Release / Plano (reaproveitar a imagem?) (push) Successful in 8s
CI / Trivy (dependências, segredos e configuração) (push) Failing after 8s
Release / ci (push) Failing after 9s
CI / Testes e imagem Docker (linux/arm64) (push) Skipped
Release / Publica a imagem (linux/arm64) (push) Skipped
Release / Cria a release no Gitea (push) Skipped
The GitHub account was suspended and the repository had no backup. The deployed code (src/, public/, index.html, main.py, requirements.txt) was extracted from the production image 1.3.1. The tests, Dockerfile, compose files, SECURITY.md, CHANGELOG.md and README were rebuilt from the records of the work sessions that created them; LICENSE, .gitignore, robots.txt and sitemap.xml were recreated. CI now runs on Gitea Actions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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958 B
Markdown
17 lines
958 B
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Please report vulnerabilities privately by e-mail to
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[contato@lucasrguerra.dev.br](mailto:contato@lucasrguerra.dev.br)
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instead of opening a public issue. You can expect an answer within a few days.
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## Hardening in place
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- Strict input validation: size, line count, alphabet, Braille-only characters for STL generation.
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- Cost budget for STL generation (filled cells × resolution), per-client rate limits and a bounded FIFO queue (2 running, up to 20 waiting, 3 per client, 60 s max wait; otherwise `503` with `Retry-After`).
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- Request body cap, no interactive API docs, generic error messages (details only in server logs).
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- Security headers (CSP, `nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options`, ...) and path-confined static file serving.
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- Container runs as a non-root user with a read-only filesystem and no capabilities.
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- Dependencies pinned, scanned with Trivy on every push and before every release (Gitea Actions).
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