CI gains a security job (Trivy fs: vuln, secret and misconfig) and an
image job that builds each of the four services and scans the result. The
secret scanner earns its place here: a DKIM key or Cloudflare token
committed by accident is a full compromise of every domain served.
release.yml publishes on a merge into main and on v* tags. Four services
on two architectures is eight build jobs pushing by digest, then four
publish jobs joining each pair into one manifest list, tagged latest, sha
and semver. github.repository is lowercased first because GHCR rejects an
uppercase path and this repository is lucasrguerra/LambdaMail.
Both scanners failed on first run, so this commit also fixes what they
found rather than shipping a workflow that is red on arrival:
- All four images ran as root (DS-0002), which section 17 risk R5
explicitly argues against. They now run unprivileged; protocols keeps
its eight ports below 1024 through cap_net_bind_service on the binary
rather than through being root.
- A HIGH advisory in postcss, reached only through Next. "npm audit fix
--force" would have resolved it by downgrading Next from 15 to 9, so
it is pinned with an override instead.
- The Node images copied the build stage's node_modules wholesale,
shipping typescript, eslint and vitest into production, and the base
image's own bundled npm accounted for the rest of the CVEs. Runtime
dependencies now come from npm ci --omit=dev and npm is removed from
the final layer.
- compose-up could never have passed: the proxy network is external
because Coolify owns it on the deploy host, and nothing creates it in
CI, so compose refused to start the stack at all.
Verified locally: actionlint clean, all ten action refs confirmed to
exist, Trivy fs and all four image scans exit 0, the full stack reaches
Healthy on every container, and the containers run as uid 10001/1000 with
all eight privileged ports bound and SMTP answering on 25. The arm64
build itself is unverified - this machine has no buildx - and will first
be exercised by release.yml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"docker compose up" could not work, which means the F0 acceptance
criterion was not being met:
- ghcr.io/rspamd/rspamd:3.9 returns "denied" and clamav/clamav:1.3 does
not exist. Both were verified against the registries; the working
references are rspamd/rspamd:3.9 and clamav/clamav:1.4.
- Rspamd received RSPAMD_REDIS_SERVERS and RSPAMD_REDIS_PASSWORD as
environment variables it never reads. Confirmed in the container that
it does not expand ${VAR} in UCL: the password reached Redis as that
literal string. Greylisting and ratelimit keep their state in Redis,
so both were silently doing nothing while appearing configured. The
credential is now rendered at startup into override.d, a tmpfs, so it
touches neither the image nor a volume.
- The ratelimit module ships enabled with no rates defined, which
accepts everything. ratelimit.conf defines the per-IP, per-user and
per-recipient buckets of section 5.2.
Verified by bringing redis and rspamd up: the real password resolves, the
rates load, and a probe message returns "Action: greylist" with the state
written to Redis.
Services also gained an image: alongside build:, so the deploy host pulls
instead of compiling while "docker compose build" still works locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every fix here is a case where the code and the plan disagreed, and the
code was wrong.
Certificates (section 8.2, 8.4). The parser documented that it skipped
expired entries but never checked, so an expired certificate would be
served until every handshake failed. LastReload() only advanced when
acme.json changed - and it does not change for sixty days - which made
the timestamp risk R2 monitors indistinguishable from a watcher gone
blind. Expiry is now checked on every pass, LastReload records the check
and LastChange the swap, and the <7d/<24h alerts of section 8.4 exist.
ARC (section 5). buildArcSealer resolved the DKIM key at startup, before
runDnsReconciler had provisioned one. On a first boot ARC was disabled
until someone restarted the process, which the log even admitted while
offering no way for it to start. A LazySealer binds on first use instead.
Health (section 8.4). There was no degraded state at all. /health now
reports one - still 200, because restarting cannot fix a certificate
Traefik never issued.
Bounces. DSNs were sent From postmaster@lambdamail.local, a domain that
does not resolve, so the notification was itself undeliverable. They now
carry the configured mail host, a Message-ID, and Auto-Submitted so a
vacation responder cannot loop against them.
Fan-out atomicity (section 6.1). Persist ran one transaction per
recipient, so a failure halfway through an alias fan-out left earlier
recipients with a copy while the sender was told to retry - and the retry
delivered to them twice. PersistAll commits the whole delivery or none of
it. Verified against Postgres by reverting the repository to the old
behaviour and confirming the new test fails on it.
SMTP replies. The use case encoded replies in error text ("550 5.7.1 ...")
which the adapter re-parsed by prefix, so rewording a message could turn a
permanent refusal into a retry. SmtpRejection carries the decision and the
adapter renders it.
Repository tests. These only run with TEST_DATABASE_URL, which CI does
set - so the job was red: copy and expunge seeded a 68-character digest
into a CHAR(64) column, and three others used fixed digests that collide
with the UNIQUE index on any re-run. A shared testBlobDigest() helper
fixes both; the suite now passes twice in a row against one database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
