has_attachments so era definido para mensagens multipart. Um relatorio agregado DMARC do Google e de parte unica: o corpo E o anexo, um application/zip sem qualquer parte de texto. Ficava guardado como nao tendo anexos, ao lado dos relatorios TLS-RPT do mesmo remetente e na mesma pasta, que trazem uma linha de texto e por isso sao multipart/mixed e apareciam marcados. A regra passa a olhar tambem para a parte de topo: uma disposicao explicita decide (um .txt enviado como a mensagem inteira e anexo, uma parte inline nao e), e sem ela conta como anexo tudo o que nao seja texto nem multipart -- um zip, um PDF, uma mensagem reencaminhada. As mensagens ja guardadas mantinham a marca antiga, e sao justamente aquelas que o utilizador esta a olhar. Ha um backfill que as re-le uma vez, em segundo plano, sem atrasar o arranque. So examina as que estao marcadas como sem anexos: a regra antiga nunca inventou um anexo que nao existisse, portanto uma marca verdadeira nao precisa de segunda opiniao e a varredura fica do tamanho do defeito. A tabela backfills guarda o marcador para nao repetir a cada arranque. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
LambdaMail
A self-hosted mail server with an integrated webmail and admin console, built to
run on Coolify from a single docker-compose.yaml.
SMTP, IMAP, POP3 and ManageSieve, with SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ARC, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT, DNS automation through Cloudflare, and spam and virus filtering. No paid tiers and no artificial limits on domains or mailboxes.
Status: pre-release. The mail path, the security posture and the web interfaces work end to end, and there is an automated test suite behind them. See What is not finished before putting real mail through it.
What it does
| Area | |
|---|---|
| Protocols | SMTP MX (25), Submission (587 STARTTLS, 465 implicit TLS), IMAP (143/993) with UID, flags, IDLE and CONDSTORE, POP3 (110/995), ManageSieve (4190) |
| Authentication | SPF, DKIM (Ed25519 + RSA dual signature), DMARC, ARC sealing, DANE/TLSA and MTA-STS on delivery, TLS-RPT ingestion |
| Filtering | Rspamd scoring with greylisting, RBLs and rate limiting; ClamAV; Sieve |
| Delivery | Durable outbound queue in Postgres with the retry ladder and RFC 3464 bounces; smarthost fallback for hosts with port 25 blocked |
| DNS | Cloudflare reconciliation of the expected records for every active domain, idempotent, with per-record verification against public resolvers |
| Filing | Sieve rules built in the UI, custom folders, and an RFC 5230 vacation responder that replies in thread and once per sender per week |
| Web | Webmail at /user/* and an admin console at /admin/*, isolated by session audience, with TOTP two-factor, recovery codes, app passwords, and English, Portuguese and Spanish |
| Console | Server-side paging and filtering, user editing (role, quota, language, password, second factor), per-user aliases, and a diagnostics page at /admin/tests |
Architecture
Two runtimes, split by what each is good at:
protocols(Go) — every protocol listener, the delivery worker, TLS certificate handling, DNS reconciliation, and the webmail's mail API. It owns folder, UID, flag and blob semantics.auth(TypeScript) — logins, sessions, two-factor, account management and the admin console API.web(Next.js) — both web surfaces, and the proxy that gives the browser a single origin.storage(TypeScript) — health only today.
Postgres is the source of truth for everything, including the outbound queue. Redis is a cache and dispatch index; losing it loses no mail.
┌──────────┐
browser ─────────▶│ web │──┬─▶ auth (sessions, accounts, admin)
└──────────┘ └─▶ protocols (mail read/send, DKIM, TLS)
│
internet ──25/587/465/143/993──────────┘
│
Postgres ─┴─ Redis ─ Rspamd ─ ClamAV
Deploying
For a real VPS, follow docs/DEPLOYMENT.md. It covers the three things no code can do for you — reverse DNS, the DNSSEC delegation and getting port 25 unblocked — and the order the rest has to happen in.
The short version:
cp .env.production.example .env # then replace every CHANGE
make preflight # checks port 25, PTR, RBLs, token scope
docker compose up -d
make create-admin EMAIL=you@example.com PASSWORD='...'
make create-admin is not optional: a fresh install has no mailbox, and every
route into the console needs one.
Ports
Everything below is TCP. "Inbound" is what the host's firewall and the provider's security group must allow; "outbound" is what the host must be able to reach.
| Port | Direction | Who connects | Required? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | in | Any sending MTA | Yes to receive mail | Must be open to the world. Rate-limited, not authenticated — that is how SMTP works. |
| 25 | out | This host → remote MTAs | Yes to send mail | The one most providers block. Without it, set a relay (RELAY_HOST); see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md. |
| 80 | in | Let's Encrypt, browsers | Yes | ACME HTTP-01 challenge, and the redirect to HTTPS. Closing it means no certificate. |
| 443 | in | Browsers | Yes | Webmail, admin console, MTA-STS policy, autodiscover. |
| 587 | in | Mail clients | Recommended | Submission with STARTTLS. The port clients should use. |
| 465 | in | Mail clients | Optional | Submission with implicit TLS, for clients that insist. |
| 143 | in | Mail clients | Optional | IMAP with STARTTLS. Prefer 993. |
| 993 | in | Mail clients | Recommended | IMAPS. |
| 110 / 995 | in | Mail clients | Optional | POP3 / POP3S. Leave closed unless something needs POP3. |
| 4190 | in | Mail clients | Optional | ManageSieve, for editing filters from a desktop client. |
| 53 | out | This host → resolver | Yes | MX, SPF, DKIM, DANE and MTA-STS lookups. UDP and TCP — DNSSEC answers overflow UDP. |
| 443 | out | This host → APIs | If used | Cloudflare DNS automation, MTA-STS policy fetch, ClamAV signature updates. |
Ports 110, 995 and 4190 are published by the compose file but are worth closing at the firewall unless a client actually needs them — every open port is one more thing to keep patched.
