Lucas RayanandClaude Opus 5
30014f0f41
DKIM rotation broke the domain it was run on. It retired the live key and inserted a placeholder as ACTIVE - private_key_enc was the literal string "dummy-encrypted-key" - so FindActiveKeys then failed for the whole domain and outbound mail stopped being signed, with the real key already gone. Reproduced against a database before changing anything. The root cause runs deeper: the auth service derives its encryption key with a plain SHA-256 of the master key while the protocols service uses HKDF with its own info string, so nothing the auth service seals can ever be opened by the signer. Rotation therefore moves to the protocols service, which owns that vault and the real key generator. It retires the previous key with a seven-day overlap in the same transaction rather than deleting it, because mail already sent under it is still being verified. Domain onboarding had three defects in one function. It built the alias destination by interpolating the domain name into the SQL text, which was injectable; it reused one placeholder for a CITEXT and a VARCHAR column, which made the statement fail and happened to hide the injection; and it ignored its scope argument entirely, so any DOMAIN_ADMIN could create domains. It also provisioned postmaster, abuse and security, missing the dmarc and tlsrpt aliases that the published records point at - PLAN.md section 7.4b is explicit that reports bounce without them. The TLS panel returned fixed values: acme_status "VALID" and 72 days to expiry, whatever the process actually held. It now reads the certificate watcher, and a compile-time assertion keeps the wiring from silently regressing into "disabled". The audit log and the readiness scorecard were fixtures too, and their field names did not match the API they now read. Two tests failed and a third asserted a fabricated constant: one depended on test order through a shared fixture that had a second factor enrolled, one used a fixed domain name and so passed once per database, and one expected "records: 13" from a function that never touches DNS. All three are fixed, and the suite now passes twice in a row against one database. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
108 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
package httppresentation
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import (
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"net/http"
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"time"
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)
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// TlsStatusSource reports what the certificate watcher actually sees. The
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// admin console used to receive fixed values - "VALID", 72 days - which told
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// an operator the certificate was healthy no matter what the process held.
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type TlsStatusSource interface {
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EarliestExpiry() (host string, expiry time.Time, ok bool)
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LastReload() time.Time
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LastChange() time.Time
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UnknownSNICount() int64
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HasCertificateFor(host string) bool
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}
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type adminTlsAPI struct {
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source TlsStatusSource
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mailHost string
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tlsMode string
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sessions *WebSessionVerifier
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pollPeriod time.Duration
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}
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func (a *adminTlsAPI) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := bearerOrCookie(r, "lm_admin_session")
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if token == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Admin session required")
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return
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}
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if _, err := a.sessions.RequireSurface(token, "admin"); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Admin session required")
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return
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}
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status := map[string]any{
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"tls_mode": a.tlsMode,
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"mail_host": a.mailHost,
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"has_certificate": a.source.HasCertificateFor(a.mailHost),
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"unknown_sni_total": a.source.UnknownSNICount(),
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"last_reload": nil,
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"last_change": nil,
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"watcher_healthy": false,
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"certificate_expires": nil,
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"expires_in_days": nil,
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"state": "UNKNOWN",
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}
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if last := a.source.LastReload(); !last.IsZero() {
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status["last_reload"] = last.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
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// Two missed polls is the smallest gap that is not a scheduling
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// hiccup, and it is the symptom of a watcher gone blind (risk R2).
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status["watcher_healthy"] = time.Since(last) < 3*a.pollPeriod
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}
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if change := a.source.LastChange(); !change.IsZero() {
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status["last_change"] = change.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
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}
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if host, expiry, ok := a.source.EarliestExpiry(); ok {
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remaining := time.Until(expiry)
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status["certificate_expires"] = expiry.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
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status["expires_in_days"] = int(remaining.Hours() / 24)
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status["soonest_expiring_host"] = host
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switch {
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case remaining <= 0:
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status["state"] = "EXPIRED"
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case remaining < 24*time.Hour:
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status["state"] = "CRITICAL"
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case remaining < 7*24*time.Hour:
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status["state"] = "WARNING"
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default:
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status["state"] = "OK"
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}
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}
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if !status["has_certificate"].(bool) {
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status["state"] = "NO_CERTIFICATE"
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, status)
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}
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// SetAdminTlsAPI wires the TLS panel to the live certificate source.
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func (r *Router) SetAdminTlsAPI(source TlsStatusSource, mailHost, tlsMode, sessionSecret string, pollPeriod time.Duration) {
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if source == nil || sessionSecret == "" {
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return
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}
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if pollPeriod <= 0 {
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pollPeriod = time.Minute
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}
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r.tls = &adminTlsAPI{
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source: source, mailHost: mailHost, tlsMode: tlsMode,
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sessions: NewWebSessionVerifier(sessionSecret), pollPeriod: pollPeriod,
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}
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}
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func (r *Router) handleAdminTls(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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if r.tls == nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "TLS_API_DISABLED",
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"The TLS panel needs a certificate watcher and JWT_SECRET")
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return
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}
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r.tls.handleStatus(w, req)
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}
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