Lucas Rayan 880dced9e4 feat: implement message deletion functionality and improve draft handling
- Added `MoveToTrash` method in `WebmailRepository` to move messages to the Trash folder instead of deleting them permanently.
- Introduced `handleDelete` method in `mailAPI` to handle message deletion requests from the client.
- Updated router to include a new route for message deletion.
- Enhanced the compose page to manage draft integrity, ensuring drafts are correctly associated with sent messages.
- Implemented UI changes to allow users to delete messages from the mail folder view.
- Added tests to verify the correct behavior of message deletion and draft handling.
- Updated database migration scripts to reconcile folder counters and ensure accurate unread counts.
- Added tests for TLS-RPT report parsing and webmail repository functionalities.
2026-08-20 15:32:14 -03:00
2026-07-23 02:18:24 -03:00

LambdaMail

A self-hosted mail server with an integrated webmail and admin console, built to run on Coolify from a single docker-compose.yaml.

SMTP, IMAP, POP3 and ManageSieve, with SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ARC, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT, DNS automation through Cloudflare, and spam and virus filtering. No paid tiers and no artificial limits on domains or mailboxes.

Status: pre-release. The mail path, the security posture and the web interfaces work end to end, and there is an automated test suite behind them. Several console panels are still read-only, and some features are recorded but not yet acted on — see What is not finished before putting real mail through it.


What it does

Area
Protocols SMTP MX (25), Submission (587 STARTTLS, 465 implicit TLS), IMAP (143/993) with UID, flags, IDLE and CONDSTORE, POP3 (110/995), ManageSieve (4190)
Authentication SPF, DKIM (Ed25519 + RSA dual signature), DMARC, ARC sealing, DANE/TLSA and MTA-STS on delivery, TLS-RPT ingestion
Filtering Rspamd scoring with greylisting, RBLs and rate limiting; ClamAV; Sieve
Delivery Durable outbound queue in Postgres with the retry ladder and RFC 3464 bounces; smarthost fallback for hosts with port 25 blocked
DNS Cloudflare reconciliation of the 13 records, idempotent, with drift detection
Web Webmail at /user/* and an admin console at /admin/*, isolated by session audience, with TOTP two-factor, recovery codes, app passwords, and English, Portuguese and Spanish

Architecture

Two runtimes, split by what each is good at:

  • protocols (Go) — every protocol listener, the delivery worker, TLS certificate handling, DNS reconciliation, and the webmail's mail API. It owns folder, UID, flag and blob semantics.
  • auth (TypeScript) — logins, sessions, two-factor, account management and the admin console API.
  • web (Next.js) — both web surfaces, and the proxy that gives the browser a single origin.
  • storage (TypeScript) — health only today.

Postgres is the source of truth for everything, including the outbound queue. Redis is a cache and dispatch index; losing it loses no mail.

                    ┌──────────┐
  browser ─────────▶│   web    │──┬─▶ auth      (sessions, accounts, admin)
                    └──────────┘  └─▶ protocols (mail read/send, DKIM, TLS)
                                        │
  internet ──25/587/465/143/993──────────┘
                                        │
                              Postgres ─┴─ Redis ─ Rspamd ─ ClamAV

Deploying

For a real VPS, follow docs/DEPLOYMENT.md. It covers the three things no code can do for you — reverse DNS, the DNSSEC delegation and getting port 25 unblocked — and the order the rest has to happen in.

The short version:

cp .env.production.example .env      # then replace every CHANGE
make preflight                       # checks port 25, PTR, RBLs, token scope
docker compose up -d
make create-admin EMAIL=you@example.com PASSWORD='...'

make create-admin is not optional: a fresh install has no mailbox, and every route into the console needs one.

Ports

Everything below is TCP. "Inbound" is what the host's firewall and the provider's security group must allow; "outbound" is what the host must be able to reach.

Port Direction Who connects Required? Notes
25 in Any sending MTA Yes to receive mail Must be open to the world. Rate-limited, not authenticated — that is how SMTP works.
25 out This host → remote MTAs Yes to send mail The one most providers block. Without it, set a relay (RELAY_HOST); see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.
80 in Let's Encrypt, browsers Yes ACME HTTP-01 challenge, and the redirect to HTTPS. Closing it means no certificate.
443 in Browsers Yes Webmail, admin console, MTA-STS policy, autodiscover.
587 in Mail clients Recommended Submission with STARTTLS. The port clients should use.
465 in Mail clients Optional Submission with implicit TLS, for clients that insist.
143 in Mail clients Optional IMAP with STARTTLS. Prefer 993.
993 in Mail clients Recommended IMAPS.
110 / 995 in Mail clients Optional POP3 / POP3S. Leave closed unless something needs POP3.
4190 in Mail clients Optional ManageSieve, for editing filters from a desktop client.
53 out This host → resolver Yes MX, SPF, DKIM, DANE and MTA-STS lookups. UDP and TCP — DNSSEC answers overflow UDP.
443 out This host → APIs If used Cloudflare DNS automation, MTA-STS policy fetch, ClamAV signature updates.