What the host has to allow
- Reverse DNS (PTR) for the public IPv4 must resolve to
PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST, and that name must resolve back to the same address. Set by whoever owns the IP block — your provider's panel, never Cloudflare. Gmail and Outlook spam-folder or refuse mail without it. If the host has a public IPv6 and publishes an AAAA record, it needs a PTR too: senders that connect over IPv6 are judged on the IPv6 reverse. - Outbound port 25 unblocked. Ask the provider; a timeout rather than a refusal when connecting to a remote MX is the signature of a block.
- Docker with the compose plugin, and a user in the
dockergroup or root. - Ports below 1024 are bound by Docker's proxy on the host, so the daemon needs the privilege — the default on a normal install. The containers themselves run unprivileged.
- The proxy's certificate directory, under
TLS_MODE=traefikonly — see Certificates below, and preferTLS_MODE=acmeif you can. - Disk for the mail spool (
protocols_spool) and Postgres. Mail is stored once and reference-counted, but plan for growth. - A firewall that does not rate-limit port 25 into uselessness. Some providers apply aggressive SYN limits that look like intermittent delivery failures.
Running locally
cp .env.example .env
make gen-dev-cert # self-signed certificate for the listeners
make up # builds from source via the build overlay
make seed # a postmaster@example.test fixture
The webmail is on http://localhost:3000. The seeded password is
dev-password-only — it is a fixture, not a credential.
Testing
make test # Go suite, auth and webmail
make lint # go vet, tsc, and the language lint
The Go and auth suites include integration tests that need Postgres. They skip
without TEST_DATABASE_URL and run against a real database in CI, which is
where the security regressions are enforced — wrong password, wrong TOTP code,
session revocation, surface isolation, cross-mailbox reads.
Configuration
Every variable is documented inline in
.env.production.example. The ones without a safe
default:
| Variable | |
|---|---|
JWT_SECRET |
Signs sessions. At least 32 characters; the service refuses to start below that rather than fall back to a constant. |
LAMBDAMAIL_MASTER_KEY |
Encrypts DKIM keys, TOTP secrets and provider tokens. Back it up separately from the database — losing it makes every stored secret unrecoverable. |
POSTGRES_PASSWORD, REDIS_PASSWORD |
No defaults; compose fails without them. |
MAIL_DOMAIN, PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST, PUBLIC_IPV4 |
Identity. PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST must match the PTR of PUBLIC_IPV4. |
Certificates
Two modes, and the choice matters more than it looks.
TLS_MODE=acme (recommended). LambdaMail obtains its own certificate for
PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST, mta-sts.<domain> and autoconfig.<domain> over DNS-01,
using the Cloudflare token already configured for DNS. It needs
LAMBDAMAIL_MASTER_KEY to seal the account and certificate keys, and
ACME_EMAIL. It is the only mode DANE can run in, because it is the only one
where the key for the next certificate exists before that certificate does.
TLS_MODE=traefik. The mail listeners read the certificate the reverse
proxy already obtained, from COOLIFY_PROXY_DIR, mounted read-only. Two things
have to be true, and neither is obvious when they are not:
- the proxy must have a router for
PRIMARY_MAIL_HOST, or that name never appears inacme.jsonand no certificate exists to read; acme.jsonmust be readable by the container's non-root user. Left at mode600owned by root — which is how the proxy writes it — it cannot be.
Either failure is silent in the same way: HTTPS keeps working, because the proxy is serving it, while the mail listeners fall back to a self-signed certificate and every client that verifies refuses SMTP, IMAP and POP3. It reads as a certificate problem and is usually a permissions problem.
/admin/security names the issuer and says outright when the certificate is
self-signed, which is the fastest way to tell the two apart.
Operating
make preflight |
Port 25 egress, PTR and FCrDNS, RBL listings, Cloudflare token scope, certificate presence |
make create-admin EMAIL=… PASSWORD='…' |
First administrator on a fresh install |
make reset-password EMAIL=… PASSWORD='…' |
Recovers a locked-out account and signs out its sessions |
docker compose logs -f protocols |
Delivery, TLS and DNS reconciliation |
GET /health on protocols |
200 healthy, 200 with X-LambdaMail-Health: degraded when a certificate needs attention, 503 when a dependency is down |
docs/OPERATIONS.md covers backups, certificate rotation, what the alerts mean and how to read a delivery failure.
What is not finished
Stated plainly, because a mail server that half works loses mail:
- Read-only console panels. The guided domain onboarding checklist reports on state rather than driving it.
- Not implemented. JMAP, BIMI, CalDAV/CardDAV, multi-node. Backups are documented but not automated.
- DANE is off unless
TLS_MODE=acme, and deliberately so: under a Traefik-managed certificate the key changes at every renewal and the published TLSA record stops matching, which permanently rejects mail at every validating MTA.
Contributing
- All code, comments and identifiers are in English.
make lintenforces it. - Tests come with the change that needs them; the suites above must stay green.
- Commits reference their issue:
#N: what changed and why.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.