A Verified Mark Certificate cannot be made here: an authority issues it after
checking the organisation. What the service can do is hold the file the
authority returns, serve it where the DNS record points, and refuse one that
would make receivers ignore BIMI without a word.
- migration 0015: domain_bimi keeps the PEM chain next to the logo
- bimi.InspectCertificate reads a chain and reports every reason it would not
work: private key blocks refused outright, the brand-indicator usage, the
validity period, the domain (exact, wildcard or organisational), and that
the logo embedded in the certificate (gzipped data URI in the logotype
extension) is byte for byte the logo being published. Tested against two
real public VMCs (eBay via DigiCert, CNN via Valimail) plus mutations
- GET /.well-known/bimi/vmc.pem (public, conditional, cacheable for an hour),
and PUT/DELETE /api/v1/admin/bimi/certificate; the GET of the logo now
reports the certificate as it stands against the logo being served, and
replacing a logo under a held certificate says it no longer matches
- GET /api/v1/admin/bimi/check looks at what a receiver would: the logo, DMARC
enforcement, the BIMI record, the public logo URL, the certificate and its
public URL. Its HTTP client is HTTPS only and refuses non-public addresses
after DNS, since the URLs come from DNS and an operator field
- the DNS record points a= at the held certificate when there is one
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
