})
}
// describeCertificate reports the held certificate as it stands against the
// logo now being served. Read from the file each time, so it cannot drift from
// what receivers get.
func (a *bimiAPI) describeCertificate(domain string, logo *BimiLogo) map[string]any {
if len(logo.VmcPEM) == 0 {
return map[string]any{"present": false}
}
cert, violations := bimi.InspectCertificate(logo.VmcPEM, domain, logo.SVG, a.now())
reasons := make([]string, 0, len(violations))
for _, v := range violations {
reasons = append(reasons, v.String())
}
out := map[string]any{"present": true, "valid": len(violations) == 0, "violations": reasons}
if cert != nil {
out["subject"] = cert.Subject
out["organization"] = cert.Organization
out["issuer"] = cert.Issuer
out["not_before"] = cert.NotBefore.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
out["not_after"] = cert.NotAfter.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
out["dns_names"] = cert.DNSNames
out["mark_type"] = cert.MarkType
out["kind"] = string(cert.Kind)
out["chain_length"] = cert.ChainLength
out["matches_logo"] = cert.MatchesLogo
out["warnings"] = cert.Warnings
}
return out
}
// putCertificate stores a certificate chain after checking it against the
// logo and the domain. A certificate that does not match is refused rather
// than stored: publishing one makes receivers ignore BIMI without a word.
func (a *bimiAPI) putCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, domain string) {
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(req.Body, bimi.MaxCertificateBytes*2))
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "READ_FAILED", "Could not read the upload")
return
}
var payload struct {
PEM string `json:"pem"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "Expected a JSON body with a pem field")
return
}
logo, err := a.store.Load(req.Context(), domain)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "LOAD_FAILED", "Could not read the logo")
return
}
if logo == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "NO_LOGO", "Save the logo first: a certificate only means something next to the logo it was issued for")
return
}
pem := []byte(strings.TrimSpace(payload.PEM) + "\n")
_, violations := bimi.InspectCertificate(pem, domain, logo.SVG, a.now())
if len(violations) > 0 {
reasons := make([]string, 0, len(violations))
for _, v := range violations {
reasons = append(reasons, v.String())
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]any{
"error": "INVALID_CERTIFICATE",
"message": "The certificate cannot be used for this domain and logo",
"violations": reasons,
})
return
}
saved, err := a.store.SaveCertificate(req.Context(), domain, pem)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("bimi: could not save the certificate for %s: %v", domain, err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "SAVE_FAILED", "Could not store the certificate")
return
}
if !saved {
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "NO_LOGO", "Save the logo first")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"ok": true,
"certificate": a.describeCertificate(domain, &BimiLogo{SVG: logo.SVG, VmcPEM: pem}),
})
}
func (a *bimiAPI) put(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, domain string) {
// A shade over the specification's ceiling, so an oversized upload is
// refused by the validator with a reason rather than truncated here.
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(req.Body, bimi.MaxLogoBytes*2))
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "READ_FAILED", "Could not read the upload")
return
}
var payload struct {
SVG string `json:"svg"`
VmcURL string `json:"vmc_url"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "Expected a JSON body with an svg field")
return
}
// Every reason at once. Fixing one rule at a time against a receiver that
// silently shows nothing is a miserable way to learn this format.
if violations := bimi.Validate([]byte(payload.SVG)); len(violations) > 0 {
reasons := make([]string, 0, len(violations))
for _, v := range violations {
reasons = append(reasons, v.String())
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]any{
"error": "INVALID_LOGO",
"message": "The logo is not SVG Tiny Portable/Secure",
"violations": reasons,
})
return
}
vmc := strings.TrimSpace(payload.VmcURL)
if vmc != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(vmc, "https://") {
// A certificate fetched over plain HTTP is not evidence of anything,
// and every receiver refuses it.
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "INSECURE_VMC", "The certificate URL must be https")
return
}
etag, err := a.store.Save(req.Context(), domain, []byte(payload.SVG), vmc)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("bimi: could not save the logo for %s: %v", domain, err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "SAVE_FAILED", "Could not store the logo")
return
}
// A certificate vouches for one exact SVG. Replacing the logo under a held
// certificate breaks it, which receivers do not report; say so now.
response := map[string]any{"ok": true, "etag": etag}
if held, err := a.store.Load(req.Context(), domain); err == nil && held != nil && len(held.VmcPEM) > 0 {
if cert, _ := bimi.InspectCertificate(held.VmcPEM, domain, held.SVG, a.now()); cert != nil && !cert.MatchesLogo {
response["certificate_mismatch"] = true
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
}
// BimiLogoURL is where a domain's mark is served from.
func BimiLogoURL(mailHost string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/.well-known/bimi/default.svg", mailHost)
}
// BimiVmcURL is where the certificate held here is served from.
func BimiVmcURL(mailHost string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/.well-known/bimi/vmc.pem", mailHost)
}