Ports 110, 995 and 4190 are published by the compose file but are worth closing at the firewall unless a client actually needs them — every open port is one more thing to keep patched.

What the host has to allow

  • Reverse DNS (PTR) for the public IPv4 must resolve to PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST, and that name must resolve back to the same address. Set by whoever owns the IP block — your provider's panel, never Cloudflare. Gmail and Outlook spam-folder or refuse mail without it. If the host has a public IPv6 and publishes an AAAA record, it needs a PTR too: senders that connect over IPv6 are judged on the IPv6 reverse.
  • Outbound port 25 unblocked. Ask the provider; a timeout rather than a refusal when connecting to a remote MX is the signature of a block.
  • Docker with the compose plugin, and a user in the docker group or root.
  • Ports below 1024 are bound by Docker's proxy on the host, so the daemon needs the privilege — the default on a normal install. The containers themselves run unprivileged.
  • The proxy's certificate directory must be readable by the protocols container. Under TLS_MODE=traefik it reads the certificate the proxy obtained, from the directory given by COOLIFY_PROXY_DIR, mounted read-only. The images run as a non-root user, so an acme.json left at mode 600 and owned by root cannot be read, and the mail listeners fall back to a self-signed certificate while HTTPS keeps working — a confusing failure that looks like a certificate problem and is a permissions problem.
  • Disk for the mail spool (protocols_spool) and Postgres. Mail is stored once and reference-counted, but plan for growth.
  • A firewall that does not rate-limit port 25 into uselessness. Some providers apply aggressive SYN limits that look like intermittent delivery failures.

Running locally

cp .env.example .env
make gen-dev-cert                    # self-signed certificate for the listeners
make up                              # builds from source via the build overlay
make seed                            # a postmaster@example.test fixture

The webmail is on http://localhost:3000. The seeded password is dev-password-only — it is a fixture, not a credential.

Testing

make test        # Go suite, auth and webmail
make lint        # go vet, tsc, and the language lint

The Go and auth suites include integration tests that need Postgres. They skip without TEST_DATABASE_URL and run against a real database in CI, which is where the security regressions are enforced — wrong password, wrong TOTP code, session revocation, surface isolation, cross-mailbox reads.

Configuration

Every variable is documented inline in .env.production.example. The ones without a safe default:

Variable
JWT_SECRET Signs sessions. At least 32 characters; the service refuses to start below that rather than fall back to a constant.
LAMBDAMAIL_MASTER_KEY Encrypts DKIM keys, TOTP secrets and provider tokens. Back it up separately from the database — losing it makes every stored secret unrecoverable.
POSTGRES_PASSWORD, REDIS_PASSWORD No defaults; compose fails without them.
MAIL_DOMAIN, PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST, PUBLIC_IPV4 Identity. PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST must match the PTR of PUBLIC_IPV4.

Operating

make preflight Port 25 egress, PTR and FCrDNS, RBL listings, Cloudflare token scope, certificate presence
make create-admin EMAIL=… PASSWORD='…' First administrator on a fresh install
make reset-password EMAIL=… PASSWORD='…' Recovers a locked-out account and signs out its sessions
docker compose logs -f protocols Delivery, TLS and DNS reconciliation
GET /health on protocols 200 healthy, 200 with X-LambdaMail-Health: degraded when a certificate needs attention, 503 when a dependency is down

docs/OPERATIONS.md covers backups, certificate rotation, what the alerts mean and how to read a delivery failure.

What is not finished

Stated plainly, because a mail server that half works loses mail:

  • Recorded but not acted on. Vacation responder, signature and the Sieve rules built in the UI are stored, but nothing consumes them yet — enabling a vacation reply does not send one.
  • Read-only console panels. The guided domain onboarding checklist, the DNS desired-vs-actual diff and the CSV import report on state rather than driving it.
  • Not implemented. JMAP, BIMI, CalDAV/CardDAV, multi-node. Backups are documented but not automated.
  • DANE is off unless TLS_MODE=acme, and deliberately so: under a Traefik-managed certificate the key changes at every renewal and the published TLSA record stops matching, which permanently rejects mail at every validating MTA.

Contributing

  • All code, comments and identifiers are in English. make lint enforces it.
  • Tests come with the change that needs them; the suites above must stay green.
  • Commits reference their issue: #N: what changed and why.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

S
Description
Your own mail server, with a webmail that is a pleasure to use.
Readme MIT
3.5 MiB
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2026-10-30 15:26:52 +00:00
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