Lucas
e989413018
- sabia-core: descoberta de interfaces, controle de modo monitor/canal via iw (ponte até ter nl80211 nativo), captura crua 802.11 via AF_PACKET (sem libpcap), parsing de radiotap e quadros de gerenciamento (beacon/probe/EAPOL), agregação em tabela de APs/ clientes, escrita de .pcap, trilha de auditoria encadeada por hash, auto-atualização via GitHub releases (curl, sem dependências de rede extras) - sabia-cli: `sabia iface`, `sabia scan`, `sabia update`, `sabia audit-verify`, `sabia ui` (servidor local + navegador, protegido por token, mesma filosofia do Guará) - OpenWolf inicializado para memória de projeto entre agentes
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
---
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description: Layered security audit of the current project (dependencies → secrets → injection → authz → report)
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argument-hint: [path or scope, e.g. src/api — omit for whole project]
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---
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Perform a layered security audit of: $ARGUMENTS (if empty: the whole project).
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Use `.wolf/anatomy.md` to target files instead of scanning blindly, and check
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`.wolf/buglog.json` for previously found security issues before re-reporting them.
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Work through the layers in order. For each, report findings before moving on:
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## Layer 1 — Dependencies
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Run the ecosystem's audit tool (`npm audit` / `pnpm audit` / `pip-audit` / `cargo audit` …).
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Flag known-vulnerable versions and unmaintained packages that handle untrusted input.
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## Layer 2 — Secrets
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Search for hardcoded credentials: API keys, tokens, passwords, connection strings,
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private keys. Check committed env files, config files, and test fixtures. Verify
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`.gitignore` covers secret-bearing files (.env*, *.pem, *.key, credentials*).
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## Layer 3 — Injection surfaces
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Find every place external input reaches an interpreter: shell commands built by string
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interpolation (exec/execSync with template strings), SQL string concatenation, HTML
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injection/XSS sinks, path traversal (user input joined into fs paths), deserialization
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of untrusted data, SSRF (user-controlled URLs fetched server-side).
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## Layer 4 — AuthN / AuthZ
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Map endpoints and privileged operations. Check: missing auth middleware, IDOR (object
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IDs without ownership checks), privilege escalation paths, session handling, CORS and
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CSRF posture, servers bound to 0.0.0.0 without auth.
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## Layer 5 — Report
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Produce a severity-ranked table (Critical/High/Medium/Low): finding, file:line, attack
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scenario, concrete fix. Log confirmed vulnerabilities to `.wolf/buglog.json` with tag
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"security". Offer to fix Critical and High items immediately.
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Rules: verify each finding against the actual code before reporting (no
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pattern-match-only findings); prefer minimal, targeted fixes; never weaken existing
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security to silence a warning.
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